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1. Introduction 
 
The topic of national borders have received a great deal of attention in the recent 
decades. Generally, borders are thereby understood as divisions between political, 
economic, cultural and community systems which coincide with the borders between 
states (cf. Van Houtum 1993). Together with the issue of borders, border regions and 
border areas have also received a great deal of attention. However, it was and still is 
difficult to define border regions and border areas.1 Very generally, border regions are 
areas which straddle national borders. However, “the landscape of the border zone – its 
morphology and potentials – has […] so far received little or no attention in European 
policy documents and empirical analyses” (Van Houtum, Van der Bruggen et. al 2013: 
139). Some border scholars talk of cross-border regions in which the borderlands of the 
EU have been transformed over time, mainly due the influence of European funding. 
They define cross-border regions as highly structured political projects and 
institutionalized regions, the main goal of which can be summed up, rather provocatively, 
as a way to acquire European funding (cf. Scott 2000 and Van der Velde 2000 in Strüver 
2004: 20, 74, 95). In the early stage of European funding for cross-border cooperation in 
the early 1990s, the European ideal was clearly discernible in the arguments of the 
European Commission that border regions should associate with each other simply 
because they share the same types of problems and because working across borders 
can benefit the regional economy on both sides of the border (Van Houtum and Ernste 
2001: 103). One of the most influential European programs to work across borders is the 
current European Territorial Cooperation, formerly known and unofficially still called 
INTERREG.  
 
                                                 
1
 Actually, defining ‘regions’ more generally has been the subject of some discussions among 
geographers since the early 1980s, including reflections on the meaning of regions in social, 
cultural and economic terms. Paasi (2001) states that in the discussion on regions, too little 
attention has been paid to the questions of what regions are and how they operate. He states that 
“[i]t seems to be common to take the idea of the region for granted [...][...]” and that a basis for 
comparing regions “by developing abstractions that could make visible the common elements of 
regions” should be found. He makes an analytical distinction between four simultaneous aspects, 
which are the formation of territorial, symbolic and institutional shapes of a region alongside “its 
establishment as an entity in the regional system and social consciousness of the society 
concerned” (Paasi 2001: 16). 
2  
This dissertation looks back on the cross-border cooperation programs that have been 
developed in the EU starting in 1989/1990. The long way to establish such programs for 
cross-border cooperation and in a broader sense to establish a European wide regional 
policy wherein cross-border cooperation is embedded will also be in the focus of 
attention of this dissertation. 
The aim of this dissertation is to explain how the administrative complexity in European 
funded cross-border cooperation has developed over time.2  
 
It is clear that in the EU cross-border cooperation increasingly has become an 
interesting and relevant issue. For one, around 37.5% of Europe’s population lives in 
border areas and border regions cover almost 40% of the EU’s land area (CEC 2001 (a): 
34; European People’s Party 2011 webpage access 09.05.2011; interview 29 2012). 
These statistics mean that the current discussions and negotiations concerning the 
European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) are affecting at least one third of Europe’s 
population. With a budget of €8.7 billion for the program period of 2007-2013 – and the 
strand of cross-border cooperation accounting for €5.6 billion – European Territorial 
Cooperation represents a small but important 2.5% of the overall budget of regional 
policy (European Commission DG Regional Policy 2012 (a) presentation; European 
Commission DG Regional Policy 2012 (b) presentation). The INTERREG program, 
though it is now officially called European Territorial Cooperation (ETC), derives its 
name from Interregional Cooperation or International Regions and is a financial 
Instrument of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) (cf. JTIS 2009). 
INTERREG is made up of three strands until 2006: Strand A: cross-border cooperation; 
Strand B: transnational cooperation; and Strand C: interregional cooperation (cf. CEC 
2008). INTERREG Strand A has never sought to ‘abolish’ borders, but as expressed by 
one of the interviewees for this research: “INTERREG is a tool to ensure that 
constitutional borders are not economic borders. The idea is to abolish economic 
borders, while the constitutional borders remain as they are” (interview 34 2009).3 
                                                 
2
 The administrative complexity, is sometimes also called ‘administrative burden’ (Dutch: 
administratieve lasten; German: administrative Belastungen) and was proved specifically in the 
‘on-going evaluation’ conducted by the Joint Technical INTERREG-Secretariat (JITS) of the 
Dutch-German Euregions in 2011. Within this questionnaire towards project participants and 
project partners of the Dutch-German cross-border program, 100 of 140 respondents answered 
with ‘yes’ towards the question if the INTERREG-program would lead to a disproportionate 
administrative burden (JITS 2011 (b): 1; 4; see also section 6.5.2). 
3
 Original quotation: “INTERREG is ervoor dat grondwettelijke grenzen geen economische 
  
3 
Another interviewee described it in this way: “INTERREG was introduced to accompany 
the internal market. INTERREG itself is not a useful tool for changing the differences 
between legal systems” (interview 8 2009).4 Generally, INTERREG/ETC is regarded as 
a program that seeks to foster cross-border economic cooperation in a broader sense 
and not as a means of rendering national borders obsolete.  
 
 
Another reason why the issue of cross-border cooperation has become topical is that 
there is growing concern about the way cross-border cooperation funded by the 
European Union (EU) has developed over the years. In the Dutch-German border 
region, those directly involved in specific projects complain that both the application 
process for European funding as well as the implementation of funded projects have 
become increasingly difficult, hampered by ever more administrative requirements and 
procedures. Approval for INTERREG cross-border projects takes a great deal of time, as 
does administering projects (interviews 13, 14 and 15 2009; interview 33 2011; 
interviews 16 and 29 2012). 
 
The greater the necessary investment in terms of time and expertise, the more likely it 
becomes that the same organizations will be able to apply for INTERREG funding 
successfully again, since they are already familiar with the complex rules (cf. JITS 
(2012) webpage, access 13.01.2013; cf. interview 34 2009). An indication of the 
increased difficulty in applying for projects and managing them is the fact that 
professional agencies are becoming involved more often. This may not be a new 
phenomenon in everyday EU policy making and administration but this is a major 
difference from the time when, without EU funding, cross-border cooperation in Dutch-
German border regions was a matter of locally supported initiatives and a bottom-up 
process that aimed to solve practical problems and improve everyday live for people 
living on both sides of the border. According to Garrelt Duin, the current minister for 
economic affairs of North Rhine-Westphalia, the simplification of European subsidies is 
long overdue. He has made clear his wish to see less control and more relevant expert 
                                                                                                                                                 
grenzen zijn. Het idee is dat de economische grenzen verdwijnen, terwijl de grondwettelijke 
grenzen gewoon blijven zoals ze zijn” (interview 34 2009). 
4
 Original quotation: “Man hat INTERREG erfunden, um den Binnenmarkt zu begleiten. 
INTERREG selbst kann nicht die Unterschiede, die es im Rechtssystem gibt ändern“ (interview 8 
2009). 
4  
assistance to improve the effectiveness and professionalism of cross-border projects in 
future programs (JITS 2013: 1).5 
 
The concerns mentioned here do not apply only to the Dutch-German border region but 
to other regions as well, and they have reached the ears of policy makers and politicians 
in Brussels. Here, discussions about the implementation of the ETC are traditionally 
based on the question of to what extent either the European Union or the member states 
themselves are responsible. For example, Markus Pieper, a German MEP, states that 
funding for cross-border projects has not been spent in the right way in Italy, Greece and 
Germany.6 He questions whether or not there is any real need for financial aid from the 
European Union, especially when projects could also be financed nationally. His main 
criticism, however, concerns the lack of oversight on European projects and he talks 
explicitly of the failure of European checks and controls.7 In his opinion, the member 
states have often had too much leeway when it comes to implementing the programs (cf. 
Euractiv, web page 2011, access 05.07.2011; cf. interview 17 2012). For him, for the 
next program period, starting in 2014, simplifying the programs and maximizing 
efficiency and effectiveness of the funds ought to become central priorities.  
 
Significantly, the European Commission, which is ultimately responsible for the work of 
EU funds, is also contributing to the discussion. The European Commission’s DG 
Regional Policy, which is responsible for programs relating to cross-border cooperation, 
has long been searching for effective control mechanisms and quantifiable indicators 
and targets that can be applied to all European cross-border programs (cf. interview 10 
(2012). A special publication called “Simplifying Cohesion Policy for 2014-2020” starts 
with the straightforward comment that “Simplification has been one of the most popular 
demands for the new cohesion policy” (CEC 2012 (b): 3).8 Apparently, the concerns 
                                                 
5
 Garrelt Duin said this within a meeting for members and project(lead)partners in the Euregion 
Rhine-Waal in Kleve at the end of 2012 (JITS 2013: 1). 
6
 Markus Pieper is a German MEP (European People’s Party), vice-chair of the European 
Parliament’s Regional Policy Committee and in charge of drafting the Parliament’s opinion on the 
future of EU cohesion policy (2014-2020) (Euractiv 2011, web page, access 05.07.2011). 
7
 Original quote: ”Meiner Meinung nach hat die europäische Kontrolle ein Stück weit versagt” 
(Euractiv 2011, web page, access 05.07.2011). 
8
 Cohesion Policy has the aim to strengthen the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the 
Union (see also sections 5.4 and 5.4.1) (cf. European Commission 2011, web page, access 
10.08.2011). 
  
5 
expressed by the border regions (as well as other European subsidy programs) have 
found a listening ear at the Commission and are being taken seriously.  
 
This research project aims to look at the origins of the problems outlined above, which 
are resulting in an increased administrative burden on cross-border projects and 
increasing the need for better and more efficient control mechanisms on how European 
subsidies are spent. This will be done using the Dutch-German INTERREG program as 
a case study. This is one of the longest standing cross-border partnerships in Europe 
and is often seen as a role model. It provides an excellent research subject through 
which to analyze and explore in greater detail the complex and multi-layered process of 
current European cross-border governance and the increasing sense that a 
simplification of its structures is necessary. 
 
 
1.1 Research question 
 
This dissertation will analyze the increasing administrative burden and complexity 
associated with this program for cross-border cooperation and, as will be explained in 
greater detail later when; by focussing on the shifts in decision-making authority over 
time from the border regions to Brussels and to other levels of governance, the related 
issue of oversight. It will focus specifically on the former INTERREG I until IIIA programs 
(1989/90-2006) and the current European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) for stimulating 
cross-border cooperation (2007-2013) across the Dutch-German border.9 
 
The case study will be guided by an analytical framework which is based on two 
important approaches in the current theoretical debates on the interdisciplinary research 
field of European Studies, when it comes to EU policy-making. The first dominant 
theoretical perspective is the Multi-Level Governance model (MLG). The term MLG has 
become commonplace in EU studies in recent years and is based on the idea that 
European cooperation has become increasingly dispersed and describes the 
development of authoritative decision-making across multiple territorial levels and the 
                                                 
9
 The European Territorial Cooperation-program (ETC) of the funding period 2007-2013 is 
unofficially called INTERREG IVA, and in this dissertation will refer to INTERREG IVA as well as 
to ETC with similar meaning. 
6  
political action that occurs at and between various levels of governance. The subject of 
multi-layered working in European Structural Funds or cross-border cooperation is not 
entirely new (e.g. cf. Hooghe and Marks 2001; Hooghe 1996; Marks 1992, 1993; Marks 
et al. 1996: 386f.; Bache 2008 (a); 2008 (b) among others). Even the combination of 
MLG with cross-border regions is not totally new since Blatter (2001) compared the 
multi-level systems of several border regions in America as well as in Europe and since 
Marks and Hooghe (2004) noticed the multi-layered governmental structure and actors 
at several levels working together or acting in cross-border regions (cf. Blatter 2001; 
Marks and Hooghe 2004: 25). In the words of Marks and Hooghe: 
 
“Governance arrangements that straddle national borders are usually functionally 
specific, and overlap with existing jurisdictions in order to solve particular 
collective action problems” (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 25). 
 
What the MLG approach lacks, however, is a clear understanding of how the interaction 
between actors on different levels takes place; here there is only a very general mention 
of “a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial 
tiers – supranational, national, regional and local” (cf. Marks 1993: 392).  
 
In the analytical framework that will be developed for the purpose of this case study, 
therefore, elements of a second approach are included; the Principal-Agent approach 
(PA). This approach generally sees the relationship between member states and 
international organizations in terms of a Principal-Agent relationship. Here, the most 
important factor is the extent to which an Agent, acting on the wish of the principal, is 
able to gain more relevant information and expertise and may thus become more 
independent from the principal and as such become more influential in the policy-making 
process. Compared to the MLG model, the Principal-Agent approach (PA) does a better 
job of clarifying the dynamics of the relationship between actors, mainly by focusing on 
the oversight and control mechanisms that result from a ‘shift of authority’ from the 
Principal to the Agent.  
 
What both the MLG and PA approaches share is the basic assumption that international 
organizations have a more or less independent role vis-à-vis the member states (cf. 
Hooghe and Marks 2001: 76). As a result of this basic assumption, it is possible to 
  
7 
combine the MLG and PA approaches and make use of their complementary qualities. 
The fact that combining the two approaches could be very useful is illustrated by this 
case study of European cross-border cooperation. It would have been something of a 
puzzle for each of these approaches individually, but can be successfully analyzed if we 
combine them. In European cross-border cooperation as well as in European Structural 
Funds in general, there has been a ‘shift of authority’ from national governments to the 
European Commission and then from the Commission back to national (the 
Netherlands) and regional (Germany) tiers of government, as well as to subregional 
authorities and the Euregions, with the development of the EU cross-border INTERREG 
program.10  
 
In using key insights from the MLG and the PA frameworks, this research aims to 
explain the process of the increasing delegation of authority in respect to cross-border 
policies from the supranational EU level by the European Commission back to the 
subnational border regions that had initially taken the initiative in setting up cross-border 
projects. In fact, the Euregions on the Dutch-German border have evolved into 
intermediaries that initiate and support projects financed by the European Union.11 They 
were established through a ‘bottom-up’ process. Over time, the role of the Euregions has 
shifted from being initiators that stimulate cross-border cooperation (during what is 
known as the ‘pre-INTERREG era’) to being full partners of the European Commission. 
The inflow of European money, directives and regulations came from ‘Brussels’ and has 
increased over time. This research aims to investigate the effects of this historical 
development. Furthermore, I will analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the 
structure that has developed, and ask whether improvements could be made in future.  
 
The research-question of this dissertation is formulated as the following: 
  
To what extent can the growing complexity and administration within the Dutch-
German INTERREG program be explained by a combined MLG-Principal-Agent 
model?  
                                                 
10
 The separate levels of governance that will be used in this research will be defined in chapter 
3. 
11
 This dissertation uses the term ‘Euregion’. Scott and Collins (1997) in Scott (2000: 105) 
explain, the term ‘Euregion’ as similar labels such as ‘Euregios’ or ‘Euroregions’. The term 
‘Euregion’ will be used within this dissertation to refer to the institution itself rather than the 
border-area which is covered by a particular Euregion. 
8  
 
To answer this central question, it will be necessary to examine the following sub-
questions concerning Dutch-German cross-border cooperation: 
 
- How is authority for conducting and implementing of the programs split between 
the subregional, regional, national and supranational levels when it comes to 
cross-border cooperation and regional policy and how has it developed from the 
first post-war cross-border initiatives to discussions about the next program 
period in 2014?  
 
- To what extent have shifts in authority and the location of expertise led to 
changing oversight mechanisms relating to decision-making procedures? 
 
- What has been the influence of these developments on the day-to-day practice of 
the cross-border cooperation within the Dutch-German INTERREG system? 
 
Fundamental to this research are the ‘shifts of authority’ from the member states towards 
‘Brussels’ (especially towards the European Commission) within the overall development 
of European integration, but also from ‘Brussels’ back to the border regions – as a 
development of an increasingly detailed system of Structural Funds and finally within the 
development of programs for the financial stimulation of cross-border cooperation. It is 
these ‘shifts of authority’ that bring in an area of the academic debate that has not so far 
been the subject of much attention, even though it is potentially important in theoretical 
terms and could add significantly to the further improvement of analytical models that 
may help us to understand European and cross-border governance.  
 
The conclusions of this research project could yield useful insights into the opportunities 
for the practical improvement of cross-border cooperation. It also aims to gain better 
insight into and understanding of the interests, positions and regulations of each 
governance-level involved in INTERREG for cross-border cooperation. 
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1.2 Existing research and terminology 
 
In research fields such as Human Geography, Spatial Planning, Political Science, 
Economics, a great deal of research has been conducted on internal European borders, 
cross-border cooperation, and the set-up, responsibilities, and activities of the 
organizations that coordinate cross-border cooperation – the Euregions. When it comes 
to the Euregions, much research has focused on the functioning, constitution, history, 
tasks and cooperation of these institutions or organizations, on borders in general and 
also on the European financial instrument of INTERREG in the field on border studies 
(cf. Ernste 2010; Ernste, Van Houtum and Zommers 2009; Van Houtum and Gielis 2006; 
Van Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer 2005; Williams and Van der Velde 2005; Van 
Houtum and Van der Velde 2004; Danielzyk, Ernste and Jung 2004; Van Houtum and 
Van Naerssen 2002; Kramsch and Hooper 2004; Van der Velde and Van Houtum 2003; 
Van Houtum and Van der Velde 2000; Scott 2000). Some border study researchers 
have also explored in detail the Dutch-German Euregions and cross-border cooperation 
work and how INTERREG is being put into practice at the Dutch-German border (cf. 
Scott 2000 in Van der Velde and Van Houtum 2000; cf. Perkmann 1999; 2003; 2005; 
2007; cf. Miosga 1999; Raich 1995).  
 
Different authors have taken different approaches towards cross-border cooperation. In 
the literature on (Dutch-German) cross-border cooperation that has taken place through 
the Dutch-German Euregions, those border-areas are often considered to be test cases 
(‘proeftuinen’) for European integration (cf. Schuurman 2002: 103). Because of its long 
tradition of working across the border, the Dutch-German cross-border region in 
particular is often seen as a kind of pilot scheme for European borderland integration 
(Strüver 2004: 117) (see also chapter 6). Van der Velde and Van Houtum (2003) 
summed up the “governance of regions along and across the borders” by saying that:  
 
“Building a cross-border cooperation structure within the framework of the EU is 
based both on subregional initiatives as well as supporting measures from 
national and EU institutions, which results in a complex multi-level and multi-
thematic framework of formal and informal institutions” (Van der Velde and Van 
Houtum 2003: 5-6). 
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Map 1: The Dutch-German border region 
 
 
(Source: JITS 2012) 
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Legend: the yellow areas are subsidie-areas that can be funded directly, the light yellow areas 
are so called ‘neighouring areas’. In those areas European funding is possible under particular 
circumstances with a maximum of 20% of the total amount of the budget of one operational 
program (cf. Council 2006 No 1080/2006 Art. 21).  
 
In a similar vein, Scott (2000: 104) states that “[…] Euroregions, local associations of 
interstate cooperation, have been systematically established within and without the 
European Union as formal instruments aimed at promoting continuity and a sense of 
strategic direction in cooperation.” In the case of the Dutch-German border, the 
Euregions were not established systematically and neither were they part of a 
systematic plan by the European institutions. They were grass-roots initiatives that 
sprang up in the border region itself. However, Scott may be right for many of the 
institutions created later for cross-border cooperation along other European borders. 
Those were established when European funding was set aside specifically to stimulate 
cross-border cooperation from 1989-1990 onwards. As a consequence, cross-border 
institutions were founded throughout Europe in the 1990s with the task of implementing 
European-funded projects and later programs. During the 2007-2013 funding period, 
European cross-border regions were funded as shown on map 2. 
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Map 2: EU-funded cross-border regions (2007-2013) 
 
 
 
(Source: European Commission 2013, web page, accessed 27.06.2013) 
 
Legend: The single program-areas all have a different colour, same colours throughout the map 
do not mean that there is any connection between those same coloured areas. The areas where 
two colours are mixed means that more than one programs are implemented at that particular 
areas. 
The term ‘cross-border cooperation’ can be considered as a kind of umbrella concept 
that includes ‘trans-frontier’ as well as ‘territorial cooperation’ between sub-national 
authorities in the various countries involved (Palermo 2011).12 The Council of Europe 
(CoE) uses the term ‘trans-frontier cooperation’ and this term includes cooperation 
between neighboring territories or transnational cooperation among national, regional, 
subregional authorities from different countries. ‘Trans-frontier’ cooperation includes also 
inter-regional (or inter-territorial) cooperation, which is cooperation between authorities 
that do not share a common border. The term currently used across the European Union 
is ‘territorial cooperation’, which exists all over Europe and which includes all inter-
                                                 
12
 See section 3.1. for an explanations on levels of governance of this case study. 
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territorial, trans-frontier, trans-European and trans-national cooperation (Palermo 2011). 
The term ‘trans-European cooperation’ is also used and within this there are umbrella 
terms such as ‘cross-border cooperation’, ‘inter-territorial cooperation’ and ‘trans-national 
cooperation’ which find a common denominator (Lambertz 2010: 7f). 
The term ‘cross-border cooperation’ includes all activities by political and administrative 
actors and societal groups that undertake activities to promote cross-border contacts, 
cooperation and development in European border regions (Thormälen 2004: 121). The 
AEBR describes the goal of cross-border cooperation as “overcoming border barriers 
and differences in systems, the development of cross-border regions for commerce and 
services, the reduction of the national border to the function of an administrative border 
and, in the long term, the transition of the current peripheral national location of 
individual border regions into a Europe-internal location” (AEBR 1997: 5).13 The AEBR 
also makes clear that cross-border cooperation incorporates all areas of life (as work, 
leisure time, culture, transport etc.). 
 
The AEBR defined cross-border cooperation very specifically by saying that cross-
border cooperation can be bi-, tri- or multi-lateral cooperation between neighboring 
subregional and regional administrative authorities (also involving other semi-public or 
private actors), which are located in geographically adjoining areas along a common 
internal EU-border (internal cooperation), a common external EU-border (external 
cooperation) or a common border between third countries and working together in all 
aspects of daily life (AEBR 2001: 10, 29). Cross-border cooperation can take place in 
different forms through governmental or spatial planning commissions and cross-border 
Euregions and they can therefore be implemented on the basis of treaties or without 
them (AEBR 1997: 5). 
This dissertation uses the AEBR’s description of cross-border cooperation as well as the 
following brief definition for cross-border cooperation by Engl (2009: 5): “The term cross-
border cooperation describes the collaboration between two or more adjacent 
subregional and regional entities in different neighboring states. As such it can adopt 
short-term structures (like single projects for a specific purpose) or permanent long-term 
structures covering various thematic issues.” The AEBR also distinguishes between 
                                                 
13
 The Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) and its role will be explained more in 
detail in chapter 6. 
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project-based cooperation and strategic cross-border cooperation. Project-based 
cooperation takes place in practice and is based on European or national law or involves 
practical solutions based on ad-hoc agreements (AEBR 2001: 10, 26 and 29). 
 
1.3 Dissertation structure 
 
The general outline of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter 2 will address the research 
methods that were used and provide an overview of the research activities that were 
undertaken which include archive research, literature studies and desk studies, as well 
as in-depth interviews. In order to explore multi-level governance relationships, a large 
number interviews with key people from the participating levels of governance involved 
have been undertaken. In this chapter it will explained how and why these interview 
partners have been seclected and how the interviews have been done. Chapter 3 then 
looks at which theoretical models can be used as tools to answer the principal research 
question: To what extent are these models suitable for analyzing the growing 
administrative burden associated with Dutch-German cross-border cooperation funded 
with European money. Two theoretical models will be addressed: the Multi-Level 
Governance model and the Principal-Agent approach. Here I will explain why I intend to 
use a combined MLG-PA model to answer the research question and demonstrate that 
in respect to regional policy and particularly the development of (Dutch-German) cross-
border cooperation, two ‘shifts of authority’ took place. These shifts can be explained 
using elements taken from the PA model, while at the same time a multi-level structure 
analysis is relevant because the shifts took place between different levels of 
governance. The ‘first shift of authority’ can be discerned in the development of 
European integration as a single European regional policy was elaborated under which 
member states passed more and more responsibility to European institutions like the 
European Commission, and consented to the development of a single European 
regional policy. The ‘second shift’ was from the European level of governance towards 
the subregional, regional and national levels as European cross-border cooperation 
funded with European money was conducted through a number of program periods. 
Both of these shifts evolved separately and gradually through incremental processes 
rather than any sudden changes.  
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Chapter 4 focuses on the first shift and the emergence of European integration through 
the incremental development of a common regional policy. Some considerable time and 
several treaties and revisions were required to develop a common idea and strategy. As 
such, chapter 4 will begin with the aftermath of the Second World War and move on to 
the Treaties of Rome (1957) and their subsequent revision in the year 1986 when the 
Single European Act was signed (coming into force in 1987). The focus of this chapter 
lies on the discussions and questions that were raised with respect to (European) 
regional policy, of which cross-border EU projects were part. Chapter 5 focuses on the 
development of the European Regional Development Fund, which was introduced in 
1975 and revised on several occasions in subsequent years. The early revisions to this 
instrument, which was designed to stimulate a regionally balanced Europe, show the 
emergence of increasing complexity. Chapter 5 focuses on the development of the ‘first 
shift of authority’ as a consequence of establishing the Single European Act (1986/1987) 
and the subsequent changes in European policy. Chapter 6 will concentrate on this 
‘second shift’ and on the Dutch-German cross-border cooperation in particular. In 
empirical terms, chapter 6 is the most important part of this research and the 
explanations for this ‘second shift’, that evolved incrementally during the 1990s, are 
detailed and the consequences for the levels of governance involved during the 
development of this ‘second shift’ will also be explored. The step-by-step development of 
the ‘second shift’, through which subregional, regional and national levels of governance 
were given increasing responsibility and leeway in pursuing cross-border cooperation, 
can generally be seen as the main reason for increasing complexity and a growing 
administrative burden. Chapter 7 combines the theoretical models described in chapter 3 
and uses this theoretical background to explain the empirical results that came about 
through Dutch-German cross-border cooperation. Chapter 7 will focus on the 
relationships between the levels of governance involved in Dutch-German cross-border 
cooperation and concentrates on monitoring, controlling and the ‘contracts’ made 
between the actors involved. Chapter 8 will summarize and present the conclusions of 
this research.  
 
The time span covered by this research will be from the immediate post-war period until 
the INTERREG IV-ETC program period. However, I will also reflect briefly on the future 
until 2020 (see sections 5.5 and 6.7). This research project will focus solely on the 
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administrative aspects of cross-border cooperation funded by the European Union. As 
far as the theoretical framework is concerned, it leans towards political science, public 
management and European Studies combined with Human Geography. Research 
carried out in the first three fields tends to focus more strongly on specific theoretical 
schools or models such as the MLG or PA models and these will be discussed in more 
detail in the theoretical sections of this dissertation (see chapters 3 and 7). What makes 
this project an important addition to existing studies in the various subfields is its 
combination of analyzing decision-making and administrative processes combined with a 
detailed historical overview of the cross-border cooperation policy in the EU and an in-
depth empirical case study research. 
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2. Methodology and research strategy 
 
By looking at the development of INTERREG (A)/ ETC over time as a case study, this 
research seeks to carry out an in-depth analysis of a complex set of possible factors in 
order to arrive at a better understanding of the relationships between the various levels 
of governance.14 
 
Even though conducting a case study means that the findings are difficult to validate for 
more general conclusions, it suits the objective of this research very well in the sense 
that it enables us to conduct a detailed, temporal analysis that could provide a lead for 
further research in this direction, as well as giving more specific outcomes regarding a 
European border region that may be considered as a best practice in Europe. The 
Dutch-German border region is one of the European border regions where cross-border 
cooperation is at its most advanced and it might be considered as a good example for 
the future for other Euregions. Cross-border cooperation in this area is the longest-
standing in Europe and is often seen as a role model in international debates. It provides 
an excellent research arena within which to analyze and explore in close detail the 
complex and multi-layered process of the current significant shifts in spatial authority that 
are occurring in European cross-border governance. 
 
 
2.1 Methodology 
 
As in any case study, this research investigates a large number of aspects or 
characteristics, which are in turn inter-related. The use of an in-depth case study suits 
                                                 
14
 According to the AEBR (2001: 201) the term Governance “describe[s] […] a process of 
authoritative formulation and implementation of general and compulsory rules, which are normally 
defined and implemented by specifically empowered state institutions and/or other public bodies 
on the ground of distinct resources at their disposal (monopoly of power execution, monopoly of 
taxation, monopoly of legitimate attribution of competencies).” The AEBR adds in its definition 
that “such regulative measures are needed mostly in those areas of society, where a large 
number of uncoordinated and parallel activities are undertaken by a broad variety of social actors” 
(AEBR 2001: 201). When the AEBR refers to “co-operative governance” across national borders, 
it means that this is no longer strictly limited to central government actors, due to the steady 
increase in the amount of cooperation initiated between regional and subregional authorities from 
different countries (AEBR 2001: 16). 
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the nature and complexity of exploring Multi-Level Governance (MLG) relationships, 
which is the case here. By using such a case study, the aim of this research is to show 
the usefulness of a combined approach – a combination of the MLG and Principal-Agent 
models (PA) – and provide new insight into the governance of European cross-border 
cooperation across the Dutch-German border. As will be discuss in greater detail in the 
following chapter, the Multi-Level Governance model is a system through which many 
actors interact in and across different levels of governance that have different 
competencies, decision-making authority and responsibilities in order to achieve one 
goal, which in the case of this research is to stimulate cross-border cooperation funded 
by the European Union.  
 
Research on MLG “starts from the assumption of complexity and requires the careful 
tracing of processes to identify causation” (Bache 2008 (a): 17). In this context, Bache 
(2008 (a)) acknowledged that research on MLG may include analyzing routine and key 
decisions in order to reveal the underlying power relations. The method used to 
investigate multi-level governance structures is interviewing a wide range of network 
participants in order to piece together the historical narrative and identify key decisions, 
the conflicts surrounding them and how and in whose favor these were resolved (Bache 
2008 (a): 17). When using this research method of interviewing actors from the various 
levels of governance who work together in one system, the researcher needs to be 
aware of the fact that the respondents may give misleading accounts of their actions – 
they may, for example, be wrong about the actions they think they take or have taken in 
the past, or about how things have happened in the past (cf. Dowding 2004 in Bache 
2008 (a): 17). There are several possible reasons for giving such ‘false’ information 
during an interview, ranging from a simple lack of knowledge to an actor’s 
overestimation of his or her own personal position. It is therefore necessary to double-
check the information gathered through interviews by questioning the claims of the 
actors involved and by cross-referencing the interview with official government 
documents for example (cf. Bache 2008 (a): 17).  
 
In order to overcome the methodological problems related to interviews, the case study 
research is based on mixed methods (cf. Verschuren en Doorewaard 2007: 184). The 
information obtained from interviews is checked and supplemented with information from 
archival research into relevant policy documents and relevant secondary literature 
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studies. Performing desk research on government documents has two goals: On the one 
hand, this made it possible to reconstruct development towards and later within cross-
border cooperation on national borders within Europe and particularly along the Dutch-
German border. A chronological overview was created, because during the 
subsequently conducted interviews, the exact dates of occasions, events or decisions 
often were blurred. The document-research made it possible to check what happened 
when or the exact moment at which decisions were made. At the same time, the 
information from the interviews was corroborated through those document-research and 
details could be added. 
 
 
2.2 Research strategy and field work 
 
Before starting the research for this case study, a compilation of a comprehensive list of 
the existing literature, internet platforms and databases on cross-border cooperation 
along the Dutch-German border, on the Dutch-German Euregions and its INTERREG 
program(s) and on European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) was made.  
 
The next phase of the desk research consisted of historical research, which included a 
fact-finding analysis and by defining the key personalities and key moments in the history 
of the Dutch-German case study. This was achieved by studying literature, databases, 
internet platforms, Euregional and European documents, and so on. This procedure was 
carried out in order to gain an overview of the historical development of cross-border 
cooperation, the factors that have influenced procedures and decisions, and current and 
past communication and negotiations between the four levels of governance in the past. 
The first stage of the desk research focused primarily on literature of cohesion and 
regional policy as well as on literature relating to European cross-border cooperation. 
The second stage concentrated on policy documents relating to the Dutch-German 
border, European Regional Policy, European cross-border cooperation, the 
implementation of European Structural Funds, the European Union Treaties and 
regulations and it also took in (annual) reports published by the European Commission, 
the European Court of Auditors and the European Parliament. As part of this desk 
research, documents produced by the national and regional authorities of Germany and 
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the Netherlands were also taken into account. The desk research of government 
documents had two goals. On the one hand, this research made it possible to 
reconstruct the development towards and later within cross-border cooperation on inner 
European borders and along the Dutch-German border in particular. A chronogical 
overview was constructed, which was useful because during the interviews conducted 
later (see section 2.2.1). Alongside this literature, potential theoretical frameworks were 
studied and the use of the Multi-Level Governance and Principal-Agent approaches was 
considered in their different contexts and the discussion of these (and other) approaches 
was followed up. 
 
 
2.2.1 Conducting the interviews 
 
The empirical research draws in part on material gathered through qualitative, in-depth 
personal interviews. This research method was chosen in order to obtain more 
information about the (previous) circumstances in which cooperation took place and the 
particular reasons for decisions made in the past, as well as to investigate the 
development of personal communication between actors at the various levels involved, 
which could not be found in official documents or in existing literature. In addition to this, 
questions about the increasing administrative burden and complexity of the program and 
about the role of the particular function of the level of governance involved were 
investigated. Interviews were conducted with actors from all four levels of governance 
who work (or worked in the past) directly or indirectly with the INTERREG program. The 
interviews were held with civil servants from the European Commission (DG Regional 
Policy), MEPs, members of the European Court of Auditors, staff members of the 
German and Dutch ministries and Staatskanzleien, members of the Landtag of North 
Rhine-Westphalia and of the German Bezirksregierungen, members of the Dutch 
Provinces and the Benelux Union, as well as staff members and program and project 
managers from the Euregions.15 The interviewees were not selected as a statistically 
                                                 
15
 The German Staatskanzleien of North Rhine-Westfalia and Lower Saxony are generally 
involved in the Dutch-German relations, but not directly in the daily work of the INTERREG 
program. Staatskanzleien are German Authorities which support the Ministerpräsident/in of the 
particular federal state. The governments of the federal states of Germany, the ‘Landtage’ are not 
involved directly in the Dutch-German cross-border program either, but they do have a political 
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representative sample, but were chosen on the basis of their position and their 
involvement with INTERREG. Within this research there were two main interview phases 
– an initial orientation phase in 2009 and a second phase that involved more detailed 
interviews in 2011 and during a two-month research visit to Brussels in 2012. At the 
beginning of this research in 2009, for example, the Dutch and German pioneers of 
Dutch-German cross-border cooperation were interviewed. These pioneers were the 
individuals who played very active role in introducing the first INTERREG initiative in the 
early 1990s. That generation has now retired, but their names were identified through 
the archival research phase, particularly through the correspondence from the 
Euregional, regional and national levels towards the European level. Other interviewees 
were identified through the Euregions themselves and through the principle of 
‘snowballing’: the question of whom I should speak to was often answered by giving 
names of people at other levels of governance. Interviewees mainly named the 
counterparts with whom they were currently working with or with whom they had worked 
in the past. Particularly at the European level, working partners can change within a very 
short period of time due to the rapid staff rotation in institutions like the European 
Commission. At the other participating levels of governance, those who had been 
working longer within the program were named. 
 
This research used semi-structured interviews, meaning that the interviews explored a 
few general topics to help to uncover the participants’ views, current and past positions 
in the Dutch-German cross-border cooperation program and thus their role within it. One 
of my goals was to elaborate the question of how the several organizations and 
institutions are handling and have handled the changes within the cross-border 
cooperation program, why changes were introduced and what consequences they had. 
The questions were adapted according to the position, past experience and detailed 
knowledge of that particular interviewee.  
 
The interviews can be placed in two categories, in each of which exactly the same 
number of people were interviewed (26 persons each). The first category of interviews 
involved participants who are or were working in the INTERREG/ ETC program and who 
were particularly familiar with the system. These interviews gave very specific and 
                                                                                                                                                 
role in European structural policy and cross-border cooperation. The Dutch Provinces in the 
border regions participate actively in the INTERREG program. 
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detailed information about the practical functioning and evolution of the program over 
time. The respondents were situated at all four involved levels of governance: at the 
Euregional/subregional level in the Euregions, at the regional level in the Dutch 
Provinces and German Bundesländer as well as at the Dutch national level, and finally 
at the European level in the European Commission. The second category of interview 
involved participants who, rather than being directly involved in the daily work of the 
cross-border program, had a good overall view of cross-border cooperation or could give 
their personal opinion about changes that should be made in cross-border cooperation. 
This second group of interviewees were mainly from the European level, such as MEPs, 
civil servants from the European Commission who were not involved directly in 
INTERREG but more in general management of the European Structural Funds, a 
Member of the Landtag of North Rhine-Westphalia and civil servants of the European 
Court of Auditors.  
 
The interviewees in the first category began with very general questions about their 
current and past positions and moved on to a discussion of communication and ways of 
working with other participants in the program. In cases where the respondent had 
worked in previous program periods, changes and possible improvements or increases 
in complexity were also discussed. However, the second stage of the interviews always 
depended on the general introduction. In cases where the respondent had been working 
in the field for a relatively short period of time, questions relating to the personal opinion 
of possible improvements to the program were put, as well as questions relating to the 
specific daily work of the interviewee and cooperation with other actors in the program. 
Interviews in the second category with participants who were not directly involved in the 
Dutch-German cross-border cooperation generally began with a general introduction and 
then moved on to very general impressions about the Dutch-German cross-border 
cooperation, possible future improvements and potential issues or dilemmas arising from 
the current situation.  
 
The interviews were held mainly at the current offices of the interviewees in Brussels, at 
the Euregions, the Building of the Provinces or Ministries and so on. In cases where the 
interviewees had already retired, the interviews took place at their homes or at locations 
of their own choosing. Four of the interviews were conducted by phone. The duration of 
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the interviews ranged between one and four hours, although the average length was 
between 90 minutes and two hours.  
 
In general, most of the interviewees, especially those in the first category, had a great 
deal of knowledge and experience in their particular working field, but were often not 
aware about the functioning and content of the other parts of the program. However, 
there were a few exceptions to this in this first category, such as individuals from 
connecting organs such as the Joint Technical INTERREG Secretariat, who had a very 
thorough knowledge of the tasks and activities taking place within the program. 
 
This stage of the qualitative research was particularly useful for investigating the ‘how’ 
questions and gathering personal opinions from the interviewees. All in all, the interviews 
gave a good representation from all parts of the INTERREG program currently involved 
at the four levels of governance (supranational, national, regional and subregional). 
  
The table below gives an overview of the interviewees I spoke with and other verbal 
contact for the purposes of this research: 
 
 
Table 1: Interviews conducted and establishing a knowledge network 
 
level of governance number of 
persons 
approached  
number of 
persons 
interviewed 
number of 
interviews** 
number of 
persons 
spoken to 
concerning 
the content of 
this research 
(knowledge 
network)** 
Euregional/Subregional 9 11* 9 23 
Regional 31 20 18 42 
National 10 4 5 13 
Supranational 33 17 14 39 
in total 83 52 46 117 
 
*At the Euregional/subregional level, more people were interviewed than were actually 
approached because on some occasions direct colleagues with useful knowledge were 
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also invited to participate in the interview or to speak to me after the interview. For the 
complete list of interview partners see Annex 2.16 
** The number of interviews refer to the exact interview moments or appointments. 
Sometimes an interview took place with more than one person. The persons which are 
categorized in the column ‘Knowledge Network’ are those people who were approached 
to get an interview. As can be seen, not all people asked by letter, email or a phone call 
were willing to participate in this research.  
 
 
2.2.2 Archival research 
 
The archival research was used to corroborate certain statements made during the 
interviews and to obtain more detailed background information concerning the issues 
mentioned in official government documents. The archival research at the border region 
and at regional and national levels was mainly conducted in combination with the 
interviews. Some interviewees already figured out where to search for particular 
documents before the interview started, due to detailed description of the (semi-
structured) interview-questions and the communication of the direction of the personal 
talk beforehand. Some interviewees were very helpful and provided archive documents 
following their interview, especially at the Dutch national and German regional levels. 
Those documents where mostly minutes and letters as well as project applications from 
the early start of European funding for cross-border cooperation at the Dutch German 
border. Sometimes interview partners searched for particular documents in their own 
personal records or in the organizational archive and the documents were then provided 
on loan or duplicated. However, much of the documentation was not allowed to be used 
directly for this research. Because there was continuous contact about the aim and 
progress of this research with some of the participants – by phone, e-mail, or through 
personal visits – particularly at the border region level, but also at the regional and 
national levels, useful information and new developments were constantly being 
communicated during the course of this research project (cf. interviews 1 2012; interview 
                                                 
16
 Because some of the interviewees did not want to be named, the references are anonymized 
with a number and the year in which the interview was conducted. The complete list of interviews, 
recordings and transcripts remains with the researcher and the supervisors of this dissertation 
and can be viewed on request.  
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2 2009; interview 3 2010; interview 4 2009; interview 5 2009). In addition to this, 
intensive archival research was also conducted independently of the interviews, 
especially at the European level. For example, during a two-month research stay in 
Brussels in 2012, considerable time and effort went into searching for material on 
European integration in general and more specifically on the emergence of European 
regional policy and the development of European cross-border cooperation. In addition 
to this, the archival search also focused on any other documents that reflected the 
increasing awareness of the need to work across borders, especially in the early stages 
of the European integration.  
 
 
2.3 Summary 
 
This research project made extensive use of mixed research methods including desk and 
literature studies, the use of databases and internet (platforms), archival research and 
conducting interviews. This triangulation of methods and sources proved to be a useful 
tool for obtaining an initial overview of historical developments and later a deeper insight 
into the current field of cross-border cooperation along the Dutch-German border funded 
by European money. 
By combining the extensive use of a range of research methods and tools, the outcome of 
the research should be seen as much more reliable than case study analyses that do not 
use this range of methods or where conclusions are drawn either from studying 
(secondary) sources or interviews. The potential to actively check information from 
different sources meant that I could take the validity of information at face value and put it 
in its proper context. 
 
26  
3. Theoretical Framework: Combining Multi-Level Governance and Principal-Agent 
 
The cohesion policy of the EU is implemented through a system that allows for the 
involvement of a number of actors in the policy process, actors that had previously been 
systematically excluded from any role in national regional policy (Leornadi 2006: 164). 
The existing literature on this research field of European regional and cohesion policy 
and also on the functioning of the European Structural Funds, in particular the European 
Fund for Regional Development (ERDF), often use the Multi-Level Governance 
approach (MLG) as a theoretical framework which analyzes and explains the functioning 
of the ‘working together’ of several actors on several levels (cf. Hooghe and Marks 2001; 
Hooghe 1996; Marks 1992, 1993; Marks et al. 1996: 386f.; Bache 2008 (b), and others). 
The term MLG has become commonplace in EU studies in recent years, and Hooghe 
and Marks were the two leading proponents of the idea. They have found that authority 
in Europe has become increasingly dispersed since the late 1950s (Cini 2007). MLG 
describes the dispersion of decision-making authority across multiple territorial levels 
and the political action that occurs at and between various levels of governance 
(Rosamond 2000). The MLG approach was first developed from a study on EU policy 
and then further developed and applied more widely (Bache and George 2006). 
Scholars generally agree that as an analytical tool, the MLG approach can be very 
helpful.  
 
Even the European Commission itself and the Committee of the Regions (CoR) use the 
MLG approach as one of the main theoretical tools with which they analyze European 
Governance (cf. CoR 2009 (b); CEC 2001 (b) COM (428) final). Especially in the years 
2008 and 2009, the CoR organized workshops (called ‘ateliers’) and meetings on the 
topic of MLG (cf. CoR 2009 (a); CoR 2009 (c)). Contributions on the MLG approach – or 
that involve the existing literature on cohesion and structural policy in Europe in 
combination with the MLG approach such as this research on Dutch-German cross-
border cooperation, embedded in the European structural policy – cannot be considered 
without the MLG model. However, in this research a second theoretical model will be 
incorporated: the Principal-Agent (PA) approach. This approach will be used in 
combination with the MLG model and not as a substitute for it. Using the PA approach in 
combination with the MLG model will enable us to investigate theoretically why shifts of 
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authority between the levels of governance involved in one common system, such as 
Dutch-German cross-border cooperation, with the stimulation of a European budget 
have occurred over time. To get a clear picture of both models, the MLG as well as the 
PA approach will be explained separately (in sections 3.1 and 3.2) and then I will 
combine both models (section 3.3). This chapter also includes a reference to the 
empirical case study in order to see how the MLG model can be used in the case of the 
Dutch-German cross-border cooperation (section 3.1.1).  
 
 
3.1 The Multi-Level Governance Model 
 
In the basic model of the MLG approach, the European Union is no longer seen as an 
international organization like any other, such as the NATO or the UN. The enormous 
complexity of internal EU activities and decision-making procedures means that in some 
policy areas the EU displays characteristics more akin to a national political system  in 
which decision-making occurs at different levels of governance  than to an international 
organization (cf. Hooghe and Marks 2001: 33f). In the context of the EU, policy-making 
also takes place through actors at different levels and representing different political, 
economic or cultural fields of activity.  
 
The MLG model is characterized by the assumption that international cooperation in the 
context of the EU requires complex analysis. A central concept is that, as Hooghe and 
Marks state, decision-making authority in Europe has become increasingly dispersed 
since the late 1950s, undermining the central role of national actors in European policy-
making (cf. Marks 1993: 392, 401f; Marks et al. 1996: 346; Hooghe and Marks 2001: 3f). 
According to the MLG model, decision-making competencies are shared by actors at 
different levels rather than monopolized by national governments. Supranational 
institutions (the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European 
Court) have independent influence on policy-making. 
 
What characterizes the MLG approach in relation to European cross-border 
cooperation? In case of the EU structural policy, MLG appears to be a two-sided 
process, involving the decentralization of decision-making to subnational levels of 
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governance as well as the centralization of new powers at the supranational level (Marks 
1993). Firstly, the process of European integration has shifted authority in several key 
areas of policy-making from the nation states to EU institutions. Secondly, 
‘regionalization’ and ‘regionalism’ in several EU countries has caused a shift in political 
authority from the national level to the subnational level (cf. Hooghe and Marks 2001: 
xi).17 Illustration 2 shows how the MLG model functions.18  
 
Illustration 2: The two triggers of MLG 
 
 
 
(Source: Own illustration (based on Hooghe and Marks 2001: xi)) 
 
Furthermore, regional and subregional governments have developed vertical links with 
the Commission that bypass the national level. Regarding the Structural Funds, direct 
contact between the Commission and subnational governmental representatives takes 
                                                 
17
 ‘Regionalization’ means the willingness of the central state to offload some of the burdensome 
tasks taken on during the heyday of the welfare state while ‘regionalism’ is the pressure created 
by sub-state nationalism towards the central state to relinquish decision-making powers (Piattoni 
2010: 9). 
18
 Some authors add a third process by which national authority has shifted horizontally towards 
organizations in, for example, the private sector and associations of private-public partnerships 
(Molle 2007: 124).  
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place on a daily and mainly informal basis (Marks 1993; interview 6 2010; interview 1 
2012).  
 
The MLG model thus bridges the traditionally separate domains of domestic and 
international politics in the context of European integration and it has strong antecedents 
in neofunctionalism.19 In fact, to many of those who apply the MLG approach in EU 
studies, these processes may make the EU fundamentally different from other 
international organizations. According to Bache and George “MLG […] challenged state-
centric accounts of the EU and focused more on the nature of the beast than on the 
process of integration” (Bache and George 2006: 39); and as such, MLG is less 
concerned with explaining the process of European integration and more with explaining 
the nature of the EU that has emerged from that process (Bache and George 2006).  
 
However, what the MLG model lacks is a clear explanation of how precisely interaction 
between actors at different levels takes place. Here MLG scholars can only speak very 
generally of “a system of continuous negotiation” (Marks 1993: 392). Even though the 
MLG perspective identifies the development of different levels of analysis, the questions 
of how and why this interaction takes place, especially interaction between the 
supranational and subnational levels, has remained largely neglected.  
 
Following Bachtler and Mendez, the nature of governance in the EU’s cohesion policy 
has been strongly contested by scholars over the years (Bachtler and Méndez 2007: 
535). Bachtler and Mendez point out that Marks (1993), for example, sees the Structural 
Funds as the “leading edge of a system of multilevel governance” where power is shared 
between several actors and several levels of governance (cf. Marks 1993 in Bachtler 
and Méndez 2007: 535f.); others, meanwhile – for example Anderson (1990), Pollack 
(1995), Allen (1996, 2005) and Bache (1998, 1999) – argue that “central governments 
remained firmly in the driving seat, playing the role of ‘gatekeepers’ between EU 
pressures and domestic policy and institutional chance” (cf. Bachtler and Méndez 2007: 
536). 
                                                 
19
 Neofunctionalism is a theory of European integration which views integration as an incremental 
process. That means that Neofunctionalists maintain that political integration and the growth of 
authority at the supranational level occur as a long-term consequence of modest economic 
integration. Integration in one sector creates pressures for integration in related sectors etc. (= 
functional spillover). This spillover of integration in one sector to others, ultimately lead to some 
kind of political community (Rosamond 2000).  
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3.1.1 Levels of governance and Dutch-German cross-border cooperation 
 
In this case study we can see four levels of governance working together in the cross-
border program funded by European money. In order to give an overview, this section 
will explain the empirical division of levels that I will use in this work. However, the fact 
that I refer to four levels of governance on both sides of the border does not mean that 
counterparts within one level have the same authority and the same tasks in a program 
such as the Dutch-German cross-border program. That division will be explained below 
when summing up of the four levels and also in the division that can be made between 
program and project levels of the current Dutch-German ETC-program (see below). 
  
The Dutch-German INTERREG program involves four levels of governance:  
 
1. at the subregional level, there are the Euregions (consisting of the stakeholder 
municipalities ‘Kreise’ and Chambers of Commerce);20  
 
2. at the regional level, there are the Dutch provinces (‘Provincies’) and the 
German ‘Bezirksregierungen’ and the German ‘Bundesländer’; 
 
3. at the national level, there are the national governments in The Hague and 
Berlin (previously in Bonn); at this level, the Dutch government is responsible for 
implementing INTERREG while the national government of Germany is not 
involved in its day-to-day running; the federal states of Germany (the 
Bundesländer) have that responsibility because they implement regional policy 
on behalf of the German national government (for more detail on the division of 
tasks between the German Bundesländer and the national level, see further on in 
this chapter) (cf. Benz 1999; Jakoby 2005; Seerden 1993: 6; cf. interview 35 
2012), 
 
4. at the European level there are the European institutions, especially the 
European Commission. 
 
                                                 
20
 The Euregional-level defined in this dissertation with the term subregional level is sometimes, 
especially in EU documents and regulations, labeled as ‘local level’. 
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Looking at the INTERREG/ETC program itself, the four levels of governance work 
together in two different areas or levels of action. To explain this in more detail, a 
division can be made between ‘program level’ and ‘project level’. The program level 
involves all four levels of governance and concerns decision-making processes that 
relate to the whole program and its progress, mid-term changes, financial shifting 
between priorities and the general (financial) administration and reporting of the program 
and also about negotiations for a future program period.21 This corresponds with the 
‘partnership principle’ of a program like INTERREG, in which several levels of 
governance work together in the “preparation, financing, monitoring and assessment of 
operations” (cf. Hooghe and Keating 1994: 378).22 Program level decisions are made in 
the Monitoring Committee.23 Decisions at project level, meaning decisions concerning 
the specifics of implementing the program such as approving projects, financial frames, 
cofinancing issues, the progress of and content of projects that are underway, are made 
in Steering Committees. Each Euregion has one regional Steering Committee. Not all 
four levels of governance participate in project-level decisions, but they all participate at 
the program level, although not all with the same amount of influence.24  
 
Within the following, the levels of governance that participate at program- and project 
levels within the ETC (INTERREG IV) period (2007-2013) are listed: 
 
Programm level: 
At program level the following program-partners participate in the Monitoring Committee: 
Supranational level:  
- European Commission (advisory seat) 
National level:  
                                                 
21
 In this dissertation, with the term ‘program’ a whole period of several years of funding – one 
particular funding period – as well as the general system of the funding with the overall aim of 
stimulating cross-border cooperation is meant, e.g. the funding period 2000-2006 or the program 
INTERREG in general. Within one funding period European financial programs run alongside 
each other, e.g. INTERREG III next to Urban II in the period of 2000-2006. 
22
 All principles of a program as INTERREG which are next to the ‘partnership principle’: 
‘subsidiary’, ‘additionality’ and ‘programming’ (see sections 5.3; 5.3.1; 7.1; 7.3). 
23
 For more explanation on the development and tasks of the Monitoring Committee see sections 
5.3.1; 6.5.1; 7.2 and 7.3. 
24
 The terms of ‘Monitoring Committee’ and ‘Steering Committee’ are terms which are used since 
the program periods INTERREG III and INTERREG IV also in programs of the Dutch-German 
border region. Within the former program periods these terms were not always used, for example 
the ‘Steering Committee’ of the Euregion Rhine-Waal was called Koordinationsausschuss 
(German) or Coördinatiegroep (Dutch) in the INTERREG I period (ERW 1994: 44). 
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- Dutch Ministerie van Economische Zaken (The Hague);  
- German Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (Berlin) 
Regional level:  
- German Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Energie, Bauen, Wohnen und Verkehr of the 
Bundesland North Rhine-Westphalia (Düsseldorf);  
- Niedersächsisches Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Verkehr (Hannover) 
- Bezirksregierung Münster;  
- Bezirksregierung Düsseldorf; 
- two regional representatives of Lower Saxony; 
Dutch provincies of:  
- Friesland;  
- Groningen; 
- Drenthe  
- Overijssel;  
- Gelderland; 
- Noord-Brabant; 
- Limburg 
Subnational / subregional level:  
- Ems Dollart Region;  
- EUREGIO;  
- Euregio Rhine-Waal;  
- euregio rhine-maas-north; 
- Bescheinigungsbehörde (advisory seat) 
 
Project level 
On project-level, the following program partners are participating in the Steering 
Committees: 
National level:  
- Dutch EZ (The Hague);  
Regional level: 
- German Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Energie, Bauen, Wohnen und Verkehr of the 
particular Bundesland 
-The particular involved Dutch provincies (depends on program area of the Euregion) 
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-The particular involved German Bezirksregierungen or the Regierungsvertretung 
Oldenburg (depends on program area of the Euregion);25 
- eventual one further regional representation of Lower Saxony 
Subnational level:  
- Each responsible Euregion 
- Joint Technical INTERREG Secretariat (advisory seat) 
- Bescheindigungsbehörde (advisory seat) 
(cf. JITS 2007 (b): 4, 6)  
 
The role of the German Bundesländer needs some further explanation. The reason for 
including the German federal states at the regional level even though they have nearly 
the same competencies as the Dutch national level in The Hague is that the 
Bundesländer “in contrast to their counterparts in regionalized and unitary member 
states, are well positioned to compete for EU funds and to engage the Commission as 
full-fledged partners in the formulation and implementation of cohesion policy [...]” 
(Anderson 1996: 163).  
 
Unlike the Netherlands, Germany can be considered an exception in Europe with its 
federal system, in which the Bundesländer have a real say in several policies. German 
“[...] policy-making requires the involvement of Länder parliaments, as decisions on the 
amount and the allocation of the structural funds affect their budgetary competences” 
(Auel 2006: 44). Hence, while in other European member states regional policy is a task 
of a central government, in Germany it is a competence of the Bundesländer.  
 
Of course, labeling the governments of the Bundesländer as ‘regional level’ is just a 
question of definition, but we do need to be clear that the authority of the German 
Bundesländer in respect to regional policy and cross-border cooperation is much more 
influential than that of the Dutch Provincies, because of the constitution of the federal 
state of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in which the Bundesländer have the authority 
to implement (European) regional policy. Each Bundesland is individually involved in the 
design and implementation of its Community Support Frameworks (CSF)26, always within 
                                                 
25
 The ‘Regierungsvertretung’ Oldenburg conducts tasks within INTERREG on behalf of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs of Lower Saxonary (in Hannover) (cf. Interview 7 2010). 
26
 Community Support Frameworks (CSF) are negotiated between the Commission and the 
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the parameters of the Joint Tasks Framework (Gemeinschaftsaufgabe). 27 As part of that 
procedure, the Bundesländer are consulted continuously by the federal government 
during the negotiations on the Structural Funds (Hooghe and Keating 1994: 382). In 
short, when it comes to the German federal system in respect to MLG, the most 
important actors are the Bundesländer. For example, while “decisions on eligible regions 
as well as the allocation of the funds are made in the federal Länder negotiations, the 
Länder dominate the subsequent stages of programming and implementing regional 
policy within the framework of the Joint Task” (Thielemann 2000: 10 in Auel 2006: 45-
46). However, the final responsibility for implementing the European regional policy rests 
with the national German government, which – like all the other national governments in 
Europe – acts as the negotiating partner in the preparation period and the official partner 
for implementing programs during the programs. In sum, even in Germany, final 
responsibility is official with the national level, even though the daily work of the 
European level correspondents directly with the regional or Bundesland level. 
 
The development of Europe after World War II fundamentally changed the cooperation 
between the national (federal) and regional (Bundesländer) levels. European integration 
created a qualitatively new MLG system within Germany, which means that the Länder 
can directly participate in intergovernmental negotiations. Benz (1999: 73) says that the 
Bundesländer have “[...] turned into external lobbyists and controllers of the German 
representatives within the European political system.” However, policies such as the 
European Structural Funds are forged in an institutional setting which establishes 
intergovernmental negotiations between the Federal and Länder governments and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
various authorities in the member states since the interventions on regional development 
changed from stimulating projects towards financing programs. The CSF is an agreement on 
objectives, finances and procedures for each eligible area (cf. Hooghe and Keating 1994: 377-
378).  
27
 Since the year 1969, the German Grundgesetz (German Constitutional Law) defines the 
“improvement of regional economic structures” as a so called Joint Task (German: 
Gemeinschaftsaufgabe “Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur”) of the Bundesländer 
and the federal/national level (Auel 2006: 45). Jacoby (2005: 110) describes the current 
engagement of the Bund within the regional policy in the way that the Bund gives financial aid 
within the framework of Joint Tasks (German: Gemeinschaftsaufgaben) conform Art. 91 a) of the 
German Grundgesetz, especially through the joint task of “improving the regional economical 
structure“, next to through the adjustment payments (German: Ausgleichszahlungen) which is 
also listed in the Grundgesetz, but not so relevant for this case study. Focusing on the Joint Task 
of “improving the regional economical structure“ has created a framework for among others the 
“Abgrenzung von Fördergebieten und für die Festlegung von Förderhöchstsätzen“, which could 
avoid a competitive subsidization (German: Subventionswettlauf) among the Bundesländer 
(Jakoby 2005: 110). 
  
35 
European Commission. Since the late 1980s, networks that include actors from 
subregional governments as well as actors from the private sector have emerged at the 
regional level below the Bundesländer. In Germany, policy making in the field of regional 
policy or European Structural Funds requires the involvement of the Länder parliaments 
because decisions on the amount and the allocations of the Structural Funds affect their 
budgetary competencies (Benz and Papadopoulos 2006: 13).  
 
In sum, when it comes to the European Structural Funds and the INTERREG and ETC 
programs, the Bundesländer which we classify as ‘regional-level government’ have the 
right to implement these programs as well as participating in decision-making in the 
programs and preparing future programs with other partners (see also list of program 
partners participating on the program and project levels above). 
 
 
3.2 The Principal-Agent Approach 
 
The main concept behind the PA approach can be summed up as follows: “An agency 
relationship exists between two parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on 
behalf of or as a representative of the other, designated as the principal” (Blom-Hansen 
2005: 629). In this way, the Principal engages the Agent to perform some task on her 
behalf and in order to do this, the principal delegates some (decision-making) authority 
to the Agent (cf. Héritier 2007: 23). The basic Principal-Agent relationship is actually a 
very simple one: there is one Principal and one Agent and the Principal cannot observe 
the Agent’s efforts but can measure its outcomes (cf. Miller and Whiteford 2002: 233). 
Originally the PA approach was applied to private firms and businesses, later to public 
agencies and recently it has also been applied to international organizations, such as the 
EU (cf. Bauer 2002; cf. Arrow 1985; cf. Pollack 1997). 
 
An Agent’s freedom of action stems specifically from the tasks delegated or, more 
generally, from having certain specialist expertise in a given policy area. This creates an 
asymmetrical distribution of information that favors the Agent, who, over time, gains 
more expertise than the Principal. This asymmetry may result in ‘shirking’, a 
phenomenon that occurs when an Agent minimizes the effort it exerts on its Principal’s 
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behalf and ‘slippage’, which occurs when an Agent shifts policy away from its Principal’s 
preferred outcome and toward its own preferred outcomes (Hawkins et al. 2006: 8).  
 
In order to curb this potential for undesired independent action on the part of the Agent, 
Principals may develop various oversight procedures in order to control the Agent’s 
behavior. However, these may in turn lead to ‘agency losses’ (Hawkins et al. 2006: 9: cf. 
Pollack 1997: 108; Hix 2005: 29) and increasing costs which may induce a new cost-
benefit calculation on the part of the Principal and a re-evaluation of its relationship with 
the Agent. Similarly, some scholars have focused on what they call ‘bureaucratic drift’, 
when Agents develop their own vision of what their mandate is or should be, and pursue 
their own interests or try to expand their tools and influence (cf. Hix 2005: 28f; Pollack 
1997: 108). Other authors have used the term ‘Principal’s problem’ and analyzed the 
mechanisms by which a principal may seek to maintain an Agent’s loyalty (cf. Ross 
1973: 134f. in Blom-Hansen 2005: 629). At this point, the terms ‘control’ and ‘oversight’ 
come into play. These can be interpreted as manifestations of mistrust or more generally 
formulated as a way of ensuring that the Agent behaves as the Principal wants. 
However, even though some Principal-Agent literature addresses the issue of control 
and oversight in terms of ‘trust’, this is less relevant to this particular case study (cf. 
Ensminger 2001) because here the focus is not on interpersonal relations between 
humans, to which the terms such as ‘trust’ and ‘assurance’ usually apply, but rather at 
institutions involved in cross-border governance. 
 
The control mechanisms generally used in PA literature to analyze institutional 
relationships are ‘process control’ and ‘outcome control’ (Aulakh and Gencturk 2000: 
524).28 The process and outcome controls can be regarded as different types of 
institutional control. However, both types differ in terms of what they monitor. While 
“Process control refers to the extent to which the principal monitors the agents’ behavior 
or the means used to achieve desired ends [...]”, ‘outcome control’ is “the degree to 
which the principal monitors the results or outcomes produced by the agents” (Aulakh 
and Gencturk 2000: 524). The PA literature generally cites four control mechanisms that 
institutions as principals may use:  
 
                                                 
28
 There is also a third one: ‘the social control’ that will not be elaborated in this dissertation 
(Aulakh and Gencturk 2000: 524). 
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1. Choosing an Agent carefully;  
2. Designing an Agent’s contract so that it includes the correct incentives;29 
3. Monitoring the Agent’s actions; 
4. Applying sanctions to Agents who ‘drift’ from the original contract (cf. Blom-Hansen 
2005: 629; cf. Molle 2007: 192f.). 
 
The four control mechanisms can be categorized into the two more general institutional 
types of control mentioned above: ‘choosing an Agent carefully’ and ‘designing an 
Agent’s contract so that it includes the correct incentives and monitoring the Agent’s 
actions’ are process controls, while ‘applying sanctions to Agents who “drift” from the 
original contract’ is an outcome control and is meant as a consequence when the 
outcome control proves that the Agent has drifted from the original contract made by the 
Principal. 
 
According to Kassim and Menon “…the principal-agent model holds significant promise 
for understanding the complex relationships and interactions that characterize the 
[European] Union…” and they also affirm that “the principal-agent model offers a way of 
grasping the institutional complexity of the EU” (Kassim and Menon 2003: 126). States 
then act as Principals, delegating their authority to international organizations which act 
as Agents. In this dissertation, the focus lies on the relationship between the states and 
the international organizations, which are actually the European institutions, particularly 
the European Commission, and the extent to which this international organization can 
act independently of the member states (cf. Hawkins et. al. 2006: 8-10; Pollack 1995: 
376). In fact, more empirical research in this area has been specifically recommended by 
PA scholars such as Piattoni, who also state that “the Council wants to supervise the 
Commissions activity, particularly when it is entrusted with the implementation of Council 
decisions which cannot, by their very nature, be sufficiently detailed to exclude any kind 
of ‘drift’ (Piattoni 2010: 21). Piattoni states that the Commission itself also needs the 
knowledge of experts from the various institutional and non-institutional levels in the 
member states in order to carry out its tasks (cf. Piattoni 2010).  
 
                                                 
29
 The relationships between Principals and Agents are usually governed by contracts, which are 
“self-enforcing agreements that define the terms of the relationship between two parties” (Lake 
1996 in Hawkins et al. 2006: 7). 
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In the field of European regional policy, national governments act as Principals which are 
not able to plan for all possible future ambiguities and sources of contention and so they 
create Agents, such as the European Commission, with the goal of safeguarding inter-
state agreements and adapting them to changing circumstances (cf. Keohane and 
Hoffmann 1991; Majone 1996; Pollack 1997 in Hooghe and Marks 2001: 10). Regarding 
the MLG model, Pollack (1995) made an early critique of the basic MLG approach 
established by Marks. He developed the model into a more ‘robust’ Principal-Agent 
model of delegation and applied this model more broadly. His main point is that the 
member states’ preferences and strategies “must take centre stage in explaining the 
development and functioning of cohesion policy” (Bachtler and Méndez 2007: 538). 
 
In the field of cohesion policy, Pollack (1995) points out specifically that when Agents (in 
this case the European Commission) attempt to pursue their own preferences, the 
Principals (in this case the member states) can rein in and rectify unruly or undesired 
behavior and outcomes in subsequent reform phases. Pollack concludes that the 
“autonomy of a given supranational institution depends crucially on the efficacy and 
credibility of control mechanisms established by member state principals…” (Pollack 
1997: 101; cf. Pollack 1995: 378-384 in Bachtler and Méndez 2007: 538). Bachtler and 
Méndez illustrate this with a specific example. They explain that the Commission was 
able to pursue its own agenda during the 1988-1993 period of the Structural Funds, 
thereby ‘outflanking’ the member states to a certain extent because the Commission had 
greater expertise “coupled with a general uncertainty about the future performance of 
new procedures which led the member states [the national level] to adopt, with very few 
amendments the Commission’s proposals” (Pollack 1997: 127; cf. Marks 1992: 212); 
Pollack argues that “a subsequent intergovernmental backlash led to a curtailing of the 
Commission’s powers in the 1993 reforms and a reassertion of the central government 
control” (Pollack 1995: 378-384 in Bachtler and Méndez 2007: 538).  
 
In order to link the shift described above to this case study, the 1993 reform of the 
European Structural Funds must be mentioned. The Commission’s informational 
advantage “had receded after five years of experience, and the Commission’s proposals 
were therefore amended by the member states, which had clear and precise 
preferences” (Pollack 1997: 127). To sum up these changes, this case study speaks of 
‘two shifts’ in cohesion or regional policy. The ‘first shift’ – within this dissertation also 
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called ‘supranationalization shift’ – ended with the establishment of the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975 and therefore includes the entire 
development of the European regional policy from the 1950s onwards (see also chapter 
4). This ‘first shift’ considers the time wherein the Commission acted autonomously and 
set its own agenda, while during the ‘second shift’ – within this dissertation also called 
‘renationalization shift’ – (especially after 1993) the preferences of the largest 
(contributing) member states played an increased role (cf. Pollack 1997: 127; the 
‘second shift’ is elaborated intensively in chapter 5).  
 
In sum, the PA approach could prove extremely useful in explaining the intentions and 
developments within relationships that involve levels of governance working together. 
However, in existing studies the PA approach has largely only considered the 
relationship between two levels of governance. In this case study, however, as pointed 
out earlier, not only is a multitude of different actors involved, they also operate at 
different levels. Whereas the MLG approach enables these to be included in the 
analysis, the combination with the PA approach offers the possibility of obtaining more 
insight into the several shifts of authority that have taken place in cross-border 
governance.  
 
 
3.3 A combination of MLG and PA for the Dutch-German case study  
 
In the attempt to uncover the mechanisms that led to more administration and 
complexity in the INTERREG/ETC program along the Dutch-German border, we will 
emphasize the importance of several ‘shifts of authority’ between the four levels of 
governance working together – subregional, regional, national and supranational – in 
this European financial program. These shifts will be identified by looking at both the 
decision-making procedures for specific cross-border projects as well as the changing 
involvement of all European levels of governance in this Dutch-German cross-border 
program through control and oversight mechanisms. Even though the Multi-Level 
Governance model (MLG) seems to offer a good way of explaining how the several 
levels of governance work together, it is not the ideal tool for explaining how shifts in 
governance – in the framework of the Dutch-German INTERREG border region 
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cooperation – took place over successive program periods. Including the MLG approach 
in a combined model is however necessary, if only as a tool to identify different levels 
involved and a description of their relations. It will subsequently be up to the PA part of 
the combined approach to provide for a more detailed explanation of the nature of the 
relationships between involved actors.  
 
Blom-Hansen (2005: 625) describes the limits of the MLG model as follows: “While this 
model [the MLG model] paints a descriptively accurate picture of the cohesion policy’s 
complex implementation structure, it fails to specify which actors, at which levels will be 
causally important and when.” He concludes that the multi-level character of the EU 
empowers the supranational and subnational levels at the cost of the nation state, which 
must accept “a significant loss of control” (Marks et al. 1996: 346 in Blom-Hansen 2005: 
628). Blom-Hansen also pinpoints the shortcoming of the MLG model, saying that it “fails 
to specify why this should be the case” (Blom-Hansen 2005: 628). While Hooghe (1996: 
1-24) argues that there would be a center where authority is accumulated, Blom-Hansen 
argues that this seems somewhat unlikely given that the MLG model states that certain 
actors at certain levels would be empowered (Blom-Hansen 2005: 628). Blom-Hansen 
suggests the Principal-Agent model (PA) as an alternative approach to address this 
question (Blom-Hansen 2005: 625). This research will not use the PA approach as an 
alternative to the MLG model, but rather as an addition to it. 
 
Compared to the MLG model, the Principal-Agent approach (PA) does a better job of 
clarifying the dynamics of relationships between actors, mainly by focusing on the 
oversight and control mechanisms that result from a shift in authority from the Principal 
to the Agent.  
 
In contrast to Blom-Hansen’s work, which focuses on the PA model and highlights the 
shortcomings of the MLG approach, the main theoretical focus in this case study is to 
incorporate the PA approach fully into MLG so that it becomes possible to explain the 
intentions of actors at several levels of governance that are working together within one 
European program, particularly when, as is the case here, actors at several levels may 
act as both Principals and Agents simultaneously. Blom-Hansen focuses on the 
relationship between the member states and the EU level in order to evaluate the degree 
of member state control and ascertain which level is in control (Blom-Hansen 2005: 628-
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630).30 However, the central question of this research is not who has the upper hand 
during implementation, but to analyze the consequences of the increasing diffusion of 
competencies to all the levels of governance involved in a program such as 
INTERREG/ETC. The diffusion of authority, responsibilities and tasks often leads to 
more administration for end-users as will become evident in this case study.31 The 
control mechanisms established as part of Dutch-German cross-border cooperation and 
the way in which these have developed over the years may be used to explain shifts in 
governance in this area. 
 
To sum up, this case study uses a combination of both theoretical approaches and takes 
as its starting point the fact that since several levels of analysis are involved in cross-
border cooperation, the MLG and PA approaches should be combined so that the 
development of control and oversight mechanisms of the PA approach can be analyzed 
in relation to different actors at different levels and their changing relationships in the 
decision-making process over time.  
                                                 
30
 Blom-Hansen’s work seems to be theoretically similar to this research, although there are a few 
differences. He focuses on the Urban Community Initiative (in Denmark) within the EU cohesion 
policy, while this research concentrates on the development of cross-border cooperation along 
the Dutch-German border. These empirical subjects are different in some important respects. 
Firstly, the INTERREG program is much larger: €700 million was budgeted for the Urban II 
programs for the period 2000-2006, while €4,871 million was budgeted for INTERREG III 
programs in the same period (cf. CEC 2000 (a): 6, 15; cf. CEC 2000 (b): 2, 9). Secondly, the 
INTERREG (A) /ETC program seeks to address problems that result specifically from differences 
between member states (cf. CEC 2000 (a); cf. CEC 2001 (b)) and as such cross-border 
cooperation directly affects the everyday lives of people in border regions where the lack of 
European integration is felt the most keenly. Thirdly, while this research uses a combination of 
the MLG and PA model (see chapter 7). 
31
 In this dissertation, ‘authority’ refers to responsibility and decision-making power in the field of 
European regional policy. One can argue that this ‘shifting of authority to one central European 
institution’ can be viewed as a ‘loss’ of sovereignty from national governments, but we should be 
clear that it is not a strict ‘loss’ because the field of European regional policy was established at 
that point and has only existed since then. In short, in this research ‘authority’ refers to the right to 
implement, conduct or decide in a particular policy field. / European Integration or Integration in 
the European Community/Union has progressed on the creation of a common market, the 
development of common institutions and the forging of common policies (cf. Hooghe and Keating 
1994: 367). 
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3.3.1 Explaining shifts of authority  
 
This research will show that two ‘shifts of authority’ have taken place over time. The first 
shift, also called the ‘supranationalization shift’, which involved authority being given 
from the member states to supranational institutions as part of the process of European 
integration, can be described as:  
 
“[...], the member states of the European Community have “pooled” increasing 
areas of policy authority, introducing prominent collective institutions” (Pierson 
1998: 27). 
 
Supranational European institutions developed during the process of European 
integration after the end of World War II and stand above the national level of the 
member state (see chapter 4). In contrast to intergovernmental cooperation, cooperation 
through supranational institutions enables the member states of (what was to become) 
the European Union to work together with a neutral partner and not solely on a 
government-to-government basis (cf. Cini 2007: 461, 465). 
 However, this ‘first shift’ did not take place immediately after World War II because the 
first contacts between the later member states of the European Union took place on an 
intergovernmental basis. As Keohane (Pierson 1998: 31) states: 
 
“[...] governments put a high value on the maintenance of their own autonomy, 
[so] it is usually impossible to establish international institutions that exercise 
authority over states” (Keohane 1984: 88 in Pierson 1998: 31f).  
 
With that in mind and particularly given the difficult and sensitive setting of the aftermath 
of World War II, it is obvious that building up supranational institutions and ‘pooling’ 
authority at a supranational level was not an easy development and evolved gradually. 
However, over time, a progression took place from intergovernmentalism towards 
increasing supranationalism, this can be explained in terms of the Principal-Agent 
model: 
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“The principals (member states) may delegate certain responsibilities to agents 
(international organizations), but only with the strictest oversight. The core 
calculation for member states is whether the benefits of collective action 
outweigh any possible risk of autonomy” (Pierson 1998: 32). 
 
The quotation above sums up what early European integration was all about: the 
decision to delegate a given authority was based on a calculation of the benefits of this 
shift of authority to the supranational level balanced against the members states’ fear of 
losing sovereignty and their wish to establish strict oversight mechanisms.  
 
In short, the ‘first shift’ – that is also labeled in this dissertation the ‘supranationalization 
shift’ – was a shift of authority from the multiple Principals – in this case the member 
states of the European Communities (and later European Union) – towards 
supranational Agents – in the first instance, the supranational organs within the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This implied a shift from 
intergovernmental cooperation towards supranationality. As Cram, Dinan and Nugent 
observe: 
 
“Since the transfer of responsibilities to supranational institutions implies the 
placing of constraints on national sovereignty – that is, restrictions on the ability 
of member states to act independently and on their own initiative – the debate 
over the balance of power within the EU between supranational and 
intergovernmental actors is fundamentally important to an understanding of both 
the distribution and balance of power at the EU level and between EU level and 
their member states” (Cram, Dinan and Nugent 1999: 5). 
 
There are various reasons to build supranational institutions or organizations – for 
example information can be distributed equally to all member states. Without such 
supranational organizations and institutions, uncertainty would exist about the 
preferences, intentions and reliability of the other actors and this would make 
agreements difficult to execute and enforce. Supranational institutions can help to 
reduce information asymmetries, they can monitor compliance and they can create links 
across issues that diminish the likelihood of defection (Pierson 1998: 32). According to 
Keohane (1984: 97), the main reason for establishing such supranational 
44  
institutions/organizations is that they “permit governments to attain objectives that would 
otherwise be unattainable” (Pierson 1998: 32). 
Especially in the European context, the member states faced a difficult problem in that 
they needed to create arrangements that would allow reasonably efficient decision-
making and effective oversight and enforcement over a wide range of complex and 
closely interrelated policy arenas. In light of these requirements, authority was 
transferred to these organizations and that means that the political organizations of the 
European Community had resources at their disposal and were not simply the tools of 
the national governments (Pierson 1998: 35).  
 
According to the definition of Cram, Dinan and Nugent (1999: 5), the term ‘supranational’ 
implies the existence of a power above or beyond the level of the nation state that 
enjoys some degree of autonomy from national governments. Accordingly, when EU 
member states create a supranational body (or procedure), they delegate a range of 
tasks that they expect to be performed without constant references back to them for 
approval (Cram, Dinan and Nugent 1999: 5). The consequence of this is inevitable, 
because the delegation of such tasks necessarily places some constraints on the 
sovereignty and powers of the member states, since they no longer have full control over 
the activities of the supranational institutions (or procedures) that they have created 
(Cram, Dinan and Nugent 1999: 6). Pierson goes one step further in his explanation and 
states that:  
 
“Over time, EC organizations will seek to use grants of authority for their own 
purposes, and especially to increase their autonomy. They will try to expand the 
gaps in member-state government control, and they will use any accumulated 
political resources to resist efforts to curtail their authority” (Pierson 1998: 35). 
 
The consequence of this development over time has been on the one hand – according 
to Pierson – that national governments generally (but not always) seek to rein in 
European Community organizations. On the other hand, those same member states 
governments also recognize that these “crucial collective organizations cannot function 
without significant power, and that the authority required must grow as the tasks 
addressed at the European level expand and become more complex” (Pierson 1998: 
35).  
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The question remains of why member states choose to extend their activities at the EU 
level, given that it means a curtailment of their own autonomy. There could be several 
reasons for this. For example, member states may find themselves caught up in a 
process from which they cannot easily extricate themselves, even when it would be in 
their interest to do so, because they find themselves increasingly entwined with their EU 
partners and increasingly influenced by the supranational institutions at every turn. It is 
possible that there has been some loss of control over the integration process, meaning 
that member states have decided that a certain trade-off between autonomy and 
influence is worthwhile. In this way, having a little less autonomy over certain policy 
decisions is acceptable if it results in having greater international power as part of a 
major economic trading bloc (cf. Cram, Dinan and Nugent 1999: 6).  
 
A ‘second shift’ – that is also labeled in this dissertation the ‘renationalization shift’ – took 
place in the field of regional policy because the Commission did not have the resources 
to implement Structural Funds in the regions on its own (cf. interview 8 2009). As Nugent 
describes, “there just are not enough officials in the DGs, and not enough money to 
contract the required help from outside agencies […]” (Nugent 2006: 175). Molle (2007) 
explains this ‘second shift’ by saying that the EU’s cohesion policy has become a set of 
very strict rules and targets and he concludes that through the implementation of this 
policy by the member states, the states actually act rather like Agents and the 
Commission as a Principal (Molle 2007: 192). This ‘second shift’ cannot be made to fit 
within the somewhat rigid MLG model, in which authority can only shift from the national 
level upwards to the supranational level or downwards to the subnational level, but is 
consistent with the view of scholars like Pollack (1997), Anderson (1990) or Bache 
(1998, 1999) who describe how the national level also gains authority back. The 
development of the European Structural Funds in general shows that the national level 
has assumed an increasingly important role in the overall implementation procedure of 
the programs. Pollack (1995: 376) describes the role of the national governments in 
European Structural Funds as follows “[The national governments] acting […] collectively 
in Council decision making and individually in the implementation of the funds, to 
structure the conditions under which regional governments interact with each other and 
with the Commission in the implementation of the Structural Funds. […] Regions are […] 
independent actors, but in a play – or institutional structure – laid down by member 
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states.” This applies particularly to the situation that has existed since the 1988 reforms 
of the Structural Funds, which enhanced the capacity of the contributing member states 
to exercise financial control and ensure value for money, and 1993 reforms, whereby 
some control over implementing the fund was shifted back from the Commission to the 
member states (Pollack 1995: 395). In Germany, and especially in this Dutch-German 
case study, the Bundesland North Rhine-Westphalia acts as a powerful regional actor on 
behalf of the national level (see section 3.1.1) and deals directly with the Commission 
when implementing the INTERREG program (cf. Pollack 1995: 377).32 In sum, under the 
auspices of EU cohesion policy, the levels of governance involved work together under a 
system of ‘shared management’ in which implementation is delegated to the member 
states (cf. Bachtler and Méndez 2007: 747). 
 
In this respect, Bachtler and Wren (2006: 143) state that the 1988 reform of the funds 
gave the European Commission much greater influence over the distribution of regional 
development funding, in particular with respect to the designation of eligible areas, the 
approval of member states development plans, the management and delivery of the 
programs, and the control of expenditure (Bachtler and Wren 2006: 143). This research 
does not contradict Bachtler and Wren’s argumentation, because they are describing the 
overall supervision and decision-making on general implementation regulations from the 
Commission. However, this research focuses on how the INTERREG is conducted on a 
day-to-day basis, following the Commission’s decisions about the overall program. The 
subnational, regional and national levels have been given more responsibility and 
authority to conducting and implement the Structural Funds and, in this particular case, 
the INTERREG program because the Commission has chosen a multi-annual program 
structure. In sum, the argumentation of Bachtler and Wren fits this research in respect to 
the overall decisions on the distribution and the working of the fund and the approval of 
the programs themselves (cf. Bachtler and Wren 2006: 143). What is different in this 
                                                 
32
 The Bundesland North Rhine-Westphalia is responsible for implementing the current Dutch-
German INTERREG program and therefore the Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und 
Energie is the Managing Authority for the program, while the national government in The Hague 
is responsible for implementing the Dutch-German-Belgian Euregion Maas-Rhine (cf. Euregio 
Maas-Rhein 2007: 83f: cf. JTIS 2007 (a): 89). In the previous period of two separate Dutch-
German programs, responsibility for implementing INTERREG in the Ems Dollard Region resided 
with the Bundesland Lower Saxony, the Managing Authority was with the Niedersächsische 
Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Technologie und Verkehr (Ems Dollard Region 2001: 97). As a 
consequence of the merger of program areas, North Rhine-Westphalia has also been responsible 
for the implementing INTERREG for cross-border cooperation in this area of Lower Saxony since 
the start of INTERREG IV. 
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analysis, however, is that the analysis is extended using a more detailed PA analysis 
that examines the way in which the relations between actors change over time. Here, the 
shifts concern not only general developments between different levels of governance, 
but more specifically between Principals and Agents and their underlying structures. By 
combining the MLG and PA approaches, it becomes clear that several Principals and 
several Agents are involved in cross-border governance. In fact, over time, Agents have 
been able to act as Principals in delegating the authority relating to the implementation 
of the INTERREG program. It is this process that I will analyze and describe in greater 
detail in the chapters that follow. 
  
The illustration below (illustration 3) illustrates my conceptual theoretical model. This 
model will be filled in with the empirical details of the in-depth case study in chapter 7.  
 
Illustration 3: Combined theoretical model based on MLG and PA  
 
 
(Own Illustration) 
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3.4 Summary 
 
In an effort to explain growing complexity in the Dutch-German cross-border program, 
the MLG model fails as an analytical approach in its own right, because it cannot 
account for the possibility of a situation where authority becomes increasingly dispersed 
over all the levels involved and where not only the European supranational level has a 
say over a program, but also the national governments of the European member states. 
Additionally, the PA approach is regarded as an excellent tool with which to explain the 
intentions and developments within relationships that involve two levels of governance 
working together. The PA approach is able to explain the mechanisms relating to 
establishing supranational institutions as Agents of the Principals, the member states. 
However, in existing studies the PA approach has largely focused only on the 
relationship between two actors. In this case study shifts in authority are involved 
between several actors at different levels of governance. While the first shift can be also 
called the ‘supranationalization shift’, the second shift back towards the national level 
(also regional and subregional levels in this case study) can be summed up as 
‘renationalization shift’. Both shifts are shown in the conceptual model (illustration 4). 
The PA approach is relevant to this case study because it allows an analysis of control 
mechanisms that may be used to investigate developments in the Dutch-German border 
region over successive program periods of funding (see chapter 6). Here, the control 
mechanisms that have been established for Dutch-German cross-border cooperation 
and the way these have developed over the years may be used to explain shifts in 
governance in this area. While the MLG approach enables the inclusion of these into the 
analysis, combining it with the PA approach offers the possibility of obtaining a better 
insight into the successive shifts of governance that have taken place in cross-border 
governance. In the next chapters, this combined approach will be tested against the 
empirical research conducted for the case study in order to determine to what extent it 
can explain the increased complexity of cross-border governance.  
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4. The Supranationalization Shift: Building a European Regional Policy  
 
This chapter will present a historical overview of the development of a European 
Regional Policy in order to show how the role of the supranational European 
Commission has developed and changed over time. The Commission is one of the 
central players in this case study and therefore also part of the theoretical framework of 
this dissertation. It will be discussed how this nascent European regional policy was 
implemented, particularly around the time when the supranational European 
Commission was first established (1967) with a separate Directorate General for 
Regional Policy, and the subsequent period of development. This chapter looks primarily 
at the first shift – the ‘supranationalization shift’ – in the theoretical model (see chapter 
3), during which member states agreed on step-by-step supranationalization and the 
establishment of common European institutions for that purpose. 
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Illustration 4: The ‘supranationalization shift’ 
 
           
(Own illustration) 
 
This chapter recounts the development of European regional policy that took place in the 
early development of European integration. We will start with the aftermath of World War 
II and continue towards the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC). Finally we will then turn to the signing of the Treaty of Rome (EEC), in which a 
first attempt to define regional policy was made. As such, the milestones of early 
European integration will serve as our reference points and help us to understand the 
context of the development of this particular policy field.  
 
In the annual documents of the European Communities in the late 1950s and other 
official government documents, the the term ‘regional policy’ came increasingly into play. 
This is demonstrated by the content of those reports, but also by institutional changes in 
the European Commission itself (cf. Europäische Kommission 1958, 1959 and 1960). 
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The European Commission, which has its origins in the High Authority of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) founded in 1951, has become a supranational 
executive body responsible for the implementation of European policies and 
representative of the organization as a whole rather than of the organization’s member 
states.33 The European Commission was given the authority to develop a European 
regional policy step by step during the process of European integration. The importance 
of a European regional policy had already been made clear by the German president of 
the first Commission of the European Economic Community (EEC), Walter Hallstein, in 
the early 1960s. Hallstein stated – during a conference for questions about the regional 
economy – that regional policy was not a policy which could be viewed as distinct from 
policy on exchange rates, agriculture and infrastructure, or from tax policy, economic 
and trade policy and so on, because regional policy penetrates all sectors.34 Hallstein 
also emphasized the strong connection between the economic and regional dimensions 
(Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 1 1961: 14).35 He also 
explained that “regional policy concerns humans in their geographical settings. The 
space in which humans exist, together with time and historical circumstance, is one of 
the elementary determining factors of their existence and more than that: it counts 
among the most elementary issues of being. The inescapable influence that it has on all 
human beings is the starting point for regional policy” (Europäische 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 1 1961: 14).36  
 
                                                 
33
 The European Commission came into being with the ratification of the Merger Treaty (1 July 
1967) of the six member states, when the hitherto separate Communities (ECSC, EEC and 
EURATOM) were merged into one single institutional structure with one Commission and one 
single Council (Laursen 2010: 1). 
34
 Original W. Hallstein: “Die Regionalpolitik stellt sich nicht neben Währungspolitik, 
Landwirtschaftspolitik und Verkehrspolitik, Steuerpolitik, Konjunkturpolitik, Handelspolitik usw. auf 
dieselbe Ebene als eine von anderen Instanzen als dem Wirtschaftsminister, Finanzminister, 
Verkehrsminister usw. betriebene staatliche Exekutivtätigkeit, sondern sie durchdringt alle 
Wirtschaften“ (Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 1 1961: 14). 
35
 Original W. Hallstein “Da die Wirtschaftspolitik den Menschen in allen wirtschaftlichen 
Zusammenhängen, also auch in seiner räumlichen Bedingtheit, ergreift, findet sich in allen 
wirtschaftspolitischen Entscheidungen, in allen wirtschaftlichen Tun, ein regionales Element“ 
Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 1:140 / The Konferenz über Fragen 
der regionalen Wirtschaft took place at 6-8 December 1961. 
36
 Original W. Hallstein: “Die Regionalpolitik sieht den Menschen in seiner räumlichen 
Bezogenheit. Tatsächlich gehört der Raum, in dem er gestellt ist, neben der Zeit zu den 
historischen Bedingungen seines Lebens, ja zu den elementarsten Determinanten seines 
Daseins. Der Zwang, den diese Tatsache auf ihn ausübt, ist der Ansatzpunkt der Regionalpolitik“ 
(Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 1 1961: 14). 
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The aim and intention of the European regional policy of the six founding member states 
was, in the first instance, to reduce economic and social disparities between the various 
regions of the European Union (cf. Heymans 1969: 15). Structured Europe-wide cross-
border cooperation, as we have known it is since 1989, is embedded in overall European 
regional policy and cannot be explained without reference to the development of the 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) that was established in 1975.  
 
Regional policy is mainly considered in association with economic policy and thus in this 
chapter the economic aspects of regional policy are also explained in detail.37  
 
Before the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975, 
the function of European regional policy was more that of redistributing the available 
funds in favor of the weakest member states. Miosga states quite specifically that a 
separate regional policy at the level of the Community did not exist at that time (Miosga 
1999: 11). In fact, the establishment of the ERDF can be considered as the first step 
towards regional policy at the community level and as an important milestone in the 
European integration process.  
 
It was a long journey towards the establishment of a structured form of European 
regional policy designed to stimulate cross-border cooperation, and this process 
developed in tandem with wider European integration; in fact, it was and remains an 
integral part of it. As Hooghe and Keating (1994: 367) have remarked: 
 
“[...] the establishment and expansion of regional policy can be understood 
neither as simply Commission policy, nor as simply an interstate transfer, but are 
to be explained by a series of economic and political factors.”  
 
                                                 
37
 However, there are also social and political aspects of regional policy which will not be 
elaborated in detail in this dissertation. The social aspects of regional policy stem from the fact 
that European states committed themselves in the post-war era to greater equalization of living 
standards within their own national territories. In contrast to the idea of “free movement of labour“, 
where labour would move to regions of possible employment, the social case says that people 
should be allowed to remain in their own communities, preserving their cultural and social 
traditions, rather than being forced to follow capital and migrate to new locations. The political 
aspect of regional policy stemed from the need to legitimize the new economic and political order, 
especially in peripheral regions or those which stood to lose from the change (Hooghe and 
Keating 1994: 369-370). 
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However, the European Commission, with its current function of managing the Structural 
Funds for regional development, plays a major part in conducting European regional 
policy and cross-border cooperation.  
 
 
4.1 The early stages of European integration 
 
Overall, the years immediately following World War II were years of convergence, when 
nation states negotiated with each other and sought to discover how they could best act 
together and where the boundaries of convergence were (George and Bache 2001: 45, 
87ff). The states of Europe had to reorient and redefine themselves, partly by redefining 
and restructuring the apparatus of the state at the national level, but also by looking to 
one another and attempting to establish connections and cooperate. A growing interest 
in Europe as a whole came increasingly into play during those early years following the 
end of World War II: 
 
“The Second World War was a catalyst for a renewed interest in European unity. 
It contributed to arguments that nationalism and national rivalries, by culminating 
war, had discredited and bankrupted the interdependent state as the foundation 
of political organization and international order, and that a replacement for the 
state had to be found in a comprehensive continental community” (Cini 2007: 
14). 
 
An awareness of the advantages of working together between the states was born.  
 
In reality, economic factors were ultimately the main reason for inter-state cooperation in 
Western Europe.38 The creation of new international and financial arrangements within 
Europe right after World War II were the first fruits of the Bretton Woods Conference in 
1944, where the representatives of forty-four countries agreed to the establishment of 
two new bodies: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
                                                 
38
 The economic aspect was also important because the European Recovery Program (Marshall 
Aid) that was given to Europe by the US came with the requirement that recipient states endeavor 
to promote greater economic cooperation among themselves (cf. Nugent 2006: 18). 
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Reconstruction (the World Bank).39 In 1947, the IMF and the World Bank became 
operative and, in addition, international economic cooperation was taken a step further 
when twenty-three countries negotiated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), with the aim of facilitating trade by lowering international trade barriers (Nugent 
2006: 17).  
 
Another example of the multiple initiatives for international cooperation undertaken 
around that time was the Treaty of Brussels, which included France, the UK and the 
Benelux countries in March 1948 (Segers 2007: 51). The aim of this Treaty was to 
promote collective defense and improve cooperation in the economic, social and cultural 
fields (Nugent 2006: 587). In April 1948, this resulted in the first major post-war Western 
European organization, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 
with sixteen founding member states. The OEEC’s immediate task was to manage the 
receipt of US aid, encourage joint economic policies and discourage barriers to trade. Its 
long-term aim was to build “a sound European economy through the cooperation of its 
members” (Nugent 2006: 18). The OEEC can be considered as one of the ‘integration 
initiatives’ within the first years of World War II, but it remained intergovernmental, as did 
the Council of Europe (CoE) which was established in 1949, and was only able to 
operate with its full consent of all member governments (cf. Segers 2007: 51; Nugent 
2006: 587, 18; Cini 2007: 18).  
In contrast to their willingness to engage in new intergovernmental projects, states were 
less enthusiastic when organizations were proposed that went beyond 
intergovernmental cooperation and into supranational integration. Hence, the more 
ambitious post-war schemes, such as the establishment of the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) (founded in 1951 through the Treaty of Paris), the European 
Defense Community (EDC) (1952-1954), which was never actually established, the 
Western European Union (WEU) which came into effect in May 1955 and later the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EAEC or Euratom) also in 1957, initially involved only a limited number of 
states and were mainly economically orientated (Nugent 2006: 22, 41; George and 
Bache 2001: 56f; Segers 2007: 54).  
                                                 
39
 The IMF was established to alleviate currency instability by creating short-term credit facilities 
for countries with temporary balance of payments difficulties. The World Bank was founded to 
provide long-term loans for schemes that required major investment (Nugent 2006: 17). 
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After the establishment of the OEEC in April 1948, the federalist Congress of Europe 
met in The Hague in May 1948 (Cini 2007: 16f). The central debate at this congress was 
not whether there should be integration, but rather what form it should take. 
Governments and political parties took positions on the question of whether it should be 
confined to intensive intergovernmental collaboration embedded in formalized treaties 
and arrangements, or whether it should be something deeper that would embrace an 
element of supranationalism and which would therefore involve a reduction in national 
sovereignty (Cini 2007: 17). 
 
On 9 May 1950 Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister of 1948-1953, put forward 
a proposal for supranational cooperation in Western Europe. This plan, which was 
basically borne out of the technical and administrative initiative and behind-the-scenes 
drive of Jean Monnet, concerned the coal and steel sectors, with the aim of placing them 
under one common supranational authority (Segers 2007: 52). As Cini points out:  
 
“Monnet himself saw the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as the 
opening phase of a process of sectoral integration, where the ultimate goal of 
political union would be the long term-culmination of an accretion of integrative 
efforts, of trust and experience, in a sector-by-sector linkage of specific economic 
areas and activities that ultimately would result in a common economic market” 
(Cini 2007: 19).  
 
Schuman declared that “it is no longer the moment for vain words, but for a bold act – a 
constructive act” (Nugent 2006: 587). But he also said that “Europe will not be made at 
once, or according to a single plan” (Cini 2007: 15). 
 
Both men, Monnet and Schuman, were enthusiastic supporters of a European unity; 
however, they did not believe that the OEEC and the Council of Europe would provide 
the necessary impetus, mainly because anyone could exempt themselves from a 
decision (Nugent 2006: 36). They came to the conclusion that in Monnet’s words:  
 
“A start would have to be made by doing something both more practical and 
more ambitious. National sovereignty would have to be tackled more boldly and 
on a narrower front” (Monnet 1978: 274 in Nugent 2006: 36). 
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The new idea behind the plan was to gain control through cooperation. This plan was a 
significant change in direction for French foreign policy – firstly because former rivals 
(France and Germany) would cooperate in the field of coal and steel, a sector that had 
been crucial in the war effort of the German regime under Hitler, and secondly because 
France would give away sovereignty to a supranational body, something which in the 
past it had always been reluctant to do. In this way, the establishment of the ECSC can 
be considered the first step towards a supranational Europe. Its establishment meant, 
that for the first time (Western) European states would voluntarily relinquish part of their 
sovereignty, however limited, in favor of the Community (Nugent 2006: 36f).  
 
The ECSC Treaty was extremely ambitious, not only because it implied the creation of a 
free trade area but also because it established a common market in what at the time 
were some of the basic building blocks of any industrialized society (coal, coke, iron ore, 
steel and scrap) (Nugent 2006: 37). Besides that, the ECSC was made up of new 
centralized supranational institutions, which had the power to:  
 
“see to the abolition and prohibition of internal tariff barriers, state subsidies and 
special charges, and restrictive practices; fix prices under certain conditions; 
harmonise external commercial policy, for example by setting minimum and 
maximum custom duties on coal and steel imports from third countries; and 
impose levies on coal and steel production to finance the ECSC´s activities” 
(Nugent 2006: 37). 
 
Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg participated in the 
ECSC and signed the Treaty on 18 April 1951, only three years after the founding of the 
OEEC.40 The ECSC came into operation in July 1952 and lasted until the expiry of the 
Treaty in July 2002, when the ECSC’s responsibilities and activities were transferred to 
the European Community (Nugent 2006: 37: 588; Segers 2007: 52).  
The High Authority was established as part of the ECSC and was – according to Article 
8 of the ECSC Treaty – appointed to “[...] ensure that the objectives set out in this Treaty 
are attained in accordance with the provisions thereof” (Nugent 2006: 38).  
 
                                                 
40
 The ECSC-Treaty is also known as Treaty of Paris. 
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In order to achieve this aim, the High Authority was able to issue, on its own initiative or 
after receiving the assent of the Council of Ministers, decisions (which were binding in all 
respects to the member states), recommendations (which were binding in their 
objectives), and opinions (which did not have a binding force) (Nugent 2006: 38). The 
High Authority had no ‘decisive authority’ but it was granted decision-making autonomy 
in fields such as prohibiting subsidies, taking action against restrictive practices, 
promoting research and controlling prices under certain conditions (cf. Segers 2007: 53). 
The clearly supranational character of the High Authority was evident not only from the 
array of powers at its disposal but also from its membership. The body had nine 
members, at least one from each member state, but crucially all of them were to be 
“completely independent in the performance of their duties” and no one would be or 
should regard themselves as being a national delegate or representative (Nugent 2006: 
38).41  
 
Alongside the High Authority, three more supranational institutions were created within 
the ECSC: the Council of Ministers, the Common Assembly and the Court of Justice 
(Nugent 2006: 38f). The High Authority was controlled by the Common Assembly, which 
consisted of 78 representatives. However, the ‘decisive power’ within the construction of 
the ECSC resided with the Council of Ministers, on which politicians from the 
governments of the member states had a seat (Nugent 2006: 38f; Segers 2007: 53).  
 
In the early years of the ECSC, it was judged to be an economic success (Nugent 2006: 
40). As Nugent (2006: 40) explains, custom tariffs and quotas were abolished, progress 
was made on the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade, the restructuring of the industries 
was assisted, politicians and civil servants from the member states became accustomed 
                                                 
41
 Comparing this last statement with the Commissioners and staff of the current European 
Commission, we can see that the High Authority is a direct ancestor of our current Commission in 
which European civil servants have gone beyond national stereotypes. As McDonald pointed out, 
phrases such as “We don’t think in terms of national differences” are common and that there 
exists an esprit européen and a European identity among the staff of the Commission. Further on 
she explains that if there are differences, they are “personality differences” and if there are 
cultural differences, than that is part of Europe´s “richness” (McDonald 2000: 62). In the fieldwork 
of this research at the European Commission, the same quotes were given: working for the 
Commission means going beyond your own nationality towards a European identity (cf. interview 
8 2009, interview 9 2009). 
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to working with one another and, above all, output and inter-state trade rapidly 
increased.42  
 
The first incarnation of a European regional policy can also be found within the ECSC in 
the way it implemented policy on investment and financing and in its policy on 
competition and cartels. On the one hand, the ECSC took care to support projects in 
less developed regions and on the other hand it also supported projects that aimed to 
dismantle overdominant industrial sectors in order to stimulate the growth of a particular 
region (Heymans 1969: 22f). For example, regions that suffered due to the fact that coal 
mines were being closed received special aid from the ECSC. Thus, under the auspices 
of the ECSC, several grants were given to regions that suffered due to the restructuring 
of the coal and steel sector. With these ECSC loans it was possible to finance 
infrastructural projects such as the regeneration of industrial sectors and other 
infrastructure projects (Spudulyte 2003: 81). Later, regional studies carried out by the 
ECSC helped to bring about plans for the adjustment of regions with outmoded industrial 
structures (Heymans 1969: 23). 
 
Even though the ECSC loans went to support a specific sector, the regional 
concentration on Montanunternehmen (e.g. the Ruhrgebiet) showed the importance of 
this support at the regional political level (Spudulyte 2003: 81). The ECSC loans were a 
way to try to solve the problems that had been brought about by the structural crisis 
since the beginning of the 1960s. The ECSC “[...] supports [...] specifically within its 
constitutional framework the easing of the necessary structural changes in the coal and 
steel sectors” (Franzmeyer et al. 1975: 95).43  
 
The instruments that the ECSC used were loans and financial support (in German the 
words ‘Darlehen’ and ‘Beihilfen’ were used). Due to the fact that the ‘Montanindustrie’ is 
concentrated in particular regions, this sectoral support was in effect also a form of 
regional support (Franzmeyer et al. 1975: 97). 
 
                                                 
42
 Nugent commented that many economists question now whether these increases occurred 
because of the ECSC (Nugent 2006: 40).  
43
 Original citation: “[...] trägt [...] im Rahmen ihrer vertraglichen Möglichkeiten insbesondere dazu 
bei, die auf dem Kohle- und Stahlsektor notwendigen strukturellen Veränderungen zu erleichtern” 
(Franzmeyer et al. 1975: 95). 
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4.2 Paving the way for supranationalization: from the ECSC to the EEC 
 
The six states which signed the Treaty of Paris in 1951 to found the ECSC went on to 
sign the Treaties of Rome to found the EEC and European Atomic Energy Community 
(EAEC or EURATOM) in 1957, and thus the European Communities (EC) began their 
life as an agreement between interdependent nation states (Laursen 2010: 2; Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz 1998: 1).44 The Treaties of Rome came into effect on 1 January 
1958 (Nugent 2006: 42).  
 
With the signing of the Rome Treaties in 1957, the European Communities took on 
broader responsibilities relating to atomic energy (under the Euratom Treaty) and the 
establishment of a common market, a common commercial policy, a common 
agricultural policy and a common transport policy (under the European Economic 
Community Treaty) (Pollack 2000: 521).  
 
Of the two Treaties of Rome, the EEC Treaty was by far the most important (Nugent 
2006: 43). The aim of this Treaty was to establish a common market (defined as the free 
movement of goods, persons services and capital), to approximate national economic 
policies and to develop common policies, most specifically in agriculture. Thus the 
objectives of the Treaty were expressed mainly in economic terms, but the preamble 
implied that there was a political purpose behind them with its inclusion of the words 
“determined to lay foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe, 
[...]” (Treaty of Rome 1957, preamble: 2; Cini 2007: 21). After the signing of these two 
Treaties, three European Communities existed alongside each other and had separate 
‘executives’ in the form of the High Authority of the ECSC, one Commission for the EEC 
and another Commission for Euratom. The three Communities also had separate 
Councils of Ministers. Only the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Parliamentary 
Assembly (the later European Parliament) were shared by all three Communities 
(Laursen 2010: 2). 
 
                                                 
44
 Explaining the terms EEC, EC and EU according to Dinan (Dinan 2010: 6), who points out that 
the European Union (EU) came into existence with the Maastricht-Treaty (1992). Earlier still, the 
name of the European Economic Community (EEC) changed to the European Community (EC), 
although the acronym EC was already widely used to describe not only the EEC but also, 
collectively, the three original communities.  
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Thus, the Treaty of Paris and the two Treaties of Rome were the Founding Treaties of 
the three European Communities, and they marked major steps forward in the 
development of post-war interstate relations by the time they were signed. They laid the 
foundation on which the signatory states would integrate specific and core areas of their 
economic activities, and a degree of supranationalism was incorporated into the 
decision-making procedures that they established for the new Communities (Nugent 
2006: 47). 
 
 
4.3 European Regional Policy within the EEC 
 
This section will elaborate on regional policy within the EEC Treaty and under the EEC 
in general. At the time when the Treaties of Rome were signed, regional policy was not 
an important point of discussion, since the heart of the debate focused on economic 
integration. As Vorauer (1997: 17) states, the joining of the six states into one ECSC 
construction in 1952 and again in 1958 with the establishment of the EEC was 
underpinned by very clear political and economic aims without any explicit regional 
implications.45  
 
First of all, we should be clear that the aim of the Treaty was, on the one hand, to 
establish and oversee common policies in fields of agriculture, infrastructure, trade and 
competition. Thus the main focus of the EEC was to establish a common internal or 
‘single’ market. On the other hand, the purpose of the EEC was to coordinate national 
economic policies with the goal of enhancing integration within the EEC. The thinking 
behind this was that the establishment of a common internal market would lead to 
increased economic growth and also reduce regional disparities within the community 
(Schindler 2005: 39).  
 
                                                 
45
 The ‘political aim’ in this respect was the idea of European integration after WWII which had 
two aims – firstly to build up a bloc against the Soviet influence in the east and secondly as a tool 
to promote sustainable peace between Europe’s two former enemies Germany and France. From 
the economic perspective, the new community was seen as a chance to retain a more 
competitive position against the leading economic powers of the United States of America and 
Japan (Vorauer 1997: 18). 
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The idea was that in a perfect market, equilibrium would be achieved and maintained by 
the free movement of capital and labor and that labor would migrate to areas of growth 
in search of employment and higher wages (Hooghe and Keating 1994: 368; see also 
footnote 36). In short, market distortions needed to be removed and the Commission’s 
role was to ensure progress towards this idea of a common market, “where conditions 
resemble those on a domestic market and where there is effective competition” (Von der 
Groeben 1969: 1). As such, the EEC Treaty did not include any specific norms that 
clearly defined the terms of regional policy (cf. Heymans 1969: 17).  
 
However, there was also an awareness that it was essential to have regional dividing 
lines within this market, in order to get a better grip of the regional problems and to place 
them in their geographical context, to gauge their importance and to ensure appropriate 
solutions (Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 2 1961: 61).46  
 
A special working group concerning regional policies was set up on 25th September 
1959, consisting of representations from the member states. This working group made it 
clear that the term ‘region’ could also be useful in a sociological sense, such as in cases 
where inhabitants of one region have some special attributes in comparison with other 
regions. The working group identified various socio-economic regions within Europe that 
might deserve special attention (Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, 
Volume 2 1961: 62; Commissie Europese Economische Gemeenschap, deel 2 1961: 
70).47  
 
Discussions at a special conference on the subject held later on in 1961 defined the 
exact borders of those socio-economic spaces. In practice it would be important to take 
care that these regions should not be too large, because then they would have the same 
borders as the national states and thereby lose their importance as distinct socio-
economic units. However, the other extreme – making these units too small – would 
                                                 
46
 Original German quote: “Eine gebietsmäßige Aufteilung ist jedoch unerläßlich, um die 
regionalen Probleme konkret zu erfassen, sie in ihren geographischen Rahmen zu stellen, ihre 
Bedeutung zu ermessen und entsprechende Lösungen zu finden” (Europäische 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 2 1961: 61). 
47
 Within the Dutch version of these documents, the German word Gebie‘ is translated as streek 
(cf. Commissie Europese Economische Gemeenschap, deel 2 1961: 69f). There is no English 
version of those two documents (cf. Commissie Europese Economische Gemeenschap deel 1 
and deel 2; Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 1 and Volume 2 1961). 
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mean that there would be too many regions. If the regions were just the same as cities 
or towns, their economic and sociological importance would also be undermined 
(Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 2 1961: 62).  
 
At that time, confusion prevailed about the terms ‘regional policy’ and ‘regional structural 
policy’. These terms were used very often in practice and with no clear explanation or 
definition (Heymans 1969: 1). Heymans (1969: 1) states that – at that time – in the 
economic theories as well as in daily practice, there was no commonly accepted 
definition of the words ‘regional policy’.  
Generally, there was agreement on the fact that the economic integration in Europe 
would only work if regional imbalances, especially in respect to income, employment and 
infrastructure, were moderated.  
 
 
4.3.1 Border Regions in the early documents of the EEC  
 
At the same conference of 1961 – the German Ministerialrat a.D. (Head of Division, 
retired) J.D. Lauenstein explained the term Grenzzone in the North of the Dutch-German 
border-area (area Emsland/Drenthe and Groningen) as follows:  
 
“We need to discuss a region that is developing on both sides of a national 
border at the same time. It is an area that was always homogeneous by nature, 
but that became divided due to the geography of surrounding marshland that 
could not be crossed, but this division no longer exists because of the cultivation 
of this land on both sides” (Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, 
Volume 1 1961: 159).48  
  
With that brief description of this particular Dutch-German border area, Lauenstein 
pointed out geographical changes that had taken place and the consequences of this for 
                                                 
48
 “Es ist zu berichten über einen Raum, der beiderseits einer nationalen Grenze gleichzeitig 
entwickelt wird. Ein Raum, der von seiner Beschaffenheit her gleichartig war und dessen einstige 
Trennung durch ungangbare Moore infolge Kultivierungen beiderseits nicht mehr existiert“ 
(Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 1 1961: 159). 
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the border area itself. While in the past, the border between the two countries in that 
particular area had been very vague because of the marshland that separated the two 
areas on both sides of the border, that situation changed with the (partial) cultivation of 
that land for agriculture. That cultivation had created one single area which was divided 
by a national border that was no longer blurred, because the land had become usable, 
unlike the former area of marshland. 
 
At the same conference, other European border areas or regions were also introduced in 
detail: the Province of West-Flanders (Belgium), South Luxembourg, the French North 
Lorraine and Luxemburg (Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 1 
1961: 189-202; 203-240; 241-265). That report on the separate border regions showed 
clearly that every border area was different and faced its own issues and challenges. 
The differences were geographic, economic or demographic in nature. However, the 
common ground for border areas was – and still is – always the same: the division of an 
area by a national border. Later – in the closing report of the conference – it was 
acknowledged that where border areas had the same economic structure, the 
development could be coordinated by undertaking the same actions at the same time. 
Examples of border areas with a similar economic structure at that time were given as: 
Eifel/Ardennen and Emsland/Drenthe; and the examples of actions undertaken were 
river management, common infrastructure or common farm or land consolidation 
(Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 2 1961: 25). During the 
conference, S. Mansholt also emphasized “special problem border areas” (Europäische 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 2 1961: 11). He spoke of “changing 
problems” within these areas caused by the disappearance of economic borders, while 
political borders – or in other words the administrative borders – remained. He confirmed 
that on the one hand border areas were and would remain far from administrative 
centers, while on the other hand economic borders would diminish through the 
establishment of a single common market. That tension would lead to many questions to 
which there were not yet any answers, he said. Later, Mansholt explained that, in 
general one set of border-area problems would disappear through the abolition of 
economic borders, but that new adjustments and movements would have to be taken 
into consideration (Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 2 1961: 
12). Mansholt explained that there was an important agreement during the discussions 
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concerning border areas in general, which was “cross-border cooperation should begin 
immediately” (Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 2 1961: 12).49  
 
The document of the ‘Erstes Programm für die mittelfristige Wirtschaftspolitik’ of 1967 
focused particularly on areas near the Community’s internal borders in its appendix to 
the chapter on ‘Regional Policy’, where it states that:  
 
“For regions situated on the common border of member states, the progressive 
dismantling of economic borders increases the necessity for cooperation, which 
should focus mainly on improving infrastructure and therefore on the 
infrastructural connections across borders. Steps that lead to the development of 
such areas should form the basis of development programs. Such programs 
should enable a mutual exchange of point of views across the border and for 
such projects which had an effect on the neighboring region, [...]”(Europäische 
Gemeinschaften 1967: 166).50 
 
Thus came recognition of the specific issues faced by border regions within the wider 
process of European integration in which the internal market was to be completed in the 
long run, and the improvement of cross-border infrastructure was identified as a focus 
for regional policy programs.  
 
 
                                                 
49
 Original quotation: “dass es sich inbesondere hier um ein Gebiet handelt, auf dem sofort mit 
einer Zusammenarbeit über die Grenzen hinaus begonnen werden muss” (Europäische 
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kommission, Volume 2 1961: 12). 
50
 Original quotation: “Für die an den gemeinsamen Grenzen der Mitgliedstaaten gelegenen 
Gebiete erhöht der progressive Abbau der wirtschaftlichen Grenzen die Notwendigkeit der 
Zusammenarbeit, die vor allem auf die Verbesserung der Infrastruktur gerichtet sein muß und 
insbesondere auf die Verkehrsverbindungen über die Grenzen hinweg. Die zur Entwicklung 
dieser Gebiete vorgesehenen Maßnahmen sollten zum Gegenstand von Programmen gemacht 
werden, die es erlauben, die Absichten beiderseits der Grenzen kennenzulernen und für 
diejenigen Projekte, deren Wirkungsbereich sich auf die Nachbarregion erstreckt, [...]“ 
(Europäische Gemeinschaften 1967: 166). 
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4.4 The development of a common European Regional Policy after 1957 
  
As explained previously, after the signing of the Treaties of Rome (1957) there were 
three European Communities (EC) (the EURATOM, EEC and ECSC). These 
Communities had separate ‘executive’ bodies in the form of the High Authority of the 
ECSC and one Commission each for the EEC and EURATOM. These three 
Communities also had separate Councils of Ministers but they shared one European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Parliamentary Assembly (the later European Parliament) 
(Laursen 2010: 1). Suggestions concerning the possible merger of the three ‘executives’ 
started to emerge soon after the Treaties of Rome came into force in 1958. On 8 April 
1965, negotiations on merging these three separate communities were concluded with 
the signing of the Merger Treaty (or Brussels Treaty) at an Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC). This Treaty came into force on 1 July 1967 after being ratified by the 
six member states and it meant that the three executive bodies of the hitherto separate 
Communities were merged into a single institutional structure with one Commission and 
one Council (Laursen 2010: 1; Nugent 2006: 589). 
In short, the European Commission of today has its origins in the High Authority which 
was established in 1951 as an institution of the ECSC but has over time become a 
supranational executive body that is responsible for the implementation of European 
policies and is representative of the organization as a whole rather than of the 
organization’s individual member states. The European Commission was first 
empowered through the ratification of the Merger Treaty (Laursen 2010: 1; George and 
Bache 2001: 88). 
 
After 1967 the communities existed alongside each other and shared the European 
institutions: the supranational Commission and the intergovernmental Council, as well as 
the Parliamentary Assembly and the Court of Justice, which they had already shared 
before 1967. In the same year, a separate Directorate-General for Regional Policy was 
established within the Commission in line with the aim of achieving a Europe with more 
balance between its regions. At this point, we need to refer briefly to the theoretical 
model of this dissertation: the establishment of one common supranational Commission 
and of a separate DG responsible for regional policy within it can be formally considered 
the first supranationalization shift of this case study.  
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Preliminary thinking developed on the practical implementation of European region 
policy during the period immediately after signing the Treaties of Rome. As explained 
previously, no common regional policy was defined in the Treaties of Rome, but the 
Commission did seek to gain competencies in this field. In its first annual report of 1958, 
the Commission emphasized that there was a need for a common regional policy 
(Holtzmann 1997: 102; Europäische Kommission 1958). Under the chapter 
“Harmonisierung der Expansion und der Regionalpolitik”, it says this on the regions and 
areas of the member states: 
 
“The existing imbalances have to [...] be reduced. Economic development 
should therefore be harmonized across the member states and their most 
important regions in different ways, [...]” (Europäische Kommission 1958: 45).51 
 
In the early stages of European regional policy, the Commission wanted on the one 
hand to coordinate the national regional policies of the member states, and on the other 
hand to encourage the discussion about a separate regional policy at the Community 
level (Holtzmann 1997: 102). In the Commission’s second annual report in 1959, it 
defined which areas or regions were less developed in relative terms. These were 
remote areas that were “[...] relatively less developed; the higher the distance to the 
central zone, the less developed the area is, measured in terms of the social product per 
person of the population” (Europäische Kommission 1959: 50) and areas of southern 
Italy were named specifically (Europäische Kommission 1959: 51).52  
The main goal of a common regional policy was to reduce existing disparities between 
the various European regions and to benefit from growth potentials that had hitherto not 
been used through common financing (Schindler 2005: 48; cf. ). 
 
In 1967, the Commission submitted its ‘initial program’ and this was duly approved by 
the Council. In a section on regional policy, concrete guidelines for the regional policy of 
the member states and the community-level institutions were elaborated. In short, this 
                                                 
51
 Original citation: “Die bestehenden Unterschiede müssen [...] vermindert werden. Die 
wirtschaftliche Entwicklung wird daher in den Mitgliedstaaten und ihren wichtigsten Regionen in 
verschiedener Weise angeglichen werden müssen, [...]“ (Europäische Kommission 1958: 45). 
52 Original citation: “[...] verhältnismässig am wenigsten entwickelt; je weiter sie von der Mittelzone 
abliegen, um so niedriger ist ihr Entwicklungsstand, gemessen an dem Sozialprodukt pro Kopf 
der Bevölkerung“ (Europäische Kommission 1959: 50). 
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‘first program’ was a start for the ‘programmatic acknowledgement’ of regional policy. 
The reason for this was the awareness that balanced, medium-term economic growth 
meant bringing about a better balance between the regions of the Community and in 
particularly helping lagging regions to catch up. These steps were to be “directed in such 
a way that in the disadvantaged regions, the necessary conditions would be created to 
stimulate the deployment of economic initiatives in respect to a mobilization of the 
product resources still available. In the meantime, care must be taken that the 
overconcentration of economic activity, which is connected to an above average 
increase in economic and social costs and that consequently impact on overall economic 
growth, is avoided” (Europäische Gemeinschaften 1967: 41; cf. Holtzmann 1997: 102).53 
 
On 17 October 1969, the Commission put forward its first suggestion for regulation in 
this field in which it formulated its regional political aims. There were four elements: the 
establishment of regional development programs by the Commission and member 
states; the establishment of a permanent committee for regional development consisting 
of representatives of the Commission, the EIB and the member states; financial support 
through interest payments and bonds; and the coordination of spatial policies by the 
Community (Holtzmann 1997: 102f). The most central point here was the establishment 
of the ‘development programs’ for less developed regions. The common financing of 
these regional plans would be realized by creating ‘interest payments and bonds’ for 
regional development (Schindler 2005: 48). 
 
These proposals were not approved by the Council, however, but surprisingly, on 22 
March 1971, the Council itself grabbed the initiative and emphasized that a European 
regional policy was in the interests of all member states and that the Commission should 
be given the appropriate instruments with which to solve regional difficulties in the 
Community (Holtzmann 1997: 103). The reasons for this sudden acceleration in this 
policy field, whereby the Council suddenly took the initiative, lay in the determination of 
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 Original quotation: “Sie [Die Maßnahmen] sollten vor allem so ausgerichtet werden, daß in den 
benachteiligten Gebieten die notwendigen Voraussetzungen für die Entfaltung wirtschaftlicher 
Initiativen im Hinblick auf eine Mobilisierung noch vorhandener Produktionsreserven geschaffen 
werden. Zugleich ist dafür Sorge zu tragen, daß übertriebenen Ballungen der wirtschaftlichen 
Aktivitäten entgegengewirkt wird, die mit überproportional steigenden wirtschaftlichen und 
sozialen Kosten verbunden sind und infolgedessen die allgemeinen wirtschaftlichen 
Wachstumsmöglichkeiten beeinträchtigen“ (Europäische Gemeinschaften 1967: 41; cf. 
Holtzmann 1997: 102). 
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the Council to achieve European economic and monetary union within 10 years (cf. 
Werner Report54 in Holtzmann 1997: 103; Schindler 2005: 48-49). The Werner Report 
highlighted the possible negative regional effects, and the need to develop one common 
regional policy in addition to the individual regional policies of the member states 
(Schindler 2005: 49; cf. Verdun 2007: 325).  
 
Another important trigger in acknowledging the necessity of a common regional policy 
was the decision to enlarge the Community northwards to include the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark at a summit in October 1972 in Paris. This was because in the UK, agriculture 
made up only a small part of the economy and the UK imported much of its agricultural 
products from its former colonies in the Commonwealth. This meant that the UK would 
pay more towards the Community to support agriculture throughout the Community than 
it would receive from the existing Structural Funds. For that reason the UK formulated a 
condition before joining the Community, which was the establishment of an ‘equalization 
fund’ (German: Ausgleichfonds) (Holtzmann 1997: 103-104). On the principle of the 
political wil of integrating the UK into the Community, the Community agreed to the 
conditions of the UK and with that the establishment of the European Regional 
Development Fund in 1975 was a fact. Before the fund was established, the heads of 
governments of the member states gave the European Commission until 31 December 
1973 to address the task of establishing a fund for regional development with the goal of 
reducing the largest regional disparities (Holtzmann 1997: 104). At the summit of Paris in 
1974, the heads of governments decided that the European Regional Development 
Fund would come into effect on 1 January 1975 with the aim of correcting the principal 
imbalances in the Community (Council 1975 No 724/75, preamble). As will be explained 
more in detail in chapter 5, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was 
established in 1975 as a step towards conducting regional policy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54
 The Werner Report of 1970 was the first paper of the European institutions whose principal aim 
was to bring aboutEuropean monetary union. The name ‘Werner Report’ came from the minister 
president of Luxemburg Pierre Werner (EU ABC, web page, access 17.08.2012). 
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4.5 Summary 
 
Chapter 4 has examined the emergence of European regional policy in the overall 
context of European integration, beginning immediately after the end of the Second 
World War; this phase witnessed a supranationalization shift in which authority was 
transferred from the member states to the European institutions, particularly the 
executive body of the European cooperation.  
In the very early years after World War II, cooperation took place on an 
intergovernmental basis, but in the 1950s the first supranational body had been 
established in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The High Authority of 
the ECSC can be seen as the direct forerunner of the later supranational European 
Commission, that was established in 1967, when the Merger Treaty of 1965 came into 
effect. 
  
The signing of the Treaty of Rome (1957) represented a milestone in European 
integration. The Treaty does not mention the subject of a common European regional 
policy explicitly; however, in official European documents the awareness of creating a 
balanced Europe and enhancing the economic and structural situation of border regions 
was the subject of increasing attention, and the practical consequences of this 
increasing awareness were clear in the conferences and discussions held on this 
increasingly important topic in the years between the Treaty of Rome (1957) and the 
Merger Treaties (1965/67) that merged the three separate European Communities (the 
EEC, EURATOM and the ECSC) into one supranational construction. At the heart of 
these arguments was the wish to promote balanced economic development across the 
regions of Europe and achieve a more balanced Europe with a better economic climate.  
The most important developments in cross-border governance in this period were the 
development of the European Communities and the later establishment of the European 
Commission and especially the creation of a separate Directorate General for Regional 
Policy in 1967 within the organizational structure of the Commission.  
 
The development of the European integration process, as described in this chapter, 
represented a significant shift in competences, away from the member states towards 
central European agencies that were empowered to implement new policies. The 
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member states, acting as Principals, gave European Institutions, and the European 
Commission in particular, the supranational authority to develop a common European 
economic and structural policy and thus created an Agent with considerable leeway to 
act under its own initiative.  
Considering illustration 4 of this chapter, wherein the first step of the MLG-PA model 
(see also illustration 3 in section 3.3.1) which is created for the purpose of this case 
study, it can be seen that the multiple first Principals built up the (first) Agent by 
establishing supranational instutions, especially the European Commission with its 
separate DG for Regional Policy. So far two levels of governance are involved and one 
shift of authority happened. 
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5. Renationalization Shift: Implementing Regional Policy from 1975 until 2013 
 
This chapter will focus on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and how it 
has been implemented since 1975, right up until the present day. It will describe how the 
second shift – that is called also ‘renationalization shift’ in this dissertation – took place, 
in which national (in Germany also regional) actors become directly involved in 
European policy making to an increasing extent, and also examine the consequences for 
the authorities involved at the different levels of governance. The ‘renationalization shift’ 
therefore started by the introduction of the ERDF in 1975, that can therefore by 
considered as kind of a turning point for this case study. 
 
When the ERDF was established, the European Commission gained decision-making 
powers over how these funds were to be distributed and was free to forge cooperative 
relationships with subregional and regional governments, as well as with social partners 
and organized civil society (Piattoni 2010: 105f.). The establishment of the ERDF was 
thus an important step for the Commission and enabled it to act as a more independent 
institution, since it was able to support subregional and regional groups by providing 
funding that had previously only been available through national governments, if at all 
(Nugent 1995: 242). However, in general, the role of the Commission in implementing 
EU policies has, over time, become increasingly that of coordinator and overseer. 
Nowadays, the Commission seeks to supervise, or at least hold a watching brief over the 
national agencies and how they perform their duties on behalf of the EU (cf. Nugent 
2006: 175). In this case, supervising means that the European Commission has 
delegated responsibility for implementing the ERDF towards the national (regional and 
subregional) levels of the member states. In that way, the point at which the ERDF 
began to be implemented can be regarded as the beginning of the second shift – the 
renationalization shift – that occurred throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s due to a 
series of reforms in the funds. Illustration 5 below shows how the renationalization shift 
took place and the European Commission, as a new Principal, gave authority to new 
Agents.55  
 
                                                 
55
 As explained in chapter 3 in Germany the regional ‘Bundesland-level’ is responsible for 
implementing European regional policy. 
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Illustration 5: The renationalization shift
56 
 
           
 
(Source: Own illustration) 
 
 
Giving authority (back) to the member states, and to regional and subregional actors, 
also involved regulating to ensure conformity to the rules of the funds and the 
establishment of mechanisms for controlling and auditing at the supranational level. 
Consequently, a few years after the launch of the ERDF, regulations were revised and 
several series of reforms led to the development of a more complex system (see also 
section 5.1.1).  
 
                                                 
56
 The second shift will be called the ‘renationalization shift’ in this dissertation. However, this shift 
could also be called ‘decentralization shift’ seen from a supranational perspective. 
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5.1 Launching the European Regional Development Fund (1975) 
 
The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was set up in 1975 and was a 
further step towards an active European regional policy. The introduction of the fund 
took place two years after the EEC had been enlarged to include Ireland, Denmark and 
the UK. The enlargement had meant the Community was no longer a group of states 
with a relatively equal level of development and it now included some extreme variations 
in wealth and economic frameworks (cf. Vorauer 1997: 48). The fund provided financial 
support for the development and structural adjustment of regional economies, economic 
change, enhanced competitiveness as well as territorial cooperation throughout the EU 
(European Commission 2011, web page, access 10.08.2011). The ERDF was limited to 
less prosperous regions and focused mainly on productive investment, infrastructure, the 
development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and research and 
development projects (Boldrin and Canova 2001: 223). 
 
Basically, European regional policy in the form of the ERDF was initially designed to 
support national regional policies and thus it only supported those regions that were 
defined by the member states themselves through their own regional policies. In effect, 
member states retained decision-making power over which regions should be supported 
and to what extent this should occur. Hence, in the period 1975-1979, the member 
states themselves selected the regions that would be eligible to receive funding and 
which regions would receive funding, but there were no effective mechanisms to ensure 
that the money actually reached the target regions. In general, governments came up 
with projects that would receive funding and mainly the grants and infrastructure 
spending were simply channeled into plans and projects that had already been planned, 
or even, as Hooghe and Keating (1994: 372) state, that had already been completed. 
During this ‘phase of participation’, then, the member states broadly retained their 
dominant role and the European Commission was not involved in their decisions. Neither 
did it have any meaningful way of monitoring the implementation of the projects (Giolitti 
1983: 11; Hooghe and Keating 1994: 372; Holtzmann 1997: 104). According to Hooghe 
and Keating (1994: 272f), a serious problem with the ERDF during this first phase of 
implementation was the question of ‘additionality’.57 It was difficult to determine whether 
                                                 
57
 The later introduced basic principles of the Structural Funds, where the principle of 
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Community resources were additional to national regional policy expenditure or they 
were merely another mechanism for financing this expenditure. The European 
Commission insisted on the additionality of the Community funds for regional policy, 
while the member states equally tried to treat them as part of their consolidated fund. 
The Commission had no Community-wide database and so no means of making 
comparisons across the Community; however, in 1975 a start was made on defining the 
regions according to the NUTS categorization (Hooghe and Keating 1994: 373).58 Also 
the later ‘principle of concentration’ of the fund was almost absent in this phase, because 
the fund did not concentrate resources on regions that needed them but rather tried to 
give every member state a slice of the cake. There were no development goals for a 
common European structural policy (cf. Vorauer 1997: 48). In fact, regions that were 
relatively prosperous and located in wealthy states could qualify for ERDF money if there 
was national support. Meanwhile poorer regions in poorer states often received little 
support in the form of national funding and this meant that those regions could not 
receive any money from the ERDF, because of missing cofinancing. Additionally, 
member states were able to scale back their own investment purely on the basis that 
there were fixed quotas for all member states. Finally, ERDF support was also rather 
one-sided, because – as will be explained below – the projects that received financial 
support mainly involved production-orientated infrastructure, while other regional 
aspects, such as housing structure or regional population, were ignored (Holtzmann 
1997: 105). 
 
Initially, the ERDF was able to support projects and plans within the industrial and 
service sectors with up to 20% funding, infrastructural projects with up to 30% funding, 
other projects of regional importance with up to 40% funding and projects related to 
research for financing future projects and plans with up to 50% funding. Applications for 
support were submitted by the member states and the decisions were laid before the 
Commission, after a hearing of a committee that included representatives of all member 
states (Council 1975 No 724/75, Art. 12; Giolitti 1983: 11).59  
                                                                                                                                                 
‘additionality’ is part of (next to ‘concentration’, ‘partnership’ and ‘programming) will be elaborated 
later on in secions 5.3; 5.3.1; 7.1 and 7.3. 
58
 Today the European Commission uses specific regional units as targets for the process of 
convergence. These regional units are divided into NUTS1, NUTS2 and NUTS3 regional units (cf. 
Boldrin and Canova 2001: 2012) / NUTS= Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics 
59
 The ‘Fund Committee’ was established for this purpose. It was composed of representatives of 
the member states and chaired by a representative from the Commission, though the chairman 
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In 1977 the Commission submitted proposals for reform in response to increasing 
criticism of the ERDF, which was often seen simply as top-up funding for national 
budgets that did not contribute directly to the goal of reducing subregional economic 
disparities or help to alleviate regional disparities (Holtzmann 1997: 105). In fact, in this 
initial phase of the ERDF, the fund appeared to be more a means by which the EEC 
could participate in the respective national regional policies of the individual member 
states rather than having much communitarian effect in its own right. 
 
In 1979, the Council decided on a first set of revisions to the working of the ERDF. One 
important change was granting the Commission the right to operate in regions that were 
not already being supported by member states. Hence, in 1979, the Commission was 
able to allocate a small ‘non-quota section’ which was funded according to programs 
rather than individual projects (Hooghe and Keating 1994: 373). This involved reserving 
5% of the total financial volume of regional expenditure was for the ‘Program to 
overcome particular regional problems that were caused by the policy of the 
Community’.60 61 This became known as ‘Specific Community Regional Development 
Measures’ and these programs were decided with mutual agreement from both the 
Commission and the member states (Council 1979 No 214/79 Art. 2 (B); Title III; Art. 13 
(1), (2); Giolitti 1983: 11; Miosga 1999: 34; Holtzmann 1997: 105-106).62 But the regions 
themselves (which were supposed to benefit from these changes) were still not part of 
the decision-making process (Holtzmann 1997: 105). The decision-making procedure for 
those Specific Community Regional Development Measures is officially described in the 
Council regulation of 1979 as follows:  
 
“[...] the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament, shall determine for each of these 
measures to be implemented [...] in the form of a special program [...]” (Council 
1979 No 214/79, Art. 13 (3) ). 
                                                                                                                                                 
was not entitled to vote (Council 1975 No 724/75 Art. 11). 
60
 Original title: ‘Programm zur Überwindung bestimmter regionaler, durch die Politik der 
Gemeinschaft ausgelöster Probleme’. 
61
 For example, the problems caused by the enlargements and the structural change within the 
Community. Support was meant for regions that needed a better supply of energy and which 
were located in the border area between Ireland and Northern Ireland (Holtzmann 1997: 106). 
62
 In German it is called spezifische Gemeinschaftsmaßnahmen or Gemeinschaftsausgaben. 
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In addition, within the changes made in 1979, selection based purely on economic 
factors and production-orientated infrastructure – as had been provided for in the 1975 
system (cf. Council 1975 No 724/75) – was ended and other potential methods for 
developing and creating a more propitious environment for small and medium-sized 
companies were included (Holtzmann 1997: 106). The scope of the newly established 
‘Specific Community Regional Development Measures’ was defined clearly by Art. 13 of 
the Council regulation 1979: 
 
“The fund may participate in financing Specific Community Regional 
Development Measures [...] these shall be measures:  
- [...] in order to take a better account of their regional dimension or to reduce 
their regional consequences, 
- [...] intended to meet the structural consequences of particularly serious 
occurrences in certain regions or areas with a view to replacing jobs lost and 
creating the necessary infrastructures for this purpose.  
These measures shall not have as their object the internal reorganization of 
declining sectors but may, by establishing new economic activities, promote 
the creation of alternative employment in regions or areas in a difficult 
situation” (Council 1979 No 214/79 Art. 13 (1) ). 
 
So for the first time, financing was organized through a number of annual programs 
rather than through single projects, and it included support for non-material investment 
such as funding consultation infrastructure for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(Miosga 1999: 34).63 
 
The reforms also included the principle of additionality in financial support. During 
preparations for the amended regulations of 1979, the Commission had wanted to 
include the ‘additionality principle’ in the text of the regulation, but the Council decided 
just to mention it in the preamble of the regulation, as follows (Holtzmann 1997: 106): 
 
                                                 
63
 Since the year 1980 seven of those Specific Community Regional Development Measures 
were established (cf. Miosga 1999: 34). 
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“whereas the procedures for making apparent the complementary character of 
the assistance provided from the fund should be specified, and whereas the 
Commission should, for this purpose, be given the information necessary for it to 
ascertain that this complementary character is ensured” (Council 1979 No 
214/79, preamble).  
 
An initial attempt at controlling of the efficiency of the spending was also made in the 
new regulations of 1979. However, checks on the efficiency of ERDF spending at that 
time and the instruments used remained rather limited. The Commission was charged 
with compiling a socio-economic report every two years on the situation in the regions 
and making suggestions for future goals and subsidy priorities (Giolitti 1983: 11-12; 
Holtzmann 1997: 107; Council 1979 No 214/79 (1); (2)).64 
 
Finally, the new regulations also redistributed the resources of the fund and stated 
that financial aid from the fund would be distributed as follows: Belgium 1.39%; 
Denmark 1.20%; Germany: 6.00%; France: 16.86%; Ireland: 6.46%; Italy: 39.39%; 
Luxembourg: 0.09%; the Netherlands: 1.58%; and the UK: 27.03% (Council 1979 No 
214/79 Art. 2 (a)). 
 
On 19 June 1984, the Council passed a further reform of the ERDF. Under these 
changes, the previously fixed spending quotas for each member state were replaced by 
ranges, which were set for three years.65 Within the new regulations, this was explained 
as follows:  
 
“3. The ERDF’s resources shall be used on the basis of ranges of which the 
lower and upper limits are shown below. [...] 
4. These upper and lower limits shall apply for periods of three years. 
                                                 
64
 Changing requirements on control and reporting of the ERDF will be discussed intensively in 
subsection 5.1.1. 
65
 Initially, the budget was distinguished through quotas fixed by the Commission. This method 
was often criticized and change was introduced step by step. Later on, in the years 1985-1987 
the system of quotas was replaced by a system of Beteiligungsspannen with fixed upper and 
lower limits, with the aim of achieving a better adjustment to the particular regional problems 
(Marx 1992: 70f in Spudulyte 2003: 77). 
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For each member state, the lower limit of the range constitutes the minimum 
amount of ERDF resources it is guaranteed if it submits, during the 
corresponding period, an adequate volume of applications for aid which satisfy 
the conditions set out in this regulation” (Council 1984 No 1787/84 Art.4 (3),(4)). 
 
Thus a minimum budget was guaranteed as well as a fixed maximum for each member 
state. While under the previous system, the European Commission had had little leeway 
due the fixed quotas for each state and because the Specific Community Regional 
Development Measures were decided by the Commission together with the member 
states, under this new system, the Commission was able to decide for itself how funding 
was to be spent (Holtzmann 1997: 107).  
Another innovation was that four different measures could be financed within the ERDF, 
which were defined by Art. 5 of the 1984-regulation as follows: Community Programs, 
National Programs of Community Interest, projects and studies (Council 1984 No 
1787/84, Art. 5). 
Compared to the programs that the ERDF could support, there were two differences: the 
Community Programs and the National Programs of Community Interest. The 
Community Programs were a collection of several annual measures which were not 
restricted to one particular state. The Council would decide on these programs after they 
had been jointly elaborated by the Commission and the member states. In addition to 
this, there were also Community Programs with specific aims.66 The National Programs 
of Community Interest were collections of multi-annual measures that focused on the 
goals and aims of particular states, the fulfillment of which would also fulfill community 
goals. For these programs, national participation was required. National participation 
was also required for the support of single projects within the ERDF, while for 
Community Programs, national participation was not necessary. The fourth measure in 
which the ERDF could participate and the financial support from this fund could be used, 
were studies, in which the ERDF could usually have a financial share of 50% and, 
exceptionally, of 70% (Council 1984 No 1787/84 Art. 24). 
                                                 
66
 These Community Programs with specific aims were e.g. the STAR-program (for enhancing the 
access to telecommunication services), RESIDER (support of the structural change within iron- 
and steel-areas) and RENAVAL (support of structural change in areas of shipbuilding) 
(Holtzmann 1997: 108). Within the framework of Communitarian Initiatives the ERDF participated 
on the financing of INTERREG and URBAN (INTERREG since 1989) (Spudulyte 2003: 77). 
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Alongside the projects and programs, there were also measures “for the purposes of the 
greater exploitation of the potential for internally generated development of regions”, in 
which the ERDF “may contribute to the financing of consistent sets of measures 
assisting business, primarily small and medium-sized companies in industry, craft 
industries and tourism [...]” (Council 1984 No 1787/84 Art. 15; Holtzmann 1997: 109).  
 
Some critics have stated that it seemed as if the ERDF was increasingly becoming a 
mechanism for interstate compensation for the countries of Mediterranean Europe and 
Ireland. According to Hooghe and Keating (1994: 371), the wealthier states (mainly 
Germany and France) were willing to pay these costs as the price of continued progress 
towards integration. However, strictly interstate compensation would not have been 
consistent with communitarian ideas. For this reason, a policy instrument had to be 
created and that could be presented as having Community-wide benefits and resources 
had to be spread in such a manner that each member state received something. 
Creating a common regional policy had the advantage that the European Commission 
could be given a role and that it would encourage the involvement of subnational 
interests in Community policy (Hooghe and Keating 1994: 371). 
 
 
5.1.1 Stricter regulations on controlling and reporting within the ERDF  
 
In the first ERDF system introduced in 1975 and the reforms of 1979 and 1980, it is 
interesting to note that the regulations and procedures on controlling and reporting within 
the ERDF system were not enhanced that much overall, but they were more specified in 
greater detail for the period after 1985, when the Council regulation 1984 came into 
force (cf. Council 1975 No 724/75; Council 1979 No 214/79; Council 1980 No 3325/80; 
Council 1984 No 1787/84).67 
 
Council regulation No 724/75 is a fairly short document consisting of 19 articles, in 
comparison with its ‘follow-up’ from the year 1984 which consisted of 49 articles. The 
first regulation in the ERDF of 1975 includes the basic idea, aims and goals of the fund 
                                                 
67
 The Council regulation No 1787/84 came into force on January 1st 1985 (Council 1984 No 
1787/84: 15). 
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as well as the principles by which the funds was to be organized and distributed. As part 
of these first regulations, it was made clear that it was mainly the European Commission 
that was responsible for managing the fund and that the Commission would be assisted 
by a ‘Fund Committee’ (see section 5.1, footnote 58) (Council 1975 No 724/75, 
preamble). In respect to reporting on the results of the fund, these first regulations stated 
very generally that: 
 
“[...] the results obtained in each region from year to year should be monitored” 
(Council 1975 No 724/75, preamble).  
 
Furthermore, the Commission was responsible for conducting the proper administration 
and effective control over the operation of the fund, in cooperation with the member 
states: 
 
“[...] the Commission should ensure, with the cooperation of the member states, 
the proper administration of investments receiving aid from the Fund and 
exercise effective control of the operation of the Fund” (Council 1975 No 724/75, 
preamble). 
 
In turn, the Commission was responsible for reporting annually on the funds to the 
European Parliament and to the Council, in accordance with this first regulation. Its 
reports were to include the financial administration of the funds during the preceding 
year and the conclusions that were drawn by the Commission from the supervision of 
the operation of the funds: 
 
“1. Before 1 July each year the Commission shall present a report to the 
European Parliament and to the Council on the implementation of this regulation 
during the preceding year.  
2. This report shall also cover the financial management of the fund and the 
conclusions drawn by the Commission from supervision of the Fund’s operations” 
(Council 1975 No 724/75 Art. 16 (1); (2)). 
 
In the amendment of 1979, the requirements were altered slightly, but they were 
basically identical:  
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“1. Before 1 October each year the Commission shall present a report to the 
Council, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee on 
the implementation of this regulation during the preceding year. 
2. This report shall also cover the financial management of the fund and the 
conclusions drawn by the Commission from the checks made on the fund’s 
operations" (Council 1979 No 214/79 Art. 21, (1) and (2)).  
 
In the requirements for monitoring and controlling included in the first set of regulations 
for the ERDF, member states are required to make all the information that was needed 
for the effective operation of the fund available to the Commission. In addition to this, the 
member states also had to “[...] take all the steps to facilitate such supervision as the 
Commission may consider useful in managing the fund” (Council 1975 No 724/75 Art. 
9(2)). The Commission had planned to carry out ‘on-the-spot checks’, which in practice 
would be done not by the Commission itself, but by the “competent authorities of that 
member state” and be conducted “[...] at the request of the Commission and with the 
agreement of the member state”. Representatives of the Commission were able to 
participate in those ‘on-the-spot checks’ (Council 1975 No 724/75, Art. 9 (3)) and they 
had several aims, including checking adherence to community rules on administrative 
practices, verifying the existence of supporting documentary evidence and whether this 
was in line with the operations financed by the fund, verifying under which conditions the 
operations financed by the fund were being carried out and whether the projects being 
implemented complied with the operations financed by the fund (Council 1975 No 
724/75 Art. 9 (4)). 
 
Under the revisions made in the regulations in 1979, the reporting requirements imposed 
on the member states were enhanced and made more specific. Every year, member 
states were obliged to report to the Commission on the regional development programs. 
They were now required to include three main points in the reports – namely, the nature 
of the financial resources allocated to regional development within the programs, the 
regional development measures that had priority, and how the member states intended 
to use community resources and in particular of the resources from the fund (Council 
1979 No 214/79, Art. 6 (5)). This reporting was also described under Article 6 of the first 
set of regulations, but those requirements had been less detailed. Those former annual 
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reports only had to include a description of the general economic and social situation of 
the regions, a plan of the resources being invested and which should be invested in 
those regions, the planned measures (including a timetable) with respect to 
infrastructure and the creation of economic activity and also any ‘aid ceiling’ (Council 
1975 No 724/75 Art. 6). 
Article 6 of the 1975 regulations had also included a section on another annual report 
that was to be submitted – a statistical summary “indicating by region the results 
achieved during the previous year as a result of action taken in each region” (Council 
1975 No 724/75: Art. 6). Under the revisions of 1979, this report was allocated an extra 
subchapter (Art. 6 (6)) and the requirements for this particular report were enhanced by 
the addition of “financial means employed” and “the actual use made of the resources of 
the fund” (Council 1979 No 214/79 Art. 6 (6)). 
Under the 1984 ERDF regulations, some changes were made in the overall ‘system of 
funding’ (see also section 5.1). The 1984 regulations focused on issues of control, 
monitoring and reporting within the ERDF. The fact that reporting on and monitoring the 
programs had become increasingly important for the member states, the Commission, 
and the other European institutions can be seen in the fact that in the 1984 regulations 
several articles were devoted to reporting, and a separate title was inserted (Title IV on 
commitments, payments and checks) that was partly dedicated to guidelines on how all 
levels of governance should work together in the programs. This Title was called 
‘monitoring operations’ (Council 1984 No 1787/84: Title IV, chapter V).  
 
As for the text of the regulations regarding reporting and communicating results, aims 
and targets of the ERDF, Article 2(2) stated that the Commission would be responsible 
for compiling a report on socio-economic changes in the regions of the Community. For 
these periodic reports, which were to be written every 2.5 years, the Commission was 
dependent on receiving appropriate information from the member states in order to 
analyze the regions. This report would be examined by the Council after consultations 
with the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee (Council 1984 
No 1787/84 Art. 2 (2)). An obligation on member states to provide the Commission with 
detailed information about developments in the regions was nothing new and had 
existed under the 1975 regulations and the 1979 regulations; however, those 
requirements had not been as detailed and specific as the ones in 1984 regulations 
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(Council 1975 No 714/75 Art 6(6); Council 1979 No 214/79 Art. 6(6); Council 1984 No 
1787/84 Art. 2). A new requirement under the 1984 regulations was what the 
Commission should do with the data provided by member states – namely, compile a 
periodic report and “on the basis of this report, the Commission shall, if necessary, 
submit proposals for Community regional policy guidelines and priorities” (Council 1984 
No 1787/84 Art. 2 (2)). 
 
As mentioned earlier, under the 1984 regulations, a separate Title IV was devoted 
completely to the commitments, payments and checks in the programs, and these were 
new requirements compared to the previous regulations. With regard to the ‘checks’ on 
the program, the 1984 regulations state in Title IV, chapter V “Monitoring Operations” 
that the member states have the duty to provide the Commission with all the information 
which is “necessary to ensure the effective operation of the ERDF and shall take all 
steps to facilitate such monitoring as the Commission may deem useful for ERDF 
management purposes, including on-the-spot checks”, which is exactly the same 
formulation as in the regulation of 1975 (Council 1984 No 1787/84 Art. 32 (2); Council 
1975 No 724/75 Art. 9 (2)). The rules for the ‘on-the-spot checks’ also remained broadly 
the same, but the following was added: “The Commission shall determine the time limits 
for the performance of the checks and shall inform the Member State concerned thereof 
in advance in order to obtain all the assistance necessary” (Council 1984 No 1787/84 
Art. 32 (3)). The goals of the ‘on-the-spot checks’ remained broadly the same as under 
the 1975 regulations, but one additional check was added – the verification of the socio-
economic effects of the operations financed by the ERDF (Council 1984 No 1787/84 Art. 
32 (4)). 
 
The 1984 regulations were a development of the 1975 regulations, but some rules and 
regulations were added in several areas. The regulations on controls, checks and 
monitoring were basically the same, but some additional requirements were added for 
the ERDF which came into effect on 1 January 1985. All in all, in 1984 regulations there 
were some additions on certain hypothetical scenarios, such as ‘if an operation has not 
been the object of any payment for four years…’ or ‘if sums which have been paid in 
error…’ (Council 1984 1787/84 Art. 32 (4)). These hypothetical scenarios could only be 
described when some first-hand experience of managing of the programs or the funds in 
general had been gained, as was the case by 1984.  
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5.2 European Regional Policy and the Single European Act 
 
When it came to thinking on European integration and regional policy, there was general 
consensus within the Commission’s Directorate General for Regional Policy in the 1970s 
and 1980s “that regional disparities were increasing within the European Community as 
part of the process of market integration”, especially for those regions or member states 
that had started out from a lower base (Leonardi 2006: 157).  
 
In Luxembourg on 17 February 1986, the by now 12 member states of the European 
Communities signed the Single European Act (SEA), which came into force on 1 July 
1987 (cf. Schindler 2005: 41). This Treaty was the first far-reaching revision of the 
Treaties of Rome and according to Nugent the SEA was “something of a mixed bag” 
which contained “tidying up provisions, provisions designed to give the Community a 
broader policy remit, and provisions altering aspects of Community decision making” 
(Nugent 2006: 49; cf. Holtzmann 1997: 90). Hence, the SEA specified several aims 
including the legal framework for European Political Cooperation (EPC) and the 
introduction of the decision-making procedure by Qualified Majority Voting (QMV).68 69 
However, the main goal was the completion of the internal market by 31 December 1992 
and the introduction of new policy areas at the community level (Schindler 2005: 41; 
Holtzmann 1997: 90).70 In short, alongside the introduction of a common policy for 
environment and research and technological development, the regional policy conducted 
since 1975 was given a new legal basis in the SEA under the newly inserted section V 
‘economic and social cohesion’ (SEA 1987 Art. 130a-130e, Art. 130f, Art. 130r: 9, 11; 
Schindler 2005: 41; Spudulyte 2003: 74). It could be that the introduction of a European 
regional policy or cohesion policy constituted in order to ‘buy’ the acceptance of less 
                                                 
68
 EPC was since then the official Community term for foreign policy cooperation (Nugent 2006: 
81). 
69
 QMV was a newly introduced legislative procedure (the cooperation procedure), which 
improved the efficiency of decision-making in the Council of Ministers and enhanced the powers 
of the EP slightly (Nugent 2006: 81; Holtzmann 1997: 90). Qualified majority voting: “the system 
of voting in the EU Council, which attributes a number of votes to each member state (very 
roughly related to their size). A majority of these votes (currently 71 per cent) is needed for 
legislation to be agreed in the Council, implying that some states will be outvoted, but will have to 
apply the legislation all the same (Cini 2007: 464).” QMV applied, for example, to the 
implementation of the European Regional Development Fund (cf. Bache and George 2006: 235). 
70
 The Single Market Program was already proposed in 1985 in a Commission’s White Paper on 
the Single Market and achieved treaty status with the signing of the SEA. Alongside this there 
was the Single Currency Program which was part of the Single Market Program and got a treaty 
basis later on with signing the Maastricht Treaty (1992) (Leonardi 2006: 156). 
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developed member states or regions for the operationalization of the Single Market and 
European Monetary Union (EMU) (cf. Pollack 1995; Allen 2000 in Leonardi 2006: 157).  
 
With the signing of the SEA in 1986 and its entry into force in 1987, the term ‘cohesion 
policy’ came into use. The SEA reaffirmed the provision of Treaties of Rome (the EEC 
Treaty) by stating that: “In particular the Community shall aim at reducing disparities 
between various regions and the backwardness of the least-favored regions” (SEA 1987 
Art. 130a: 9).  
 
As Leonardi (2006: 157) describes, the SEA included some “rosy expectations” when “it 
stated that the objective of Cohesion policy was to reduce the level of regional disparities 
existing in the Community.” He continues that this statement was interpreted by many as 
an “overly optimistic dream rather than a real empirical prospect in the short- to medium 
term.”  
Hence, Leonardi (2006: 156) states that from the outset, the cohesion policy was 
conceived by the European Community policy-makers as a necessary complement to 
the Single Market und the Single Currency Programs. In this light, the signing of the SEA 
and later the Maastricht Treaty can be seen as a real new beginning of the European 
regional policy through which member states committed themselves explicitly to the 
objective of structural balancing (Spudulyte 2003: 74). 
 
In short, the basis for a common structural policy, as we know it today, was created by 
the SEA and began with its implementation after the reform of 1988. Before 1988/89 the 
regional policy of the Community “was conceived as a relatively minor initiative whose 
primary purpose was to provide support for the regional development policies 
undertaken by the Member States” (Leonardi 2006: 156). 
 
While the goal of the Treaties of Rome had been to decrease disparities among the 
member states by establishing one common market and through a step-by-step 
approach with the national economic policies, under the SEA this goal was to be 
conducted by the Community. Let us consider Article 130a (first sentence), which states:  
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“In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall 
develop and pursue its actions leading to strengthening of its economic and 
social cohesion” (SEA 1987 Art. 130a: 9). 
 
Furthermore, looking at the terms of the SEA Treaty on economic and social cohesion 
and Structural Funds, in Article 130b (third sentence) we find the following:  
  
“The Community shall support the achievement of these objectives by the action 
it takes through the structural Funds (European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section, European Social Fund, European Regional 
Development Fund), the European Investment Bank and other existing financial 
instruments” (SEA 1987 Art. 130b: 9).71 
 
Additionally, the economic policies of the member states were to be conducted in such a 
way that the goals described in Article 130a would be achieved. “The implementation of 
the common policies and of the internal market” should be conducted according to the 
goals set out in Articles 130a and 130c of the Treaty and the support of the Community 
to achieve these objectives is to take place through the involvement of the Structural 
Funds (SEA 1987 Art. 130b)72.  
  
Regional policy instruments were enhanced significantly compared to those created by 
the Treaty of Rome. For the first time, a legal basis was created for common, regional-
political subsidies. The three Structural Funds mentioned in the citation above were 
granted a legal basis for working to reduce regional disparities and stimulate growth and 
employment in the regions. Alongside this, the financial instruments of the EIB and the 
ECSC were created to operate alongside the funds (Spudulyte 2003: 74; Holtzmann 
1997: 93). 
                                                 
71
 The ‘objectives’ to this sentence refers are set out in Article 130a and Article 130c, which states 
that “[...] the Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the various regions and the 
backwardness of the least-favoured regions” and “The European Regional Development Fund is 
intended to help redress the principal regional imbalances in the Community through participating 
in the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind 
and in conversion of declining industrial regions” (SEA 1987 Art. 130a, Art. 130c: 9). 
72
 The Structural Funds mentioned in this article were: the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section, the European Social Fund, the European 
Regional Development Fund, as well as “the European Investment Bank and the other existing 
financial instruments” (SEA 1987 Art. 130b). 
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Article 130c of the Treaty mentions the ERDF separately and defines its goal as “to help 
redress the principal regional imbalances in the Community through participating in the 
development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind 
and in the conversion of declining industrial regions” (SEA 1987 Art. 130c). Article 130d 
states that the Council would be required to decide unanimously on the tasks, aims and 
organization of the Structural Funds at the suggestion of the Commission, as mentioned. 
The Article states:  
 
“Once the Single European Act enters into force the Commission shall submit a 
comprehensive proposal to the Council, the purpose of which will be to make 
such amendments to the structure and operational rules of the existing structural 
Funds (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section; 
European Social Fund; European Regional Development Fund) as are necessary 
to clarify and rationalize their tasks in order to contribute to the achievement of 
the objectives set out in Article 130a and Article 130c, to increase their efficiency 
and to coordinate their activities between themselves and with the operations of 
the existing financial instruments. The Council shall act unanimously on this 
proposal within a period of one year, after consulting the European Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee” (SEA 1987 Art. 130d). 
 
In sum, the Article 22 of the SEA, it is also made clear that after ratifying the SEA, the 
Commission was to submit a proposal to the Council for comprehensive amendments to 
the structure and the operational rules of the Structural Funds. This was necessary “to 
clarify and rationalize” the task of the Structural Funds “in order to contribute to the 
achievement of the objectives set out in Article 130a and Article 130c, to increase their 
efficiency and to coordinate their activities between themselves and with the operations 
of the existing financial instruments” (SEA 1987 Art. 22 supplement for EEC-Treaty Art. 
130d). Hence, to coordinate the enlarged regional- political instruments, Article 130d of 
the SEA made provision that the Council, acting on the proposals of the Commission, 
was to allocate tasks, set objectives and organize the Structural Funds, in addition to 
determining general rules and regulations to ensure efficiency and coordination among 
the authorities and financial instruments involved (Holtzmann 1997: 94). 
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One further point is can be mentioned: the European Social Fund (ESF) – which had 
been made part of social policy in 1957 – is mentioned in the SEA explicitly in the 
context of regional policy. What was more, part of the Agricultural Fund was also set 
aside for regional aims (Holtzmann 1997: 93). 
 
 
5.3 Development of a European regional policy after the SEA 
 
By the end of the 1980s, regions already existed as political institutions in a number of 
member states and had been granted constitutional powers to involve themselves in 
implementing the European cohesion policy in areas such as regional planning, 
development, vocational education and transport. Regions began to mobilize and lobby 
for funding in Brussels by establishing their own representations in Brussels, for 
example.73 As well as seeking to influence policy-making at the supranational level, they 
also forced national governments to acknowledge the role of the regions in EU policy-
making (cf. Leonardi 2006: 159-160). What was new at the end of the 1980s – when 
structural cohesion funding was established – was that the policy changed from a policy 
‘for the regions’ towards a policy ‘by the regions’, meaning that the regions as 
administrative and political institutions became both the decision-makers and the actors 
responsible for implementation. The national level was no longer seen as the only level 
where development policies could take place (Leonardi 2005: 5-6; Paraskevopoulus 
2001 in Leonardi 2006: 160).74 Referring back to the theoretical model of this 
dissertation (chapter 3), we can see, that the second shift, which we have called the 
‘renationalization shift’, began during the 1980s by giving not only the member states but 
                                                 
73
 One of the interviewees explained the tasks of the representation of the Bundesland North 
Rhine-Westphalia in Brussels as follows: “The task of the representation is to recognize very 
early developments and political blueprints of the European Commission. As soon as something 
written is available the representation has to send it to its ministeries in Düsseldorf. Normally, we 
are one of the first who get those information and we make the first evaluation and are in this way 
participating in the development-phase of European law” (interview 32 2012). Origional quotation: 
“Die Aufgabe der Landesvertretung ist, zu einem sehr frühen Zeitpunkt Entwicklungen, 
Politikentwürfe der Europäischen Kommission in Erfahrung zu bringen. Sobald etwas schriftliches 
vorliegt muss dies von uns weitergeleitet werden an die Ministerien in Düsseldorf. Wir sind in der 
Regel einer der ersten, die dies zur Verfügung haben und die erste Bewertung machen und von 
daher sind wir in der Entstehungsphase der europäischen Rechtsetzung beteiligt“ (interview 32 
2012). 
74
 Regarding the theoretical model of this dissertation in chapter 3 and 7, this development is part 
of the so called ‘second shift’, described in the illustrations 3 and 8.  
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also the regions (depending on the constitution of the state involved) responsibility for 
implementing the policies. 
 
The SEA, on the one hand, sought to open national borders between the member states 
to the free flow of goods, people, capital and services: 
 
“The internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which  
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty” (SEA 1987 Section II Art. 13 
supplementing Art. 8a of the EEC-Treaty). 
 
Thus, the SEA “stressed the Importance of the large frontier-free market in 1992, the 
strengthening of economic and social cohesion, faster progress in research and 
technology, the development of social and environmental policy and monetary 
integration” (CEC 1990: 11). 
 
Regional institutions were also allowed to interact with counterparts in other states, in 
order to improve the overall economic and social situation of the Community (SEA 1987 
preamble: 2). This principle was broadly based on the European Outline Convention 
(EOC) of 1980 and was the legal basis for the ‘Treaty of Anholt’, for example, which 
related to the Dutch-German border and was signed in 1991 (see section 6.2). 
 
New rules and regulations were planned for the Structural Funds designed to ensure 
efficiency and coordinate the activities of the funds with each other and with other 
financial instruments. In 1988 the Commission and the Council followed this aim and five 
regulations were decided (Holtzmann 1997: 109): 
 
- Council Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 of 24 June 1988 on the tasks of the 
Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of their activities 
between themselves and with the operations of the European Investment Bank 
and the other existing financial instruments; 
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- COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 4254/88 of 19 December 1988 laying down 
provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the 
European Regional Development Fund; 
 
- COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 4253/88 of 19 December 1988 laying down 
provisions for Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards coordination of the 
activities of the different Structural Funds between themselves and with the 
operations of the European Investment Bank and the other existing financial 
instruments;  
 
- COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 4255/88 of 19 December 1988 laying down 
provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the 
European Social Fund; 
 
- COUNCIL REGULATION (EEC) No 4256/88 of 19 December 1988 laying down 
provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the 
EAGGF Guidance Section. 
 
The new regulations of 1988 concerning the Structural Funds and the ERDF were 
actually a general reform. As a consequence of the agreements set out in the SEA, in 
1988 the Structural Funds were given the additional objective of ensuring cohesion. To 
that end the budget for the Structural Funds was doubled between 1987 and 1993 (cf. 
EEC 1988 No 4253/88, preamble). 
 
In 1988, a general reform of the ERDF took place. A number of principles were 
introduced which remain the basic principles for the implementation of the European 
cohesion policy today (see section 5.3 and chapter 6). The size of the Structural Funds 
in financial terms was doubled incrementally between 1987 und 1993 (cf. Holtzmann 
1997: 111).75  
 
 
                                                 
75
 By way of comparison, in the mid-1980s the ERDF accounted for only 7.5% of the Community 
budget while in the 2007-2013 period the Structural and Cohesion Funds comprised around 36% 
of EU spending (Michie and Fitzgerald 1997 in Bachtler and Wren 2006: 143). 
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The regulations governing the Structural Funds, their effectiveness and their 
coordination with the activities of the EIB and other existing financial instruments 
(Council 1988 No 2052/88) had been decided and came into force in accordance with 
Article 130d (SEA 1987) – see section 5.2 for an explanation of Article 130d – in order to 
provide a comprehensive proposal, “the purpose of which will be to make such 
amendments to the structure and operational rules” of the existing European Structural 
Funds which “are necessary to clarify and rationalize their task” (Council 1988 No 
2052/88, preamble).76 Additionally, regulation No 4254/88 was published, “laying down 
provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the European 
Regional Development Fund”. The aim of this regulation is explained in its preamble and 
can be summed up by saying that the common framework regulation – regulation EEC 
1988 No 2052/88 – had to be backed up with specific provisions, which refer to the 
ERDF (Council 1988 No 4254/88, preamble). The third regulation in this context, “laying 
down provisions for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88”, gives general rules for 
the implementation of all the Structural Funds (Council 1988 No 4253/88). 
 
Within the regulatory framework, the focus is not so much on a detailed explanation of 
the monitoring and control system (cf. Council 1988 2052/88). This was done through 
separate regulations for implementing the Structural Funds (cf. Council 1988 No 4253/ 
88).77  
 
The EEC 1988 No 4254/88-regulation established the ERDF with its specific forms of 
participation. It was, for example, possible to support private investment in order to 
create or save of jobs, for investment in public infrastructure, for actions related to “the 
development of indigenous potential in the regions”, for projects in border regions, for 
regional situation analyses and regional environment investment (Council 1988 No 
4254/88 Art. 1; Council 1988 No 2052/88 Art. 3). As far as cross-border cooperation was 
concerned, Article 10 of the ERDF regulations of 1988 was very important. It allowed for 
a financing of:  
                                                 
76
 As explained in section 5.2 the existing Structural Funds were the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund, Guidance Section (EAGGF), the European Social Fund (ESF) 
and the ERDF, while the ERDF was the main instrument “for achieving the objective of ensuring 
the development and structural adjustments of regions whose development is lagging behind“ 
and whereas the ERDF “plays a central role in the conversion of regions, frontier regions and 
parts of regions [...] seriously affected by industrial decline“ (EEC 1988 No 2052/88, preamble).  
77
 The fourth and fifth mentioned regulation on the ESF and EAGFL, see above, will not be 
elaborated in this section or in this dissertation. 
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“the spatial consequences of measures planned by the national authorities, 
particularly major infrastructures, when their effects go beyond national 
boundaries” 
 
and 
“measures aiming to correct specific problems of the border regions within and 
outside the Community” (Council 1988 No 4254/88 Art. 10 (1)a). 
 
Additionally, Article 10 of the ERDF regulations from 1988 was also important for the 
border regions, because it provided for pilot schemes that particular border regions 
inside and outside the Community could participate in (Council 1988 4254/88 Art. 10 
(1)b; cf. interview 11 2009; cf. interview 2 2009). The Dutch-German border regions 
participated in this scheme in the years 1989-90 (see sections 6.2 and 6.3).  
 
Generally, the aim of the 1988 reforms was to retain the autonomous character of the 
structural funds and increase the coherence as regards the objectives of Article 130a of 
the SEA (cf. SEA 1987 Art. 130a: 9). The innovations of the common regional policy – as 
can be seen in the ERDF regulations, but also within the other regulations of 1988 – 
were based on four basic principles of the funds that were already mentioned in section 
5.2 of this dissertation:  
1. Partnership between the Commission and the member states 
2. Programming  
3. Concentration  
4. Additionality 
(cf. Holtzmann 1997: 110).78 
 
The introduction of these four central principles into the system of implementing 
European Structural Funds was an important step in the development of the 
‘renationalization shift’, because national, regional and subregional authorities have 
since then taken care that those principles have been applied properly. 
                                                 
78
 All four principles will be explained in general for the Structural Funds and for the ERDF within 
the following (see section 5.3.1) and also into detail for this case study of Dutch-German cross-
border cooperation (see chapter 6). 
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5.3.1 Structural Funds after the 1988 reforms 
 
The 1988 reforms meant significant changes to the overall system. First of all the 
‘principle of programming’, which was (and still is) based on strategic, multi-annual plans 
rather than the former project-based approach was introduced and it was stated that “the 
main emphasis should be on assistance in the form of multi-annual programs” (Council 
1988 No 2052/88, preamble).79 According to Barca (2009: 15), the change from annual 
to multi-annual budgeting increasingly reflected “the idea that economic and social 
development was not so much to do with building infrastructure and giving out subsidies 
to firms but more to do with encouraging the provision of extensive bundles of integrated 
services”. In the case of the ERDF, funding before the advent of the ‘programming 
principle’ had been distributed as cofinancing for regional development projects in 
assisted areas determined exclusively by national governments and largely subsumed 
within national regional policy budgets. Together with the reform of the Structural Funds 
of 1988, funding activities began to increase in scope, scale and rigor (cf. Bachtler and 
Michie 1995: 745-746). 
 
The ‘concentration principle’ – meaning concentrating on a limited number of objectives 
and focusing on the least developed regions – was also introduced. The principle of 
concentrating actions on five main objectives was a consequence of the increasing 
importance of bringing about economic and social cohesion in the Community which was 
clearly formulated in the SEA (cf. Holtzmann 1997: 111).  
 
The ‘partnership principle’ meant that the participation of national, sub-regional and 
supranational actors was expected in the “preparation, financing, monitoring and 
assessment of operations” (Council 1988 No 2052/88 Art.4 (1); Council 1988 No 
4253/88 Art. 9; Bachtler and Méndez 2007: 537). This ‘partnership principle’ is described 
in the Council regulation 1988 No 2052/88 as “close consultations [...] between the 
Commission, the Member State concerned and the competent authorities designated by 
the latter at national, regional, local or other level”. Cooperation between several levels 
                                                 
79
 For the overall promoting of actions within the Structural Funds there were some more 
possibilities of funding after the reform of 1988 of which the part-funding of Operational Programs 
was one. The other funding possibilities were called “part-financing of a national aid scheme 
including payments“, “provision of global grants“ and “part-financing of suitable projects including 
repayments“ (Council 1988 No 2052/88 Art.5).  
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of government is repeated in the same set-up through the implementation of the general 
regulations on the Structural Funds, where it says that “it is necessary to establish 
procedures for ensuring close association between the Commission and the Member 
States as well as, where appropriate, national, regional and subregional authorities 
designated by them” (Council 1988 No 2052/88, preamble). The principle of ‘partnership’ 
is developed in more detail in Council regulation 1988 No 4253/88, the regulation that 
states that the Commission should be able to adapt – in agreement with the member 
state concerned – Community Support Frameworks “to take account of measures not 
provided for in the plans submitted by the Member States, including measures resulting 
from new Community initiatives” (Council 1988 No 4253/88, preamble).80 The 
‘partnership principle’ is also applied in the cofinancing structure, whereby several levels 
of governance can and are required to support programs and projects, which the 
European Commission normally supports up to a maximum of 75% (for objective 1) and 
50% (for all other objectives) of the total amount (detailed elaboration on European 
objetctives can be found in section 5.3.2). Operational programs should be supported by 
cofinancing rather than projects (cf. Council 1988 No 4253/88, preamble; Council 1988 
No 2052/88 Art. 13).81 
 
The ‘partnership principle’ is based on two principles, complementarity and subsidiarity, 
which are summed up here under the principle of “additionality”. Complemenarity means 
that common financial resources only exist to complement national efforts and not as a 
replacement for them. This is described officially in the framework regulation on 
Structural Funds in 1988:  
 
“Community action is intended to be complementary to action by the Member 
States or to back up national measures” (Council 1988 No 2052/88, preamble). 
and 
                                                 
80
 As can be seen within this Council regulation 1988 No 4253/88 the Community Initiatives, 
where INTERREG for cross-border cooperation was part of since 1990 came increasingly into 
play. 
81
 Operational Programs (OP) had and still have to be set up for every program period of funding. 
A program has to be conducted by dint of projects. Through setting up OPs it is possible to 
account in which way European money is planned to be spent. Targets, priorities and actions 
should be written down in those documents, as well as the organizations structure of distribution 
and ways of project approval. In short, within those documents the goal of the funding is stated 
and how could it be achieved. 
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“Community operations shall be such as to complement or contribute to 
corresponding national operations” (Council 1988 No 2052/88 Art. 4). 
 
The principle of ‘subsidiarity’ means that competences must be delegated to and tasks 
performed at the lowest appropriate level (cf. Holtzmann 1997: 111). In short, the 
principle of ‘additionality’, means that EU funding was not (and still is not) a substitute for 
national expenditure and with that “EU resources should add to rather than replace 
national resources” (Nugent 2006: 371). 
 
All these principles, but particularly the principles of ‘partnership’ and ‘programming’, are 
only implemented when activities are controlled and monitored and so the framework 
regulations on the implementation of the Structural Funds stated in its preamble that it 
was necessary “to establish effective methods of monitoring, assessing and carrying out 
checks in respect of Community structural operations, based on objective criteria, and to 
ensure that those methods are adapted to the tasks of the different Funds” (Council 
1988 No 2052/88, preamble). In Council regulation 1988 No 4253/88 regarding the 
implementing conditions of the Structural Funds according to the regulation 1988 No 
2052/88, it says in this respect that “[...] it is necessary to specify the arrangements for 
the monitoring and assessment of Community structural action in order to strengthen the 
effectiveness of assistance methods in achieving the objectives and to assess the 
impact of assistance” (Council 1988 No 4253/88, preamble). In Article 23 of the same 
regulations, financial control procedures are explained in greater detail and it is stated 
that member states are to take regular action to ascertain that intervention financed by 
the Commission has taken place in accordance with the rules and that representatives 
from the Commission are allowed to perform random ‘on-the-spot checks’ (Council 1988 
No 4253/88 Art. 23 (1), (2)). These ‘on-the-spot checks’ were not a new feature, but as 
explained in section 5.1.1, had already been introduced at the launch of the ERDF (cf. 
Council 1975 No 724/75 Art. 9 (3)). In respect to monitoring and partnership, Article 25 
states that the Commission together with the member state concerned should ensure 
that the implementation of the assistance from the funds is monitored correctly. The way 
in which such monitoring should be conducted is also specified as jointly agreed 
reporting procedures, random checks and the establishment of Monitoring Committees 
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(Council No 4253/88 Art. 25).82 The Commission itself was responsible for 
communicating with its Committees about the implementation of the funds annually and 
for sending a summary of its report to the European Parliament for information (Council 
1988 No 4253/88 Art. 25 (1)). To monitor the interventions, physical as well as financial 
indicators would be used. These indicators were not generally fixed but related to the 
specific character of the operation, the objectives and the type of assistance that was 
provided as well as the socio-economic and structural situation of the relevant country 
(Council 1988 No 4253/88 Art 25 (2)). After the end of assistance through a Structural 
Fund, an end report was to be submitted by an authority appointed by the relevant 
member state (Council 1988 No 4253/88 Art. 25 (4)). The assessment of the actions 
supported by the Structural Funds should also be carried out according to the 
‘partnership principle’, whereby the competent authorities in the member states could 
contribute “in such a way as to ensure that assessment can be carried out in the most 
effective manner” (Council 1988 No 4253/88 Art. 26 (1)). The monitoring of the funds 
also includes ex-ante and ex-post evaluations in which basic conditions for the Structural 
Funds in general were laid down in Council regulation 1988 No 4253/88 Article 26 (2). 
This regulation states that these evaluations would relate to three levels: the overall 
impact of the objectives, in particular the strengthening of the economic and social 
cohesion of the Community; the impact of operations under each Community Support 
Framework; and the impact of individual operations (Council 1988 No 4253/88 Art. 26 
(2)). The results of these assessments were to be communicated to the European 
Parliament and to the Economic and Social Committee, in accordance with regulation 
1988 No 2052/88 Art. 16 (Council 1988 No 4253/88 Art. 26 (5)).  
 
As can be seen from this outline, control and oversight are closely related to reporting 
and the allocation of funding in a multi-annual program structure and this meant 
introducing a comprehensive system of monitoring and evaluation and a Monitoring 
Committee for each Community Support Framework (CSF) and each Operational 
Program, on which representatives of national and regional authorities and the 
Commission would have a seat.83 84 Monitoring and evaluating the programs still takes 
                                                 
82
 The role and task of Monitoring Committees in respect to this case study of Dutch-German 
cross-border cooperation will be elaborated in chapter 6.. 
83
 The definition of a (regional) operational program is formulated as follows: “An operational 
program [...] shall comprise a series of consistent multiannual measures which may be 
implemented through recourse to one or more Funds, to one or more of the other existing 
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place through the Monitoring Committees which constantly discuss and observe the 
progress of the particular program, as well as conducting evaluations, but additionally, 
the programs had, since the 1988 reforms, been required to submit annual reports to the 
European Commission on the implementation of the Structural Funds. The Commission 
in turn submitted periodical reports to Committees which were concerned with the 
separate objectives of funding (cf. Bachtler and Michie 1995: 745-746; Council 1988 No 
2052/88 Art. 6 (1); Art. 17). Thus, the Commission was required to compile a periodic 
report every three years, about the social and economic situation in and the 
development of the regions of the Community. The member states were required to 
provide the Commission with the relevant information to enable it to make this analysis 
for all the regions of the Community “on the basis of statistics which are as comparable 
and as up to date as possible. The report must also make it possible to assess the 
regional impact of other Community policies” (Council 1988 No 4254/88, title II, Art. 8; cf. 
Council 1988 No 4253/88, Art. 6 (1)). 
 
Overall, it can be seen that during the first period of funding, which lasted until 1993, the 
program authorities that administered the Structural Funds tended to prioritize the 
establishment of basic management systems and financial absorption. This was 
particularly evident within the regulations for the ERDF, in relation to which basic 
requirements concerning cofinancing, individual projects and evaluations were laid down 
(Council 1988 No 4254/88 Art. 4; Art.5; Art.7; Mairate 2006: 172). In the subsequent 
program periods, the scope for generating added value was increased by introducing 
new ideas and developing the systems of program management, project selection and 
monitoring (Mairate 2006: 172). 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
financial instruments, and to the EIB. [...] Operational programs shall be undertaken on the 
initiative of the Member States or of the Commission in agreement with the Member State 
concerned.“ (Council 1988 No 2052/88 Art. 5 (5); Council 1988 No 4254/88 Art. 3). The first 
guidelines for operational programs “which Member States are invited to establish in the 
framework of a Community initiative concerning border areas (Interreg)“ was set up conform the 
regulations Council 1988 No 4254/88 Art. 3 (2) and Council 1988 No 4253/88 Art. 11 (CEC 1990 
Notice C(90) 1562/3 (2)). 
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 The Structural Funds Council Regulation No 1083/2006 states that a monitoring of Operational 
Programs is necessary to ensure the quality of the implementation of the programs. In order to do 
this, Monitoring Committees had to be set up and their responsibilities had to be defined, together 
with the information to be passed to the Commission and the framework for assessing that 
information (Council 2006 No 1083/2006 (65): 29). 
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 5.3.2 Structural Funds over the successive program periods  
 
During the first program period of 1989-1993, the division of the Structural Funds 
concentrated on six objectives and 12 Community Initiatives (CIs) (cf. CEC 1990: 12).85 
In the following program period of 1994-1999, the six objectives remained and there 
were 13 Community Initiatives. Objective 1 focuses on the development and adjustment 
of regions and aims “to promote the development and structural adjustment of the 
regions whose development is lagging behind” (Council 1988 No 2052/88 Art.1; cf. 
Council 1993 No 2081/93 Art. 8). Funding under objective 2 was allocated to regions 
that suffered from decreasing industrial development and it aimed to stimulate the 
economic revival of those regions affected by the industrial crisis. Border regions were 
also covered under objective 2 (Council 1988 No 2052/88 Art. 1; Art. 9 (2); Council 1993 
No 2081/93 Art. 9 (1)). Objective 3 focuses on combating of long-term unemployment 
across the whole Community (Council 1988 No 2052/88 Art. 1; Art. 10). At the start of 
the Structural Funds, objective 3 targeted people who had been unemployed for over a 
year and were older than 25 years. In 1994-1999 period, the focus of objective 3 was 
widened to include the aim of facilitating the integration of young people into working life 
as well as the groups previously targeted due to their long-term exclusion from the labor 
market. Objective 4 was closely related to objective 3 (cf. Council 1988 No 2052/88 
Art.10; Council 1993 No 2081/93 Art. 10), although objective 4’s goal of integrating 
young people (under the age of 25 years) into the labor market was originally formulated 
as “facilitating the occupational integration of young people” (Council 1988 No 2052/88 
Art. 1). In the 1994-1999 funding period, objective 4 aimed to facilitate the adaptation of 
workers to industrial changes and changes in production systems (cf. Holtzmann 1997: 
112- 113; cf. Boldrin and Canova 2001: 220). Objective 5 was split into objectives 5a 
and 5b and had to be considered in the context of the reform of the common agricultural 
policy (Council 1988 No 2052/88 Art. 1; Art. 11). Objective 5a aimed to accelerate the 
adjustment of production, processing and commercialization structures within farming 
and forestry sectors so that they could accommodate the reform of the European policy 
on agriculture and promote the modernization and structural adjustment of the fisheries 
                                                 
85
 CIs have enabled the EU to focus on particular European problems and opportunities 
concerning regional development, as well as to experiment with new approaches and campaigns 
to promote the development of network cooperation between regions that straddle national 
borders (Panteia et al. 2009: 9). 
  
99 
sector. Objective 5b promoted the development of rural areas (cf. Council 1993 No 
2081/91 Art.2).86 87 
With the start of the 2000-2006 program period the number of objectives decrease to 
three “in order to increase the concentration” and “to simplify the operation of the 
Structural Funds” (Council 1999 No 1260/1999, preamble (4)). Three objectives were 
established, whereby the ERDF was to promote objectives 1 and 2 (Council 1999 No 
1260/1999 Art. 2). In this funding period, the ERDF accounted for 49 per cent of the 
funding and the ESF for 30 per cent. Other funding was available from the EAGGF 
Guarantee, the EAGGF Guidance, the FIFG and the Cohesion Fund (Nugent 2006: 
317).88 
 
The next phase of the Structural Funds (funding period 2007-2013) also included three 
objectives, but these were newly defined (cf. Council 1988 No 2052/88; Council 1991 
2081/91; Council 1999 No 1260/99; Council 2006 No 1083/2006).  
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 Within the period of 1989-1993 the ERDF was just involved within the objective 1, 2 and 5b and 
with that with 80,1% of the total interventions. The main share of the ERDF-fund within this 
division was concentrated on objective 1, with 75,4% for the period 1989-1993 (Council 1988 No 
2052/88 Art. 1, 2, 3; Holtzmann 1997: 113). In the period of 1994-1999 the ERDF was involved in 
objectives 1, 2 and 5b (cf. Council 1993 No 2081/93 Art. 2).  
87
 There also existed an objective 6 targeted “regions corresponding to or belonging to regions at 
NUTS 2 level with a population density of eight inhabitants per km² or less” and this were regions 
of the northern parts of Finland and Sweden, with a population equal to 0.4% of the Community’s 
total. The amount of funding was in 1994-1999 less than 1% of the total budget for the Structural 
Funds (Boldrin and Canova 2001: 223). The sixth objective existed from 1995-1999 and was laid 
down within the Protocol 6 to the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden (cf. Council 
1999 No 1260/1999 Art. 3 (1)). The ERDF was also part of objective six (1995-1999), but the 
budget was very low. 
88 Objective 1 in the period from 2000-2006 was covering regions on NUTS 2-level, which per 
capita BIP was less than 75% in the years 1996-1999 than the average of the Community and 
was promoting the development and structural adjustment of regions whose development was 
lagging behind. Regions under objective 1 were ‘outermost regions’, as well as the areas which 
were laid in objective 6 in the period from 1995-1999. (Council 1999 No 1260/1999 Art. 1; Art. 3 
(1)). Regions under Objective 2 in the same period, where regions with structural problems 
(NUTS 3 or a territorial unit which fulfills several criteria summed up in Art. 5 (5); (6) (Council 
1999 No 1260/1999) and objective 2 therefore supported “the economic and social conversion” 
(Council 1999 No 1260/1999 Art. 1). Regions were covered by this objective were “undergoing 
socio-economic change in the industrial and service sectors, declining rural areas, urban areas in 
difficulty and depressed areas dependent on fisheries” (Council 1999 No 1260/1999 Art. 4). 
Under objective 3, interventions were promoted which were not supported under objective 1. 
Objective 3 supported “the adaptation and modernization of policies and systems of education, 
training and employment” (Council 1999 No 1260/1999 Art. 1, Art. 5). 
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Another new feature was that the Structural Funds were reduced from six to three (see 
illustration 6),89 with the ERDF, ESF and the Cohesion Fund remained. “The reduction in 
the number of financial instruments is part of an attempt to make cohesion policy 
simpler, more transparent and, above all, more focused” (Nugent 2006: 371). Objective 
1 from the period of 2000-2006, which promoted regions which were lagging behind in 
development was now grouped together with intervention through the Cohesion Fund 
under the new objective 1 with the title ‘Convergence’. This objective 1 of ‘Convergence’ 
was supported by the ERDF, the ESF and the Cohesion Fund and had the goal of 
accelerating  
 
“[...] the convergence of the least-developed Member States and regions by 
improving the conditions for growth and employment through the increasing and 
improvement of the quality of investment in physical and human capital, the 
development of innovation and of the knowledge society, adaptability to 
economic and social changes, the protection and improvement of the 
environment and administrative efficiency” (Council 2006 No 1083/2006 Art. 3 
(a)). 90 
 
The new objective 2 is concerned with stimulating regional competitiveness and 
employment and is supported by the ERDF and the ESF. Actually, the former objectives 
2 and 3 were adapted for the new objective 2. The new objective 2 with the title 
‘Regional competitiveness and employment’ is aimed  
 
“[...] at strengthening regions’ competitiveness and attractiveness as well as 
employment by anticipating economic and social changes (Council 2006 No 
1083/2006 Art. 3 (b)). 
 
                                                 
89
 In this context, the Community Initiatives Leader+ and EAGGF were replaced by the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). The FIFG became the European Fisheries 
Fund (EFF). The European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and the European 
Fisheries Fund (EFF) have their own legal basis in the period of 2007-2013 and are thus no 
longer involved in the cohesion policy (CEC 2007 (a): 11) 
90
 The objective of ‘Convergence’ has an 82% share of the total Cohesion Funding. The objective 
of ‘Regional competitiveness and employment’ has a share of 16% of the total Cohesion Funding, 
while the objective of ‘European Territorial Cooperation’ accounts for around 2.5% of the 
Cohesion Funding (Nugent 2006: 372). 
  
101 
Under the new objective 3, the former Community Initiative of INTERREG III became a 
funding objective in its own right under the title of “European Territorial Cooperation” 
(ETC).91 The whole of objective 3 is financed through the ERDF (Council 2006 No 
1083/2006 Art. 3, Art. 4). As such, the development of cross-border cooperation of the 
former INTERREG IIIA was no longer classed as a Community Initiative (see section 
5.2.2). Broadly speaking, the emphasis on territorial cooperation was increased with this 
change in objectives and thus the awareness of the importance of territorial cooperation 
within Europe became more prominent (cf. interview 1 2012). The official formulation of 
the aims of new objective 3 on territorial cooperation is the following.  
 
“the European territorial cooperation objective [...] shall be aimed at 
strengthening cross-border cooperation through joint local and regional 
initiatives, strengthening transnational cooperation by means of actions 
conductive to integrated territorial development [...] and strengthened 
interregional cooperation and exchanges of experience at the appropriate 
territorial level” (Council 2006 No 1083/2006 Art. 3(c)). 
 
This excerpt shows that the previous Community Initiative of INTERREG – with its three 
strands INTERREG IIIA to promote cross-border cooperation, IIIB to promote 
transnational cooperation and IIIC to promote interregional cooperation – has been 
incorporated within this third objective on territorial cooperation (see also section 6.3 for 
explanations on the strands within the INTERREG Community Initiative). 
 
In order to show the overall complex development of the European funds illustration 6 
shows the changes made in the funds and their priorities over time. 
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 Within the 2007-2013 period the Community Intiatives Urban II and Equal are part of the 
convergence objective (Objective 1) and the regional competitiveness and employment objective 
(Objective 2) (CEC 2007 (a): 10). 
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European Structural – and Regional Policy Instruments 
1960 European Social 
Fund (ESF)  
1962 European 
Agricultural and Guidance 
Guarantee (EAGGF) 
1975 European Regional 
Development Fund 
(EFRD)  
1993 Financial Instrument 
for Fisheries Guidance 
(FIFG) 
1993  
Cohesion Fund 
 
2002 European Union 
Solidarity Fund (EUSF) 
1985: Revised form of the EFRD-
fund regulation: - Enhancement of 
the funds; - Decoupling of 20% of 
the funds fort the realization of 
Community policies. 
1986: Implementation of the first 
Community Initiatives: STAR and 
Valoren  
 
1988 further Community Initiatives: Resider and Renevial  
01.01.1989: The Community initiatives are from now on not only financed by EFRD, but also by ESF und EAGGF. 
Revised form 1999: From 14 Community initiative remained only 4: INTERREG III, Urban II, Leader+ and Equal  
1989-1993 
subsidy of 
objective 1, 5a 
and 5b 
1989-1993 
subsidy of 
objective 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5b 
2000-2006: 
subsidy of 
objective 1, 2, 3 
and Equal 
2000-2006 
subsidy of 
objective 1 
and Leader+ 
2000-2006: 
subsidy of 
objective 1 
1989-1993 subsidy of objectives 1, 2 and 5b, INTERREG III and urbanII 
(ERAC2004) b(S.10) 
2000-2006 subsidy of objectives 1 and 2 and INTERREG III and UrbanII  
2007-2013: subsidy of objectives 1, 2, 3. / Cross border cooperation is now a separate 
objective inside of the EFRD-program: objective III. INTERREG IVA is called officially: 
“Europese territoriale samenwerking” (ETS) / Europäische Territoriale Zusammenarbeit 
(ETZ)/ European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) 
2007-2013 
subsidy of 
objective 1, 2 
2007-2013 
subsidy of 
objective 1 
Illustration 6: The development of Europan Structural Funds 
Own illustration based on Europäische Kommission 1996; Vorauer 1997, ERAC 2004 
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5.4 Reforms of the Structural Funds in 1993 and 1999 (1994-2006) 
 
The reform of the Structural Funds completed in 1993 was one of the consequences of 
the Maastricht Treaty – officially known as the Treaty on European Union (TEU) – signed 
in 1992. The regions of Europe had high expectations from the Maastricht Treaty in 
respect of strengthening subnational participation. These expectations were not fulfilled, 
however, because the regions were only given the right to be heard in particular cases 
and cross-border cooperation between decentralized public authorities, for example, was 
not explicitly regulated. Overall, the main focus of the TEU was on cooperation between 
member states in the context of enhancing socio-economic conditions (cf. Vorauer 1997: 
31; cf. Seerden 1993: 56)). However, some changes were introduced for the regions, 
such as the introduction of the Single Market (and with that the free flow of goods, 
capital and people), the agglomeration effects and the repositioning of multinationals 
within a unified European market, as well as the introduction of budgetary discipline in 
the countries that were preparing to participate in the EMU (Leonardi 2006: 158). The 
introduction of the structurally funded cohesion policy occurred in 1989 and the doubling 
of the financial resources with the reform of the Structural Funds took place in 1993, and 
it is difficult to distinguish which of these had a greater impact on the growth which took 
place during those years. However, it is certainly interesting to note that the periphery 
began to grow at a higher rate than the core (Leonardi 2006: 158).92 
 
As for the TEU in respect to regional or cohesion policy, it is obvious that this policy was 
still an instrument which aimed to reduce regional disparities, but was no longer limited 
to that goal; it now had a further objective of enhancing the stability of the European 
economy. Under the TEU, a common regional policy is considered as a requirement for 
European Monetary Union (TEU 1992 Art. 130a 1st sentence; 130b 3rd sentence; Art. 2; 
Art. 3j in Holtzmann 1997: 95).  
 
The TEU also implied changes in the way that the common regional policy was to be 
conducted. Article 130b (4th sentence), for example, states that the Commission has to 
submit a report about the progress of the economic and social cohesion every three 
years, as well as a report on the Structural Funds and the EIB: 
                                                 
92
 For this context see also section 5.4.1. 
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“The Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the Economic and Social Committee of the Regions every three years on the 
progress made towards achieving economic and social cohesion [...]” (TEU 1992 
Art. 130b, 4th sentence: 26).  
 
Furthermore, the ERDF was referred to specifically in the TEU: 
 
“The European Regional Development Fund is intended to help to redress the 
main regional imbalances in the Community through participation in the 
development and structural adjustment of regions whose development is lagging 
behind and in conversion of declining industrial regions” (TEU 1992 Art. 130c). 
 
Compared to the SEA, the TEU made clear which goals the cohesion function of the EU 
regional policy was to focus: strengthening economic and social cohesion (cf. TEU 1992 
preamble, Art. B (first bullet), Art. 2, Art. 3j, Art. 130a 1th sentence and Art. 130b 3th 
sentence; cf. Holtzmann 1997: 96). 
 
Holtzmann (1997: 97) observes that it is important to acknowledge that regional policy 
since Maastricht has been active in three separate fields: reducing regional disparities, 
stimulating economic development in structurally weaker regions, and stimulating 
common economic stability. However, regional policy has also had ensure the 
strengthening of the economic and social cohesion, which has in turn rested on realizing 
political integration.  
 
The TEU not only enhanced the goals of regional policy, but also expanded the 
instruments available to implement it by introducing the Cohesion Funds (since 1993). 
The European organization of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) was also established 
and given regional-political competencies (Holtzmann 1997: 98). Within the TEU of 1992 
the EU leaders decided to set up the CoR as „consultative assembly which will provide 
regions and cities with a voice in the EU decision-making process and act as a direct link 
between Brussels and the citizens” (COR 2011: 1).93 
                                                 
93
 Primarily there existed 189 members within the CoR and with the enlargement of 1995 with 
Austria, Finland and Sweden the CoR consisted of 222 members. Within the Treaty of 
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In respect to evaluation procedures and as a direct consequence of the ‘programming 
principle’, the TEU raised the profile of economic and social cohesion and the impact of 
Community policies on the cohesion of the EU. The commitment to carrying out ex-ante 
and ex-post evaluation had already been established in the framework regulations of 
1988, but no detailed requirements had been given for conducting such evaluations 
beyond that effectiveness in respect to the wider goals of the Structural Funds and its 
consequences for specific structural problems would be evaluated (Council 1988 No 
2052/88 Art. 6 (2)). Since the introduction of the TEU, the impact of policies was to be 
monitored by evaluations and thus the European Council requested in December 1992 
that greater emphasis should be given to the ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of the 
programs.94 The regulations approved in 1993 made a clearer distinction between the 
three phases of the multi-annual program-cycle – namely the appraisal, monitoring and 
evaluation of the particular program (Bachtler and Michie 1995: 746). Council regulation 
1993 No 2081/93, which relates to the tasks and effectiveness of the Structural Funds 
and the coordination of activities between the Structural Funds the EIB and other 
existing financial instruments, states in this regard that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Amsterdam (1997) CoR’s remit was extended “to cover around two-thirds of the EU’s legislative 
proposals” (COR 2011: 1). The Treaty of Amsterdam also made it possible for the Committee to 
be consulted by the European Parliament. In 2001 within the framework of the Treaty of Nice the 
democratic legitimacy of the CoR was underlined, because the members had to be elected or 
politically accountable to an elected regional or subregional assembly. The maximum number of 
members was fixed at 350. Within the in 2002-03 “Convention on the Future of the EU”, the CoR-
members took part in that convention which was responsible for drafting EU constitutions. The 
text of this constitution “expressly recognizes the role and powers of subregional and regional 
government; it also gives the CoR the right to go to the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities to challenge EU laws which do not comply with the principle of subsidiary” (COR 
2011: 1). With the 2004 EU enlargement, the members of the CoR increased towards 317 and 
with the enlargement of 2007 towards 344 members. The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 confirms the 
“CoR’s right to appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union to safeguard its prerogatives 
and the subsidiary principle” (COR 2011: 1). Next to this the Lisbon Treaty also obliged the EP to 
consult the CoR and it also widened the scope of the CoR competences, e.g. by adding civil 
protection and climate change to the list of policy areas where the CoR must be consulted (COR 
2011: 1). 
94
 The ex-ante evaluation (or appraisal) is part of the program-planning phase. A structured 
assessment of the social and economical situation in the program area has to be made. 
Especially the expected impact of the proposed measures and an analysis of the relevance of the 
proposed implementation and monitoring arrangements have to be given. The ex-post evaluation 
is the final stage in the evaluation process and is the duty of the Commission in collaboration with 
the member state (in contrary to the ex-ante evaluation which is the solely responsibility of the 
member states itself). The ex-post evaluation is carried out by interdependent evaluators, which 
exams the use of the resources, the effectiveness and efficiency of the assistance and its impact 
and which draw conclusions regarding the policy and economic and social cohesion (Bachtler 
and Wren 2006: 145-146). 
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“[...] ex ante appraisal, monitoring and ex post evaluation should be developed 
and provisions should be made for greater flexibility in the implementation of 
Community structural assistance to meet real needs” (Council 1993 No 2081/93: 
6). 
 
In Council regulation 1993 No 2082/93 concerning the Structural Funds in the 1994-
1999 program period, a separate chapter (chapter VII) is devoted to monitoring and 
evaluation, in which the monitoring of the programs (with the required Monitoring 
Committees, annual program structure etc.) has its own subchapter, along with the 
“appraisal and evaluation” of the programs, in which the main focus was on “ensuring 
the effectiveness of Community assistance” (Council 1993 No 2082/93 Art. 26: 29). In 
sum, according to Bachtler and Michie (1995: 747), both the regulations above 
emphasized that the member states as well as the Commission were responsible for the 
evaluation process, and that it was the duty of ‘competent authorities’ in the member 
states to ensure that appraisal and evaluation were carried out in as effectively as 
possible. Within this funding period, the obligations on member states to monitor and 
evaluate their regional policies increased with the newly introduced appraisal, monitoring 
and evaluation requirements included in the revised regulations (cf. Council 1993 No 
2081/93; Council 1993 No 2082/93; cf. Bachtler and Wren 2006: 145). As Bachtler and 
Michi (1995: 750) conclude, the new requirements for monitoring and especially 
evaluation responded to the concerns of member states and Community institutions 
regarding the overall effectiveness of the Structural Funds and the efficiency of 
operations.95  
In addition to this, a third evaluation moment was required for the period 1994-1999 – 
the interim evaluation, which was to be undertaken after 3 years to provide a critical 
analysis of progress and allow adjustments to be made, if necessary (Bachtler and Wren 
2006: 145).96  
 
The volume of the funds allocated to regional policy grew substantially. In 1975 the 
budget for the three existing European Structural Funds – the ERDF, the ESF and the 
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 Community institutions such as the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Court of Auditors (Bache and Michi 1995: 750). 
96
 The ‘interim evaluation’ or ‘mid-term evaluation’ was carried out at the mid-point of the program 
by independent evaluators. The main aim is to find out “whether the pogramme strategy is still 
relevant in the light of economic and social trends and to assess the initial results of assistance 
and the extent to which targets have been attained” (Bachtler and Wren 2006: 146). 
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EAGGF – had been nearly 1 billion ECU. In 1993 it was around 18 billion ECU and by 
1999 the total was 30 billion ECU (including the Cohesion Fund established under the 
TEU) (Holtzmann 1997: 29). The ERDF had been launched in 1975 with 300 million 
units of account, 500 million units of account for the year 1976 and 500 million units of 
account in for the year 1977 (Council 1975 No 724/75, Art. 2: 2).97 Within the program 
period of 1989-93, 35.4 billion ECU were allocated to the ERDF and in the subsequent 
period of 1994-1999 this had more than doubled to 80.5 billion ECU (Boldrin and 
Canova 2001: 223).  
 
The next reform of the Structural Funds took place in 1999 and the changes were 
applied in the third period of structural funding in the years 2000-2006. Under this set of 
reforms, the political priority remained by focussing on economic and social cohesion 
and the main goal of reducing disparities remained unchanged (cf. Treaty of Rome 1957 
Art. 130; cf. Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 Art. 158). The proposals of the Commission 
regarding the European Structural Funds were divided into three areas. Firstly, it 
proposed concentrating more on the intervening of the funds. Secondly, the Commission 
believed that the implementation of the funds should be simplified and decentralized and 
thirdly, that improvements in efficiency and better monitoring were necessary. Thus a 
new element of the European structural policy was introduced: improving the efficiency 
of the financial participation of the Structural Funds. Continuing criticisms – criticisms 
that persisted despite the repeated reform of the Structural Funds – concerning the tactic 
of giving aid through the ‘Gießkannenprinzip’ (‘watering can model’), concerning the 
increasing lack of transparency, inefficiency, the often entrenched centralism and lack of 
relevant objectives, all led to a significant revision of the European regional policy and 
the Structural Funds in 1999 (cf. Spudulyte 2003: 75). In view of the forthcoming eastern 
enlargement of the European Union, the primary goal of reforming the Structural Funds 
was at that time to introduce increased flexibility into regional policy. On the basis of 
Agenda 2000 and the proposals of the Commission, a reform of the European Structural 
Funds was decided on 21 June 1999. Changes in European structural policy came into 
effect in the year 2000 and were effective for the period 2000-2006 (Spudulyte 2003: 75; 
Council 1999 No 1260/1999).  
                                                 
97
 Within the German version of the same EEC regulation the term ‘units of account’ is called 
‘Rechnungseinheiten’ (cf. Council 1975 No 724/75, Art. 2: 2, German version). In 1979 the 
common European currency system was introduced, named ECU (European Currency Unit). 
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Hence, one of main aims of the reform of 1999 was to simplify the implementation of the 
funds and to achieve this, several aspects of program management were decentralized 
to the member states, including responsibility for monitoring and evaluation (Bachtler 
and Wren 2006: 145). As already explained above, the rules and regulations for 
implementing the funds became increasingly complex over time, the membership of the 
European Union also expanded and as that happened the number of eligible areas 
increased. Thus the 1999 aim of ‘simplification’ has mainly to be seen in the light of 
simplifying the work of the European Commission. The withdrawal of the Commission 
from the content of the programs and their technical administration, which was 
increasingly shifted towards the national level of the member states, meant that the 
European Commission gradually became a supervisor rather than a participant (see the 
case study in chapter 6). It is likely that the drive towards simplification came mainly from 
the side of the Commission at the time of the reform of 1999. However, for the other 
levels of governance involved in the ERDF, implementing the funds may have been 
become even more complex. In the light of the Principal-Agent model, we can see that 
the ‘renationalization shift’ from the Commission as new Principal towards authorities at 
the national, regional and subregional levels, which became new Agents, took place 
almost entirely at that time and would later be reinforced through the subsequent smaller 
reforms of 2006 (see also chapter 3). In reality, this ‘renationalization shift’, which is 
sometimes called a ‘decentralization movement’ seen from a supranational perspective 
– began as soon as the Structural Funds were introduced in the form of programs. This 
second shift, whether we call it ‘renationalization’ or ‘decentralization’, is evident in the 
day-to-day functioning of the programs – for example in the process of approval of the 
projects within a particular program.98 In practical terms, this second shift brought 
increasing authority to the national level because of the establishment of the Managing 
Authorities which were (and still are) located at national level (cf. Council 1999 
1260/1999 Art. 8 (3); Art. 9 (n); Art. 34).99 By establishing Managing Authorities at the 
national level, the national level took increasing responsibility within the Structural Funds 
programs compared to previous funding periods (cf. Council 1993 No 2081/93; Counci 
                                                 
98
 This ‘shift’ can be seen within the constellation of participants the Steering and Monitoring 
Committees, in which the European Commission retreated step by step and no longer has a 
decisive seat (cf. Council 1999 No 1260/1999 Art. 35 and for detailed information on this 
retreatment in the example of the Dutch-German cross-border cooperation, see chapter 6). 
99
 For the Dutch-German INTERREG-program the Managing Authority is located on regional level 
of the ‘Bundesland-level’ on behalf of the national level (see for an explanation on federal 
Germany section 3.1.1). 
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1999 No 1260/1999, Art. 8 (3); Art. 9 (n); Art. 34). The tasks and responsibilities for the 
Managing Authorities included submitting the annual reports of the separate programs to 
the Commission, collecting the required financial and statistical information about the 
programs and submitting them to the Commission, meeting annually with the 
Commission to discuss the results of the previous year’s programs or adjusting the 
programs at their own initiative or following a request from the Monitoring Committees. 
The organization of the mid-term evaluation was also among the duties of the Managing 
Authority and, as Bachtler and Wren (2006, see above) stated, this was thus among the 
responsibilities of the national (German regional) level (cf Europese Commissie 2000: 
28).  
 
In previous funding periods, prior to 1999, the role of the Monitoring Committee had not 
been prescribed into detail (cf. Council 1999 No 2081/1999). However, its tasks and 
responsibilities were prescribed in the framework regulations for the Structural Funds for 
the period of 2000-2006. These included approving the Operational Programs (OPs), 
approving adjustments in the OPs and monitoring the evaluation of the process of the 
programs and approving the annual report on how the program is being conducted 
(Council 1999 No 1260/1999 Art. 35; cf. Europese Commissie 2000: 28).  
The ‘renationalization movement’ or ‘second shift’ of authority towards the national, 
regional and subregional levels of governance can also be seen in the make-up of the 
participants of the Monitoring Committee, where the European Commission gave up its 
role as a decisive voice and became an advisory member (since the 2000-2006 funding-
period). The Commission remained in close contact with the Managing Authority through 
its annual meeting about the program and the communication between both 
organizations concerning any remarks or adjustments relating to particular programs. 
The Commission approves the annual report and conducts the ex-post evaluation, for 
which it works together with the member states and the Managing Authority (Council 
1999 No 1260/1999: Art. 43 (2); cf. Panteia et al. (2009); cf. Interview 8 2009). 
 
Referring to our Dutch-German case study, it is clear that the national or German 
regional level was already involved as a partner during previous funding periods and had 
had “total responsibility and ultimate accountability for the available INTERREG budget 
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towards the EU” (JITS 2000: 96).100 For 2000-2006 period, the official role of the national 
(German regional) level was enhanced by the formalization of the tasks and functions of 
the Managing Authority (JITS 2000: 96). What was particularly interesting for the border 
regions was that in the framework regulations on the Structural Funds, border regions 
were acknowledged through the insertion of a special chapter – Chapter III – which was 
devoted to Community Initiatives. Article 20 of that chapter indicates the several fields 
which were to be covered by Community Initiatives. Article 20 1. (a) states that:  
 
“cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation intended to encourage 
the harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of the whole Community 
area (‘Interreg’); …” will be stimulated (Council 1999 No 1260/1999 Art. 20, 1. 
(a): 20). 
 
 
5.4.1 The effects of the Regional or Cohesion Policy (since 1989) 
 
The year 1989 changed how regional policy and cohesion policy were conducted 
throughout the Community. When cohesion policy was first launched in 1989, the 
expectations of the structural implementation of this policy were not high (cf. Rumford 
2000 in Leonardi 2006: 157). Over the years it became clear, however, that the goals 
had been very ambitious and also that it was hard the measure the extent to which the 
EU had in fact become ‘cohesive’ and whether disparities had been significantly reduced 
(cf. CEC 2004 (a) in Leonardi 2006: 158). According to Leonardi however, “it has also 
helped to change the often negative expectations of policy-makers in the Cohesion 
countries and at European level on the potential benefits to be expected from Cohesion 
policy” (Leonardi 2006: 158). Generally speaking, as Leonardi (2009: 158) explains, 
cohesion policy had impacted on social policy and on the internal policies of the EU. He 
elaborates that in terms of social policy, cohesion policy “has changed the nature and 
expectations vis-à-vis overall employment and the levels of unemployment in Europe’s 
less-developed areas.” Viewed from a political perspective, he explains that “[...] 
cohesion policy has served to change the nature of European integration from one 
                                                 
100
 Original citation: “[...]gesamte Verantwortung und endgültige Haftung über die finanzielle 
Abwicklung der zur Verfügung stehenden INTERREG-Mittel gegenüber der EU” (JITS 2000: 96). 
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emphasizing simple market integration to one stressing mutual solidarity and a united 
political future” (Leonardi 2006: 158). 
 
Overall, the structural implementation of cohesion policy has not been a disappointment 
at all. The EU’s cohesion policy operates as one of the three pillars of the Union, 
alongside the single market and monetary union, “in the construction of a European 
political and economic space” (Leonardi 2006: 158). In this context, the Third Cohesion 
Report of 2004 says that it is the only policy which transfers resources from the wealthier 
parts of the EU to poorer ones (European Commission 2004 (a)): 
 
“It is worth recalling that Cohesion policy [...] is the only policy of the European 
Union that explicitly addresses economic and social inequalities. It is thus a very 
specific policy involving a transfer of resources between Member States via the 
budget of the European Union for the purpose of supporting economic growth 
and sustainable development through investment in people and in physical 
capital” (European Commission 2004 (a): xxv in Leonardi 2006: 159). 
 
 
5.5 The current program period and the outlook for the future (2007-2020) 
 
As a consequence of the developments described above, the programs have moved 
from one program period to another with an increasingly heavy burden of administration, 
which has to be dealt with at all participating levels. This issue of the administrative 
burden of the programs is widely acknowledged in Brussels. For example, in the ‘Fourth 
Report on Economic and Social Cohesion’ (CEC (c) 2007), the reform of cohesion policy 
for the program period of 2007-2013 is described (CEC 2007 (c): 8f) and the priority for 
future reforms was identified as ‘better regulation’, which might mean simplification. 
 
As for the future development of the Cohesion Funds and the ERDF, the commitments 
made to simplify in the proposal “Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on specific provisions for the support from the European Regional Development 
Fund to the European territorial cooperation goal” dated 14 March 2012 go into greater 
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detail.101 In general, we can say that the issues of ‘(in)efficiency’, ‘(in)effectiveness’ and 
‘simplification’ are central in the discussions in Brussels concerning the next funding 
period that will start in 2014. In short, the ‘simplification’ of the programs ought to 
enhance their ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ and reduce the administrative burden and 
“[…] cutting red tape” (European Commission DG Regional Policy 2012 (a) presentation: 
12). In its proposed regulations for the ERDF, the Commission states: 
 
“To increase the value added of the Union's cohesion policy, the specific 
provisions should lead to considerable simplification on all levels involved: 
beneficiaries, programme authorities, participating Member States and third 
countries, as well as the Commission” (Council 2012 No COM(2011)611 final/2: 
9).  
 
In the proposals and discussions relating to the preparation of the new regulations for 
the European Structural Funds and the ERDF for the funding period 2014-2020, the 
general tenor is that funding should be concentrated “on a smaller number of priorities” 
which are “better linked to the Europe 2020 Strategy”. The focus here will be on results 
and monitoring progress towards the agreed objectives and “increasing the use of 
conditionalities and simplifying the delivery” (Council 2012 No COM(2011)611 final/2: 
2).102 
 
During 2011 and 2012, the proposals for the next funding period of 2014-2020 were 
widely discussed, especially at the supranational level, and communicated to all other 
levels. One of the main points to be communicated in 2012 from the supranational level 
to the national, regional and subregional levels (and other interested recipients) was that 
the proposal would foresee a greater harmonization of rules, whereby “eligibility rules will 
                                                 
101
 Since the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), the Parliament has been responsible for the framework 
regulation of the Structural Funds. That is why the discussion about the proposal in the EP is 
much more lively for the next program period than it was in the past (cf. interview 32 2012; cf. 
Lisbon Treaty 2007; e.g. Art. 15 (point 14): Art 16 (point 15)). 
102
 “Europe 2020 is the EU's growth strategy for the coming decade. [...] Concretely, the Union 
has set five ambitious objectives – on employment, innovation, education, social inclusion and 
climate/energy – to be reached by 2020. Each Member State has adopted its own national 
targets in each of these areas. Concrete actions at EU and national levels underpin the strategy.” 
(Barroso web page European Commission, access 30.03.2013, cf. Interview 26 2012).  
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be either fixed at EU level or by the Monitoring Committee of the programme as a 
whole”, with national rules only being applied in cases where there are no European 
rules (Council 2012 No COM(2011)611 final/2: 7). The proposal also states that: “This 
will also facilitate a joint approach in carrying out the management verifications and 
audits by the audit authority and thus contribute to greater harmonization in this field” 
(Council 2012 No COM(2011)611 final/2: 7).  
 
The proposals for new regulations on the ERDF explain the activities and structure of 
future programs in detail. The European Commission (DG Regional Policy) also 
published a special item on simplification, which is called ‘Simplifying Cohesion Policy 
for 2014-2020’ in order to elaborate the process of simplifying future programs in detail. 
It is significant that the first sentence in the introduction of this document states that 
“Simplification has been one of the most popular demands for the new cohesion policy” 
(CEC 2012 (b): 3). The next section of the document emphasizes that simplification 
cannot be achieved by relying only on the Commission’s proposals. It continues by 
arguing that member states and all the authorities involved have a key role to play in 
ensuring simplification: 
 
“a reduction of administrative burden for beneficiaries is the main aim behind the 
Commission´s proposals. Some elements of simplification reduce administrative 
effort at all levels and some are targeted at national and regional administrations” 
(CEC 2012 (b): 4).  
 
The document on simplifying cohesion policy includes a total of ten points on 
simplification. These include the following:  
- ‘Harmonisation of rules with other Common Strategic Framework (CSF) Funds’103;  
- ‘More flexibility in the set-up of programs and systems’;  
- ‘Increased proportionality’;  
- ‘Legal certainty through clearer rules’;  
- ‘More efficient delivery and lighter reporting’;  
                                                 
103
 As explained above, the amount of regulation involved in the Structural Funds was already 
reduced for the period 2007-2013, in order to make the programs more comparable with each 
other and better manageable at least at the national (German regional: ‘Bundesländer’) and 
supranational level of governance, in which several programs (national, or German regional level) 
or all (supranational level) are managed. 
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- ‘Reducing the administrative burden for beneficiaries;  
- ‘A move towards results-based management: the Joint Action Plan’;  
- ‘E-Cohesion’;  
- ‘Simplification of European Territorial Co-operation’  
- and ‘Simplification of the European Social Fund’ (CEC 2012 (b): 5-14). 
Not all of these points correspond with the case study in this research – because they 
are embrassing the whole cohesion policy – and therefore the points that fit to this case 
study are explained and the efforts which has been made so far in respect to these 10 
points of improvement, at the Dutch-German program are elaborated within the section 
on cross-border cooperation in section 6.7 (cf. CEC 2012 (b)). 
 
Even though there is acknowledgement in Brussels of the problem of the increased 
administrative burden on programs generally and in this case particularly on cross-
border cooperation, there is skepticism about the extent to which real change is 
possible. In contrast to the plausible-sounding commitments and the control 
mechanisms of the Structural Funds in general and how they might be changed in the 
future, one interviewee at the DG Regional Policy said: “Under the new regulations 
things will not get any better. The discussion is about simplification for the end-user, but 
everything is being shifted towards the management authorities and they already have a 
heavy workload with the controlling issues” (interview 12 2012).104 
 
Regarding control mechanisms and measuring the output of Structural Programs in 
general, one other civil servant from the DG Regional Policy who works in the 
department for cross-border cooperation and is responsible for the ‘Qualitätssicherung’ 
of the programs seemed to share the point of view of the previous interviewee: “Under 
the new proposals for the regulations things will not become any simpler. Even though 
the goal is to achieve simplification, in general it will become more complicated, meaning 
that in some areas things will become simpler and in others it will not” (interview 10 
2012).105 
                                                 
104
 Original quotation: “In de nieuwe verordening wordt het niet beter. Men heeft het wel over een 
simplyficatie voor de eindverbruiker, maar het zwartepunt verschuift gewoon op de 
managementauthoriteit, die hebben het nu ook al zwaar met de controles” (interview 12 2012). 
105
 Original quotation: “Mit den neuen Verordnungsvorschlägen wird es nicht einfacher. Das Ziel 
ist zwar eine Vereinfachung, aber im Grunde wird es schwieriger, d.h. in einigen Sachen mag es 
einfacher werden, in anderen aber eher nicht“ (interview 10 2012). 
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In order to demonstrate how complex it is to simplify programs, chapter 6 will discuss 
two concrete aspects of simplifying a program like INTERREG in the context of 
administration, which will, on the one hand, effectively measure of the results of the 
programs and report these from the subregional, regional and national government level 
up to the supranational European level and the European Commission, while on the 
other hand striving to reduce the administrative burden for beneficiaries.  
 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
While the first years of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) that started in 
1975 can be seen as kind of a test phase, when regulations were revised and intensified 
(see section 5.1), the later reforms, especially that of 1988 which put the principles of the 
Single European Act (SEA) into practice, are evidence of an incremental 
renationalization, mainly through the introduction of the four principles developed to 
guide European structural funding: ‘partnership’, ‘programming’, ‘concentration’ and 
‘additionality’ (see sections 5.3 and 5.3.1).  
 
Basically, the common structural policy, as we still know it today, was created through 
the SEA and began to be implemented after the reform of 1988. The goal of reducing 
disparities – which had been defined in the Treaties of Rome (1957) (see chapter 4) – 
remained essentially unchanged until the time of the SEA, but the means of achieving 
that goal differed. In the times of the EEC, the goal was to decrease (economic) 
disparities in and between member states simply by establishing a common market and 
using the national economic policies in Europe. After the SEA, however, this goal was 
taken over by the Community as a whole, enabling more actors to become involved in 
the process. The idea was that developing European structural funds such as the ERDF 
could lead to that goal.  
 
A new development at the end of the 1980s was that the regions of Europe began to 
lobby at the European institutions in Brussels for themselves and with relative success, 
by establishing regional representations in Brussels but also by establishing the 
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Committee of the Regions (CoR) after the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty) 
of 1992. Regional policy changed from a policy ‘for the regions’ towards a policy ‘by the 
regions’. In that sense, regions as administrative and political institutions became both 
decision-makers and the actors responsible for implementation. The supranational level 
(the European Commission) was no longer seen as the only level where development 
policies could be initiated and authority was transferred from the supranational level 
towards other, (sub)national levels. 
 
The European Structural Funds and its European objectives have changed over time as 
has been explained in this chapter (see section 5.3.2). The changes in the funds and 
their objectives can be regarded as adaptations to the requirements of the European 
regions over time, but later, especially since the reforms of 1999, as attempts to simplify 
the system of Structural Funds. As well as reducing the number of objectives and funds 
in the later program periods, the number of regulations for implementing them has also 
decreased. For example, the latest regulations are generally applicable for nearly all 
funds and there are no longer separate guidelines for the separate funds (see also 
section 6.5.1). The question remains, however, for whom this alleged simplification has 
been undertaken – for the supranational level or for the other levels of governance that 
are involved in the practical day-to-day work of the funds.  
 
To sum up chapter 5, the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) in 1975 can be seen as kind of a turning point from the ‘first shift of authority’ – 
the supranationalization shift – towards the ‘second shift’ also labeled as the 
‘renationalization shift’ in this dissertation. By establishing the ERDF, a fund that was 
from the very beginning implemented in the regions of the member states themselves, 
the European Commission as a supranational institution delegated increasing amounts 
of authority and responsibility to the other levels of governance involved – national, 
regional and also subregional authorities. In terms of the combined MLG-PA model of 
this dissertation (see illustration 3), the European Commission turned from an Agent of 
the first shift (see illustration 4) towards a ‘new Principal’, while the other involved levels 
of goverance became ‘new Agent’ with the second shift (see illustration 5).  
This development took place mostly after the reform of 1988, when the four basic 
principles, mentioned above, have increasingly transformed the European Commission 
into a supervisor rather than a participant. In other words, the European Commission 
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has become more and more the new Principal while the other authorities involved at the 
various levels of government have become the (multiple) ‘new Agents’. Those multiple 
second ‘new Agents’ implement the programs for regional policy by themselves and with 
increasingly responsibility. It depends on each country how authority between those 
multiple second Agents is divided and which level of governance has which authority by 
conducting regional programs. A side-effect of this tendency in European regional policy, 
cohesion policy and European Structural Funds has been that the European 
Commission, acting as a ‘new Principal’, has increasingly sought to control the way 
money has been spent in the regions. In fact, particularly due to the principle of 
‘programming’, control and oversight mechanisms have increased because they are 
closely related to reporting. The allocation of funding by means of a multi-annual 
program structure has made reporting and controlling ever more important since it has 
become a channel of communication up to the supranational level and a control tool of 
the European Commission. Much later, the other levels involved have sometimes added 
extra requirements for particular programs, which will be discussed later on in the Dutch-
German case study (see chapter 6). In general, the development of increasing oversight 
and control by the supranational level over the other levels of governance involved 
began right after the introduction of the ERDF (see also section 5.1.1), but became 
much more pronounced after the reform of 1988. 
 
It is this second shift, the division of authority over multiple actors on multiple levels 
whereby positions of Agents and Principals change, especially after the 1988-reform, 
that result in increasing complexity of administration within the Dutch-German cross-
border program. I will focus on this issue in the next chapter on the Dutch-German 
cross-border cooperation.  
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6. Cross-border Cooperation: The Dutch-German Border 
 
This chapter aims to outline the development of Dutch-German cross-border 
cooperation. Most important point to note in this context is, that there has been not one 
development but at least two: on the one hand there was general European integration, 
the establishment and development of supranational institutions and the development of 
European regional and cohesion policy (as has been described extensively in chapters 4 
and 5). In parallel to these processes, we see a grass-roots development in the border 
regions themselves to establish networks, institutions and organizations with the aim of 
promoting cross-border cooperation in the border region for the benefit of the individual 
region itself. These early initiatives did not depend on decisions made in Brussels, but 
from the border regions themselves; they were not part of the European-wide strategy 
for integration, but can be considered more as separate initiatives that sprang up 
independently and in slightly different forms.  
In general, these two developments met each other in the 1980s, when the European 
institutions in Brussels became increasingly aware that they should support cross-border 
cooperation systematically by European financial funding.  
 
After explaining the details of structural European funding for border regions and the 
impact that the cross-border INTERREG program had on the Dutch-German border from 
1989 until today (see sections 6.3 and 6.4), this chapter will focus on the increasing 
complexity of Dutch-German cross-border cooperation and the practical reasons for this, 
including an analysis of European documents such as guidelines and regulations (see 
section 6.5.1) and a discussion on the complexity of the day-to-day work of the program 
(see sections 6.5.2 - 6.5.4). We will also discuss the simplification of the program, 
especially for the end beneficiaries (see sections 6.6 and 6.7).  
 
 
6.1 Early cross-border cooperation in the context of the ERDF 
 
In the first ERDF regulations, cross-border regions were defined as regions that could 
receive financial support from the ERDF. When distributing the fund, the Commission 
planned to examine, among other things: 
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“(D) whether the investment falls within a frontier area, that is to say, within 
adjacent regions of separate member states” (Council 1975 No 724/75 Art. 5) 
 
In 1981, within the framework of the ERDF in combination with trans-frontier or cross-
border cooperation, a recommendation was published by the Commission which set out 
the regulations for the ERDF of 1975 and its amendments of 1979 and 1980, and the 
Commission’s recommendation of 1979 to the member states on regional development 
programs (cf. CEC 1979 No 535/79, point 4 and 5; cf. Council 1979 No 214/79; cf. 
Council 1980 No 3325/80; cf. CEC 1981 No. 879/81). In this particular document, 
recommendations were made by the Commission about the Dutch-German ‘Ems Dollart-
Programme’, which was communicated to the Commission by the Netherlands and 
Germany and discussed by the Regional Policy Committee in 1979.106 The ‘Ems Dollart-
Programme’ was prepared jointly by the two states involved and was seen as an initial 
experiment “bringing into relief the specific problems of this area, and in particular the 
bottlenecks arising from delayed integration and from measures adopted on either side 
of the frontier” (CEC 1981 No 879/81). The document states that this program should be 
developed further “in order to achieve improved cooperation of regional development on 
both sides of the frontier” and should be based on joint objectives” (CEC 1981 No 
879/81). What is particularly interesting is that in this recommendation the specific case 
of the Ems Dollart Region is transferred to the border regions in the member states 
generally and to other activities within those regions: “There are other areas adjoining a 
common land frontier that present special problems for which common trans-frontier 
programs are being prepared” (CEC 1981 No 879/81).  
 
The Commission’s 1981 recommendation also acknowledged the general existence of 
problems and issues specific to border areas and stated that the member states 
therefore “have a special responsibility with regard to these regions and areas” and that, 
where those issues occur, it is the task of the relevant authorities to cooperate closely 
with across borders (cf. CEC 1981 No 879/81). The central point of this 
recommendation, however, was the Commission declaration that it intended to examine 
                                                 
106
 Within this English document the program is called ‘Ems Dollar Programme’, in the German 
translation however, the program is called ‘Ems-Dollart-Programm’, as known until the end of 
INTERREG IIIA (2006). 
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development programs for the border regions and would prioritize funding for studies 
into improved coordination in formulating regional development programs for those 
border regions (CEC 1981 No 879/81). Furthermore, recommendations to the member 
states were made that the Netherlands and Germany should continue its cross-border 
Ems Dollar Program with the aim of elaborate it further and also establishing 
development programs for other areas along the Dutch-German. The aim was these 
programs: 
 
“[...] starting from a common basis, should aim at the harmonization of regional 
and sectoral aids to private investment and should indicate bottlenecks as well as 
action to be undertaken particularly in relation to economic and social 
infrastructure” (CEC 1981 No 879/81). 
 
In addition to this, the Commission recommended that border areas, which were to 
receive financial assistance through the ERDF program in the years 1981-85, should 
reach out to authorities on the other side of the border in order to coordinate an 
economic and social analysis, especially “concerning employment problems related to 
trans-frontier movements” (CEC 1981 No 879/81). The most important recommendation 
for the general development of cross-border cooperation programs on internal borders, 
especially at the Dutch-German border, was this recommendation:  
 
“For areas closest to frontiers the Member States should examine the possibility 
of formulating common transfrontier programmes, particularly in relation to 
economic and social infrastructure investments and to the protection of the 
environment” (CEC 1981 No 879/81). 
 
This recommendation was the Commission’s appeal for action in border regions in 
respect to establishing joint programs. It is easy to imagine that the prospect of financing 
joint programs in future within the framework of the ERDF had played a role in the 
Commission’s decision to publish this recommendation, particularly when one 
remembers that the European authorities in Brussels were already in close contact with 
the ‘lobbyists’ of the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR). The bottom-up 
involvement from the member states and the border regions themselves came about in 
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several border regions at that time and these activities were mainly grouped within the 
(AEBR), which had been set up in 1971.107 
 
The AEBR represented the border regions at the European level from the beginning, and 
had close contacts with the European Parliament, the European Commission (DG 
Regional Policy), the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social 
Committee. It was based on the idea that “the diversity of Europe's problems and 
opportunities are concentrated in the border and cross-border regions like under a 
magnifying glass“ (cf. AEBR 2013 web page access 21.03.2013). This association 
encouraged closer cooperation and individual discussions with commissioners and 
director-generals and was also in regular contact with the European Parliament, 
especially with the Regional Committee during this first period of the ERDF (AEBR 2008: 
30; interview 5 2009). In fact, the lobbying work of the Euregions themselves was mainly 
conducted by the AEBR in Brussels during the 1980s and helped to achieve structural 
support for European cross-border cooperation and resulted in the later INTERREG 
initiative for cross-border cooperation (cf. interview 5 2009: Gabbe and v. Malchus 2008: 
19).108 
 
Cooperation within the AEBR in the 1970s consisted mainly of cooperation under the 
aegis of the Council of Europe (CoE), since promoting cross-border cooperation was at 
that time one of the aims of the CoE, and with that it was the CoE that, from all 
international organizations, most intensively dealt with the possible role of the regions 
and municipalities and the impact of their cross-border contacts as factors in the 
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 “The idea of setting up a European association, or “union for border regions”, was first 
discussed in 1965 at the International Regional Planning Conference in Basel. Following 
intensive preparatory work, ten border regions set up a Standing Conference of European Border 
Regions on 17-18 June 1971 at the Anholt Castle (EUREGIO). The Conference chose to call 
itself the “Association of European Border Regions (AEBR)” (AEBR 2006: 10) The message 
which was send from the AEBR towards European institutions from the 1970s onwards can be 
summed up as: “It is in these places (in the border regions) that Europe becomes a reality for its 
citizens. It is at these internal borders that European unification must prove its worth and that the 
European continent must join together. If this is not possible at the borders, then the entire 
European unification and integration process would be in jeopardy" (AEBR 2006: 20). 
108
 In the 1970s and 1980s, subregional cross-border organizations from all over Europe lobbied 
in Brussels for European funding for border-regions (cf. Gabbe and v. Malchus 2008: 19f). They 
did this partly through a Europe-wide association for border regions, the Association of European 
Border Regions (AEBR). Successful lobbying, along with the fact that there was already a 
favorable attitude to cross-border cooperation in the Dutch national government and the German 
federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia, led to the start of INTERREG as a pilot project in 
1989/1990 (Perkmann 2005: 172).  
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European integration proces (Raich 1995: 31). This partnership between the AEBR and 
the CoE was to lead to the European Outline Convention (EOC) of Madrid on 21 May 
1980, which came into force on 22 December 1981.109 The central goal of the EOC was, 
in brief, to stimulate cross-border cooperation between territorial partners and 
authorities, because cross-border cooperation between decentralized authorities was 
understood to be a tool with which to achieve the goal of improving integration between 
the member states of the Council of Europe (Seerden 1993: 42). However, the EOC 
itself was not a legal basis for cross-border cooperation at the subnational level, and so 
bilateral or multilateral agreements between the states at the national level were also 
needed.110 The nature of these agreements was determined according to the laws of the 
particular states involved, in accordance with the EOC (cf. Raich 1995: 36). 
 
This kind of bottom-up program, prepared at the regional or national level, was closely 
akin to the existing Dutch-German Euregions, which had already been established.111 In 
fact, the Euregions played a main part in developing those programs. On the basis of the 
first Dutch-German program mentioned above which had already received support from 
the EEC at the end of the 1970s, the AEBR developed into a systematic structure which 
was based on this first experience of such a program and could be summed up as a 
“'system for cross-border development concepts and programs” (cf. Von Malchus, 
Robert and Gabbe 1981 in AEBR 2006: 22). Alongside this, the so-called “European 
Charter for Border and Cross-Border Regions” was published by the AEBR. The Charter 
outlined the historical background of cross-border cooperation and its potential obstacles 
and opportunities, as well as the objectives and tools available to each of the individual 
sectors, such as regional planning, infrastructure, economy, culture and tourism (AEBR 
2006: 22). 
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 However, the European Outline Convention was not established in haste. As early as 1966, 
there was a draft agreement for cross-border cooperation between decentralized authorities (cf. 
Seerden 1993: 41; cf. Parliamentary Assembly 1966). 
110
 Because of the fact that the EOC was only weakly binding in a legal respect, the convention 
can be regarded as a first step towards decentralization within the cooperation of the border-
regions (Raich 1995: 36). 
111
 In 1958 the first Dutch-German Euregion was established, which was the EUREGIO (Gronau) 
and in 1978 the last Euregion along this border was set up, the euregio rhine-maas-north 
(Mönchengladbach). For a more detailed explanation on the structure of the Dutch-German 
border and its Euregions see section 6.2. The euregio rhine-maas-north is always written in lower 
cases, while the EUREGIO (Gronau/Enschede) is always written in capitals 
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The first border areas to receive financial support from the ERDF for cross-border 
cooperation, during the mid-1980s, were mainly the border areas in Ireland and Northern 
Ireland, in order to enhance their economic and social development (cf. Council 1980 No 
2619/80; cf. Council 1985 No 3637/85). However, in 1987 the Commission approved 
also three national programs for France, Belgium and Luxembourg which together 
formed a coherent whole called the three-frontier European Development Pole (EDP) 
and was “a pilot project for cross-frontier cooperation in the Community” (CEC 1987: 13). 
 
 
6.2 The development of (Dutch-German) cross-border cooperation: a bottom-up 
movement  
 
Parallel to the development of the ERDF and European regional policy in general, there 
was also increasing cross-border activity in the border regions themselves. In the case 
of the Dutch-German border, subregional organizations called Euregions sought to 
promote cross-border cooperation in the Dutch-German border regions. In 1958, Dutch-
German cross-border cooperation project was initiated by the border region itself and the 
first Dutch-German Euregion – the EUREGIO in Gronau/Enschede – was established. 
This was followed by the Euregio Rhine-Waal (ERW) in Kleve in 1968, the Dutch-
German-Belgian Euregio Maas-Rhine (EMR) in Aachen-Maastricht-Eupen in 1976, the 
Ems Dollart Region (EDR) in Nieuweschans in 1977, and the euregion rhine-maas-north 
(ermn) in Mönchengladbach in 1978.  
Originally, all these organizations were established by subregional stakeholders on 
either side of the border, who took the initiative to provide money for cross-border 
cooperation long before the European Commission launched its INTERREG program in 
1989 (cf. Ministerium für Wirtschaft und Mittelstand 2001; cf. Van Houtum 1993 75f.; 
Miosga 1999: 68f).  
 
At the time of the establishment of the first Euregions in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
– which is sometimes called the ‘pioneer phase’ – the Euregions along the Dutch-
German border focused mainly on Aufbauarbeit or building upwards.112 As such, the 
basis for these Euregions were subregional problems, especially those faced by the 
                                                 
112
 In Breuer (2001: 86) the German words ‘Pionier-Phase’ and ‘Aufbauarbeit’ are used. 
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inhabitants of the border regions on both sides of the border, and the objective was to 
solve these problems through cross-border activities or cross-border cooperation 
networks (cf. Breuer 2001: 86). 
  
The Treaty of Anholt (German: ‘Anholter Vertrag’, Dutch ‘Verdrag van Anholt’), which 
was signed by Germany and the Netherlands in 1991, provided for cross-border 
cooperation at a regional level and created a legal basis for Dutch-German cross-border 
cooperation. The Treaty of Anholt can be seen as a direct consequence of the European 
Outline Convention of 1980 (entered into force 1981), as well as being the result of 
lobbying by a number of decentralized organizations at the national level during the 
1980s, which wanted to take action across the Dutch-German border.113 The Treaty of 
Anholt was signed on 23 May 1991 and came into force on 1 January 1993, being 
signed by the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and by the 
German federal states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony (cf. Treaty of 
Anholt 1991: 1). The goal of the Treaty was to create an opportunity for decentralized 
organizations to act across borders under regulation by public law (cf. Caspers 2011: 
6).114 As Seerden (1993: 202) summed up, the main principle of this Dutch-German 
Treaty was that cooperation was not compulsory and the Dutch-German Treaty created 
a framework within which decentralized authorities are able to make public cross-border 
agreements (Seerden 1993: 202). 
  
                                                 
113
 The Treaty of Anholt is officially called in German ‘Abkommen zwischen dem Land Nordhrein-
Westfalen, dem Land Niedersachsen, der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und dem Königreich der 
Niederlande über grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit zwischen Gebietskörperschaften und 
anderen öffentlichen Stellen‘ and in Dutch ‘Overeenkomst tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 
de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland, het Land Nedersaksen en het Land Noordrijn-Westfalen inzake 
grensoverschrijdende samenwerking tussen territoriale gemeenschappen of autoriteiten‘ (Treaty 
of Anholt 1991). 
114
 The ‘Treaty of Anholt’ is not the only contract between the Netherlands in Germany in respect 
to cross-border cooperation. However, other contracts usually concern intergovernmental 
cooperation instead of cooperation between decentralized organizations. An example for another 
such agreement is the ‘Algemeen Verdrag tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de 
Bondsrepubliek Duitsland tot regeling van met de grens verband houdende vraagstukken en 
andere tussen beide landen bestaande problemen’ of 1960 (came into force in 1963). On the 
basis of this contract other contracts in respect to cross-border cooperation were established, e.g. 
the „Overeenkomst tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland 
inzake het kleine grensverkeer“ (1960), ‘Verdrag tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de 
Bondsrepubliek Duitsland nopens het verloop van de gemeenschappelijke landsgrens, de 
grenswateren, het grondbezit in de nabijheid van de grens, het grensoverschrijdende verkeer 
over land en via binnenwateren en andere met de grens verband houdende vraagstukken, met 
bijlagen en slotprotocol (Grensverdrag)’ (1960) of het ‘Eems-Dollardverdrag’ (1960) (Seerden 
1993: 223-229). 
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This makes the basic principles of the Treaty of Anholt clear: cooperation is voluntary 
and the internal law of the states is inviolable (cf. Treaty of Anholt 1991). 
Working together within a framework of public law has some advantages over 
cooperating on an informal basis or under private law: Firstly, there is better democratic 
control over cross-border cooperation, and greater political influence. Secondly, 
cooperation is better structured and sustainable cooperation can be undertaken; and 
thirdly, it enables a more efficient action through subregional government (cf. Caspers 
2011: 6). 
 
In general, European regional policy came to play an ever increasing role, especially 
during the 1980s, when the Single European Act was an important step towards 
realizing further market integration. However, the later support of the Structural Funds 
shifted the priority of cross-border cooperation matters such as culture and social issues 
to the economic stimulation of the border regions (cf. Breuer 2001: 87).  
 
 
6.3 A general outline of the INTERREG program 
 
European funding for cross-border cooperation within the ERDF and the INTERREG 
program started in 1989 as a pilot and continued in a program structure in 1990 (cf. 
interview 30 2009). The new aspect of the Community Initiative INTERREG within the 
overall umbrella of the ERDF was that European financial aid was not solely allocated to 
states and regions but also to subregional cross-border structures such as Euregions 
(CEC 2002: 7). 
 
From 1990 until the end of its last program period (2006), INTERREG was one of 
several European Community Initiatives (CIs). The INTERREG for cross-border 
cooperation progressed from being a CI to being a distinct EU policy objective in its own 
right (for further explanations on European objectives see section 5.3.2). As such, 
INTERREG became a separate objective and is no longer part of the European 
Community Initiatives. The objective on which INTERREG is based is called European 
Territorial Cooperation (ETC) and the term INTERREG in fact is just the working title of 
the program. The overall aim of INTERREG program for cross-border cooperation has 
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remained constant throughout all its funding periods and continues to state that: 
‘National borders should not be a barrier to the balanced development and integration of 
the European territory’ (CEC 2004 (b): 2). The extent to which the Commission sees an 
important role for itself in this respect is evident in the Commission’s statement that 
“border areas have often been neglected under national policy, with the result that their 
economies have tended to become peripheral within national boundaries” (CEC 2004 
(b): 2).  
The creation of the objective of European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) did not entail 
any huge changes in the cross-border programs themselves, but emphasized the 
importance of the European territorial cooperation within the wider European framework. 
According to Danuta Hübner:115 
 
“The increased importance of these cooperation programmes, still commonly 
referred to as INTERREG, is demonstrated by the fact they have now become 
one of the three Cohesion Policy objectives” (CEC 2007 (b); cf. interview 18 
2009). 
 
In addition to this change, the financial volume of all cross-border cooperation programs 
rose significantly from around €1.1 million in INTERREG I, to around €2.6 million in 
INTERREG IIA, to around €4.0 million in the program period of INTERREG IIIA to 
around €5.6 million in 2007-2013 (cf. Gabbe and V. Malchus 2008, cf. AEBR 2000: 39; 
cf. CEC 1990 No 90/c 215/04: 6). In respect of INTERREG’s increasing budget, it has to 
be said that INTERREG has widened its remit over successive funding periods (see also 
illustration 5) and that there were also enlargements of the European Union, so the area 
over which INTERREG was implemented was larger than at the beginning of the 
program.  
 
The INTERREG program has now been through three program periods. It is currently in 
its fourth period of funding and discussions about the fifth period of funding are taking 
place between all the levels of governance involved. INTERREG I was implemented in 
                                                 
115
 Danuta Hübner was a European Commissioner for Regional Policy from 2004 until 2009. In 
2009 she was elected to the European Parliament and consequently she had to give up her 
position in the European Commission. 
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the period of 1990-1993, INTERREG II in 1994-1999, INTERREG IIIA in 2000-2006 and 
European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) (often called INTERREG IV A) in 2007-2013. 
A general overview of the development of the INTERREG programs can be seen in the 
illustration below (see illustration 7). 
 
 
Illustration 7: The development of the INTERREG initiative 
 
Type of 
Cooperation 
Before 
1990 
1990-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006 2007-2013 
Cross-border 
cooperation 
Bottom-up 
initiatives 
without 
EC/EU 
support  
 
INTERREG I 
(31 
programs) 
INTERREG IIA 
(59 programs) 
INTERREG 
IIIA 
(64 
programs) 
ETC*  
(INTERREG 
IVA) 
(52 
programs) 
Energy 
networks 
  INTERREG IIB 
(9 programs) 
  
Transnational 
cooperation 
   INTERREG 
IIC  
(1997-
1999) 
(7 
programs) 
INTERREG 
IIIB 
(13 
programs) 
ETC  
(INTERREG 
IVB) 
(13 
programs) 
Interregional 
Cooperation 
   INTERREG 
IIIC 
ETC  
(INTERREG 
IVC) 
 
*ETC=European Territorial Cooperation 
 
(Source: cf. Dühr, Colomb and Nadin 2010: 233; CEC 2004 (a): 156) 
 
 
6.4 INTERREG as a game-changer for the Dutch-German Euregions 
 
Since 1989, the cross-border Euregions have also been responsible for implementing 
the INTERREG initiative – which was and still is part of the ERDF framework – and for 
coordinating the INTERREG projects, alongside their other responsibilities such as 
conducting other (European) subsidy programs (such as EURES, EUROPE DIRECT, 
SSK) and advising the inhabitants of border regions on cross-border issues.116 The 
                                                 
116
 EUROPE DIRECT is an EU-wide network of information centers about the European Union, 
which has existed since 2005. The Euregion Rhine-Waal was until the end of 2012 one of these 
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reason for involving the Euregions in distributing European funding for cross-border 
cooperation may be that, especially along the Dutch-German border, the Euregions were 
at that time already well-rooted institutions with a stable organizational structure and 
they had already several years of experience in cross-border cooperation. In addition to 
this, as Miosga states: 
 
“By delegating tasks (setting up programs and finding projects), the Euregions 
were assigned a new role, one that nearly the same as that of regional 
development agencies. This gave them the responsibility to use their powers in 
their particular field of responsibility, which is regulated by the INTERREG 
guidelines and which should be applied in the sense of an innovative [...] regional 
policy” (Miosga 1999: 90).117  
 
The launch of INTERREG was a game changer for the Dutch-German Euregions 
because suddenly there was a lot more budget to conduct cross-border cooperation in a 
larger scale and therefore working across border was acknowledged Europe-wide by the 
supranational authorities. Giving European money to the border regions meant also an 
establishment and introduction of new structures and administrative mechanisms: 
Especially when the first INTERREG program started in 1990 in compliance with the 
‘programming-principle’ – so that the European Commission could keep track of all 
cross-border projects – the Euregions and the other involved levels of governance 
(national and regional levels on both side of the border) had to prove their activities and 
had to decide together with the supranational level about the content of cross-border 
cooperation. Even though the launch of INTERREG meant that other levels of 
                                                                                                                                                 
information centers and organized for example events relating to European topics and gives 
citizens the opportunity to get more information about European issues. EURES is a European 
program which connects border regions with each other to improve the employment situation by 
making EURES-advisors available, setting up cross-border job-databases etc. (Euregio Rhein-
Waal 2011, web page, access 05.07.2011). SSK stands for “Sport, Soziales und Kultur” and is a 
financing tool of the ERW which existed already before the INTERREG program started. It 
finances mainly events instead of projects (as INTERREG does). SSK is not financed by the 
European Union, but by the contributions of the members of the ERW, which are mostly 
municipalities, cities or chambers of commerce in the border regions. 
117
 Original citation: “Durch die Aufgabenzuweisung (Programmerstellung und Projektfindung) 
sind die Euregios mit einer neuen Aufgabenstellung konfrontriert, die der Funktion regionaler 
Entwicklungsagenturen nahe kommt. Somit sind sie in die Verantwortung genommen, in ihrem 
jeweiligen Zuständigkeitsbereich die Spielräume, die die INTERREG-Verordnung vorgibt, zu 
nutzen und im Sinne einer innovativen [...] Regionalpolitik anzuwenden” (Miosga 1999: 90). 
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governance became involved, the Dutch-German Euregions were still enthusiastic about 
the program because European money made it possible to develop larger cross-border 
projects than the former smaller initiatives financed by the stakeholders in the border 
area (cf. interview 19 2012). 
 
Before INTERREG funding was introduced, there were loose contacts across the border, 
but nothing binding. For example, the ERW had a connecting role between 
municipalities on both sides of the border, but many parties had no contact with each 
other (cf. interview 19 2012). As already explained, the Euregions hardly had the means 
of establishing specific cross-border cooperation projects before INTERREG started in 
1989. In those times “being associated with an Euregion or being interested in cross-
border cooperation as a civil servant was seen more as a voluntary matter” (interview 19 
2012).118 
Before the program structure was introduced for INTERREG, a pilot phase was 
conducted in which five projects were realized following the example of the ERW. At this 
stage of INTERREG, it was not just any projects that received finance, but projects were 
chosen on the basis of the ‘Grenzüberschreitendes Entwicklungs- und 
Handlungskonzept’ of the ERW from 1989. 
 
During the pilot phase of INTERREG (1989/1990), decision-making authority for specific 
cross-border projects lay with the European Commission. This meant that in this first 
year of INTERREG funding, the Commission dealt with applications for cross-border 
projects directly. The decision on whether or not a project would be supported by 
European INTERREG money was taken by the European Commission alone. However, 
before this final decision, in the case of the ERW for example, the Euregion Council 
approved the project before the applications could be sent to the European Commission 
(cf. Euregio Rhein-Waal 1993: 1; interview 3 2010). However, as was made clear in the 
case of the ERW: “The Euregion Rhine-Waal is responsible to the European 
Commission for the financial processing of the funds” (Euregio Rhein-Waal 1993: 1).119 
In this pilot phase, some Euregions used European money to draw up regional 
                                                 
118
 Original quotation: “Verbonden zijn aan een Euregio of als ambtenaar geïnteresseerd zijn in 
grensoverschrijdende samenwerking werd meer als een vrijwillig iets gezien” (interview 19 2012). 
119
 Original citation: “Die Euregio Rhein-Waal trägt die Verantwortung für die finanzielle 
Abwicklung der Fördermittel gegenüber der Europäischen Kommission” (Euregio Rhein-Waal 
1993: 1). 
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development plans or, for example, bicycle paths that led across the border. The first 
cross-border projects financed by the European Commission were in fact simple, 
specific and had a short duration. The projects had to be realized within two years 
(interview 2 2009). There was no official start to this pre-INTERREG period; the 
Euregions each began applying for money independently for cross-border projects at the 
European Commission (interview 11 2009; cf. Regio Rijn-Waal 1989: 1). 
As early as 1990, the national governments of Belgium, the Netherlands and the 
regional government of Germany (the Landesregierungen of North Rhine-Westphalia 
and Lower Saxony) agreed on a common concept for the Operational Programs for the 
border regions along the Dutch-German-(Belgian) border. The governments agreed 
mainly on uniform structures and priorities for the Operational Programs, which had to 
be established by each Euregion in order to conduct the INTERREG in a program 
structure (cf. MWMT 1993: 9, cf. Miosga 1999: 69). 
 
Following the pilot phase, the first INTERREG program period (1991-1993) got 
underway and European financial aid for cross-border cooperation was structured into 
programs. Conducting programs meant following the rules of Operational Programs. 
Hence, the overall program of cross-border activities was coordinated according to the 
first Operational Programs, which were based on the Guidelines of the European 
Commission (cf. Regio Rijn-Waal 1990; cf. CEC 1990 No 90/c 215/04: 7). Dealing with a 
program structure rather than having to get every single project approved by the 
Commission itself meant a smaller workload for the European Commission (cf. interview 
8 2009). At this time, some other European border regions were quite highly developed 
in their cross-border activities, but the Dutch-German (and Dutch-Belgian border) areas 
were exceptional in respect to the procedure that they followed to establish their first 
Operational Programs: in other European border regions – even in those border regions 
which were considered to have an advanced level of cross-border development – such 
as the French-Belgian, French-Italian or French-Spanish border areas – the Operational 
Programs were mainly developed by national authorities, which meant that the border 
regions were only occasionally involved and the impact of the regional level was rather 
limited. The first Operational Programs along the Dutch-German border, by contrast, 
were developed by the regions themselves and were based on partnerships with 
national authorities, which in turn bundled the programs and communicated them to the 
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European Commission (cf. Broos and Gabbe 1992: 6 in Miosga 1999: 79; cf. interview 
11 2009, cf. interview 27 2009). 
 
Allocating funding through a program structure implied that the final decision-making 
authority for individual cross-border projects was no longer solely in the hands of the 
European Commission. Under the INTERREG I program, decisions on whether cross-
border projects were approved or not were taken by the ‘Coordination Committee’ 
(Dutch: ‘Koordinatiegroep’), which included representatives from the Commission and 
the Dutch national government, the German regional governments, and the Dutch 
Provinces; in the case of the ERW also the Regierungspräsident of Düsseldorf and the 
Region Rhine-Waal had a decisive seat (cf. Regio Rijn-Waal 1990: 23; 44).120 Including 
the subregional and regional levels in the decision-making process was greatly 
encouraged from the beginning of INTERREG, in order to put the principle of 
‘partnership’ into practice (cf. Miosga 1999: 67). However, the Dutch-German border 
regions can also be considered as an exception in respect to this decision-making 
procedure because of the strong element of regional and subregional participation from 
the beginning of INTERREG right up until the current funding period. In other internal 
European border areas, decisions on cross-border cooperation projects are often 
determined mainly by national authorities, while in this Dutch-German case study the 
Euregions themselves have always had a seat on the Steering Committees and the later 
Monitoring Committees (since INTERREG IIIA). As such, they have a decisive voice and 
the decisions on approval of cross-border cooperation-projects have had to be made 
unanimously. This has meant that the voices of the Euregions have been influential (cf. 
Regio Rijn-Waal 1990: 44; cf. Euregio Rhein-Waal 1994: 52; cf. JITS 2000: 100; JITS 
2007 (a): 96f; cf. Miosga 1999: 79).121 This is illustrated by an example from the later 
Operational Program of the three Dutch-German Euregions that work together in the 
INTERREG IIIA period (2000-2006), which states specifically:  
 
                                                 
120
 However, during the review of the minutes of the Koordinatiegroep- meetings of INTERREG I 
of the Regio Rijn-Waal at the archive of the Euregion Rhine-Waal, it is remarkable that there was 
no representative of the European Communities (Dutch EG) present at the first two meetings. Not 
only were these representatives absent, it seemed that they were not invited at all, because they 
were not listed (own archive-studies at the Euregio Rhine-Waal 2012). 
121
 The other exceptions in this respect are the Dutch-Belgian border regions (cf. Miosga 1999: 
79). 
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“This [the Steering Committee] represents the partnership between national, 
regional and local actors within the Euregion. [...] The decisions of the Steering 
Committee will be made unanimously” (JITS 2000: 100).122 
 
The responsibilities of the ‘Coordination Committee’ of the INTERREG I program 
included approving individual applications for cross-border projects, as well as other 
issues concerned with the INTERREG program such as the co-financing of the projects 
(cf. Regio Rijn-Waal 1990: 23; 44).123 
 
This development of involving several decision-making parties alongside the European 
Commission represented a ‘shift of authority; from the European Commission towards 
the border regions and towards the national, regional and subregional levels of 
governance’ in case of the Dutch-German border. However, although the Commission 
wished to delegate authority from the central level of EU policy-making to the 
subnational level of the cross-border regions and the national level, it also still wanted to 
maintain its influence over cross-border policy decisions within INTERREG I. This might 
have been why the Commission officially retained a decisive seat on this first 
‘Coordination Committee’, in case of the ERW for example.  
 
With the start of INTERREG’s second program period, INTERREG II (1994-1999), the 
decision-making process changed, as the example of the ERW shows.124 The European 
Commission stopped participating in decision-making concerning individual projects and 
was thus no longer an active member of the Euregional Steering Committees that 
replaced the old Coordination Committee (ERW 1994: 22, 52). The other participants, 
                                                 
122
 Original citation: “Dieser [Der Lenkungsausschuss] repräsentiert die nationale/regionale/lokale 
Partnerschaft innerhalb der Euregio. [...] Die Beschlüsse der Lenkungsausschüsse erfolgen 
einstimmig” (JITS 2000: 100).  
123
 The INTERREG I program was evaluated at the end of its first period by the European Court 
of Auditors (ECA). One of the main conclusions of this evaluation was that the projects lacked a 
cross-border character and that there was an absence of cross-border cooperation, “inter alia, in 
the management of the Community Initiative programs (CIPs)” (ECA 2004: 6; cf. interview 24 
2010, cf. interview 30 2009). 
124
 In the period of 1994-1999, a total of 75 INTERREG II programs throughout Europe were 
supported under the three strands: Strand A for cross-border cooperation, strand B for completing 
energy networks and strand C for cooperation in regional and spatial planning (see also 
illustration 7 for an overview of the programs). Regarding Strand A, 59 programs were 
implemented along internal and external European borders with a length of more than 15,000 km. 
In accordance with the Third Cohesion Report, the eligible program areas covered around 36% of 
the total EU territory and around 27% of the total EU population (CEC 2004 (a): 156; cf. 
illustration 5). 
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including the representatives of national and regional governments, kept their seats on 
the Steering Committee. From this time onwards, the European Commission began to 
focus on the overall structure of the program and on monitoring and controlling the 
implementation process, rather than involving itself in individual projects. In order to 
monitor the overall progress of the program, representatives from the European 
Commission sat in on the Monitoring Committee meetings for the INTERREG II 
programs. This ‘shift’ in decision-making authority meant that responsibility for decisions 
within the programs came to reside at the national, regional and subregional levels, 
which from that point on decided together on specific projects.125 Right up until the 
current INTERREG program, decisions on projects have continued to be made with the 
involvement of the same three levels of governance – the subregional, regional and 
national levels (cf. European Commission and AEBR 2000: 45).126  
 
It was not only the program structure that changed from INTERREG I to INTERREG II, 
but also the requirements set for the projects. For example, within the Operational 
Program (OP) for INTERREG I set for the ERW, six criteria were mentioned but defined 
rather vaguely. The OP of INTERREG II for the ERW lists eight much more specific 
criteria, dealing with – for example – the cofinancing issue, as well as the budgetary 
question. The criteria for the former INTERREG I program were, in comparison, much 
more vaguely formulated (see Annex 1).127 Besides that, the application forms for project 
applicants were more extensive under INTERREG II than they had been under 
INTERREG I and the time needed for projects to be approved also became much 
longer. This later had negative consequences for the end-beneficiaries, because they 
had to wait longer before starting their project (cf. interview 19 2012). 
 
The first two INTERREG periods were conducted in separate regionally specific, 
decentralized and small-scale programs along the Dutch-German border and not 
                                                 
125
 The several levels of governance working together in the Dutch-German INTERREG system 
are described, defined and explained in the chapter of the theoretical framework (section 3.1.1) of 
this dissertation. 
126
 The Commission wanted to leave it to the decentralized public authorities to choose the areas 
in which they wished to cooperate in order to improve their development policies and instruments. 
This allowed Steering Committees to select the projects best-suited to the regional development 
and cohesion objectives (ECA 2004: 30). 
127
 For the concrete list of criteria of INTERREG I and INTERREG IIA which are given in the two 
OPs of the ERW, please see Annex 1 with the title ‘Project-criteria in INTERREG I and 
INTERREG IIA for the ERW’. 
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through a common program as had been indirectly demanded by the guidelines for 
INTERREG I, which stated: “For border areas within the Community joint mechanisms 
should be envisaged” (CEC 1990 No 90/C 215/04: 7). However, the Dutch-German 
Euregions did not act completely separately from each other because they worked on 
the basis of common program structures that were decided on 9 December 1991 with 
two documents. Firstly there was the ‘Vereinbarung zum niederländisch-
nordrheinwestfälischen-niedersächsischen-EG-Programm INTERREG’ and secondly the 
‘Übereinkunft der Partner mit der INVESTITIONSBANK NRW’. The principles of the 
INTERREG program until the current fourth funding period were fixed within the 
framework of this first Vereinbarung. For example, this states that financial responsibility 
resides with the ‘Bundesland’ North Rhine-Westphalia and that the INTERREG partners 
must decide on projects in the Steering Committees (cf. Miosga 1999: 70f). 
 
As can be seen in the map below (map 3), before the start of INTERREG III, all Dutch-
German Euregions worked in separate INTERREG programs with common basic rules, 
(with exception of the Dutch-German-Belgian Euregion, the Euregio Maas-Rhine did not 
participate in the Dutch-German Vereinbarung and Übereinkunft of 09.12.1990 (cf. 
interview 25 2009). 
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Map 3: Situation of pilot phase, INTERREG I and INTERREG II (1989 until the end of 1999) 
 
 
 
Source: JITS 2009. 
 
In 2000, when the INTERREG III program started, a reorganization took place among 
the program areas, so that the original five Dutch-German-(Belgian) cross-border 
organizations that had previously worked in separate INTERREG program areas merged 
to form three separate programs.128  
This meant that three of the four Dutch-German Euregions joined together to form one 
program. Hence, in addition to the Ems Dollart Region in the north and the Euregio 
Maas-Rhine in the south, one joint INTERREG program was formed consisting of the 
EUREGIO, Euregio Rhine-Waal and euregio rhine-maas-north, as can be seen in map 
4.  
                                                 
128
 See also illustration 6 (section 6.3), wherein the development of the strands of INTERREG are 
shown, next to the number of programs and that within the INTERREG IIIA period there existed 
64 programs, while in the first ETC period the number of programs reduced to 52, which is the 
consequence of merging program areas. 
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Map 4: Joining of INTERREG IIIA programs working together (2000-2006) 
 
 
Source: JITS 2009. 
 
 
Since then, a newly established Joint Technical INTERREG Secretariat (JTIS) has 
connected these three cross-border Euregions which implemented INTERREG through 
one joint Community Initiative Program (CIP). The JTIS was and continues to be the 
central pivot between the border regions on the one hand and the European 
Commission and the national actors involved on the other.129 At the start of the 
INTERREG III period, the European Commission had no decisive seat on the common 
Monitoring Committee as it had done previously under INTERREG II (cf. JTIS 2004 (a); 
cf. JTIS 2008). All other program partners retained their decisive seats on the Monitoring 
Committee, but the European Commission withdrew as a decisive member of the 
                                                 
129
 Since the start of the joined INTERREG IIIA program of the three Dutch-German Euregions 
the JITS is responsible for all questions related to the conducting of the program. The JITS 
supports the Monitoring Committee on program level and also the Management Authority with 
respect to the management of the program. Furthermore the JITS is responsible for the 
communication towards the European Commission and it supplies INTERREG participants with 
seminars related to e.g. applications for funding or EU-regulations. In addition to this, the JITS 
organizes meetings between the program managers of the Euregions on regular basis and is 
responsible for all PR activities at the program level (JITS 2007 (a): 50) 
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Committee at the start of INTERREG III (in 2000) and representatives of the 
Commission sit only as advisory members (cf. Euregio Rhein-Waal 1994: 52; cf. JITS 
2000: 98).130 
 
This merger of program areas was based on discussions between the European 
Commission and the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and was published in the “Opinion 
of the Committee of the Regions on: - the ‘Communication from the Commission to the 
Member States laying down guidelines for the Community Initiative for rural development 
(Leader+)’ - the ‘Communication from the Commission to the Member States 
establishing the guidelines for Community Initiative Programs (CIPs) for which the 
Member States are invited to submit proposals for support under the Equal initiative’, 
and - the ‘Communication from the Commission to the Member States laying down 
guidelines for a Community initiative concerning trans-European cooperation intended to 
encourage harmonious and balanced development of the European territory (Interreg)’” 
(CEC 2000 (a) No 2000/C 156/04). In this document, it was explained that the 
Commission proposed framing “one program only per national border, with specific sub-
programs for smaller cross-border cooperation zones” (CEC 2000 (a) No 2000/C 156/04: 
21). The view of the CoR was that, particularly the INTERREG IIIA regions, should 
“proceed on the basis of their own political priorities, which cannot be encapsulated in 
one central program per national border” (CEC 2000 (a) No 2000/C 156/04: 21). 
Additionally, the CoR argued that the formation of such large program areas would run 
counter to the bottom-up principle. In fact, the CoR wanted to retain all cross-border 
cooperation programs from INTERREG II in the INTERREG IIIA program period (CEC 
2000 (a) No 2000/C 156/04: 21). The final decisions on program areas were laid down in 
the guidelines for the INTERREG III program and formulated as follows:  
 
“In general, each programme will be drawn up for a border with subprogrammes 
for each cross-border region where appropriate. In duly justified cases (e.g. very 
long borders, points where several borders converge, well developed existing 
cooperation structures), the programmes will be drawn up for one cross-border 
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 With the start of INTERREG IIIA there exist three subprograms, but the INTERREG partners 
participated (and still participate) within common Monitoring Committee (German: 
Begleitausschuss, Dutch Comité van Toezicht). 
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region and may cover one or more borders” (CEC 2000 (b) No 2000/C 143/08, 
point 22: 10). 
 
This meant that cooperation between the three of the four Dutch-German Euregions 
became reality in the INTERREG IIIA program period. All three Euregions fell partially 
within North Rhine-Westphalia and thus the Managing Authority was given to that 
particular Bundesland.131 132 
 
The reason for merging program areas was, according to some of my interviewees, to 
streamline the coordination of programs on the part of the European Commission. 
Additionally, due to successive European enlargements, there were ever more program 
areas, a trend which forced the Commission had to promote mergers so that it would still 
have the capacity to supervise all the (smaller) programs (cf. interview 6 2010; cf. 
interview 19 2012; cf. interview 34 2009 ). 
 
Under the current INTERREG IV program/ETC, a second series of mergers took place. 
On the Dutch-German border, the Ems Dollart Region joined the program of the three 
neighboring Euregions, so that now only two program areas remain along the Dutch-
German-(Belgian) border (see map 5). The Dutch-German program area now includes 
almost the whole Dutch-German border region and covers approximately 4/5 of the 577-
kilometre border. The total area of the whole program area is 46,737 km2, with 53% of 
the area in the Netherlands and 45% in Germany. The program area covers parts of the 
German Bundesländer of Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia, as well as parts of 
the Dutch Provincies of Friesland, Groningen, Drenthe, Overijssel, Gelderland, Noord-
Brabant and Limburg (JITS 2007 (a): 13). 
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 Part of the area covered by the EUREGIO (Gronau) lays in Lower Saxonary. The EDR covers 
the area of the Dutch-German border which is in Lower Saxonary and had next to the Dutch-
German-Belgian Euregion of the EMR a statutes aparte in the INTERREG IIIA program period. 
132
 On 12th February 2002 the INTERREG program partners of the three jointed Euregions 
signed an agreement wherein the Bundesland North Rhine-Westphalia in representative of the 
two other involved national partners (the Netherlands and the Bundesland Lower Saxony) got the 
responsibility as a Managing Authority conform Art. 9 of the EC framework regulation (cf. Council 
1999 No 1260/1999 Art. 9 (n); JTIS 2000: 4).  
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Map 5: The INTERREG/ETC program (2007-2013) along the Dutch-German border 
 
 
 
Source: JITS 2009. 
 
 
These mergers meant greater involvement by the German federal states, in this case 
study the Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia. Since INTERREG IIIA, the Ministerium 
für Wirtschaft und Mittelstand, Energie und Verkehr of the state of North Rhine-
Westphalia has had the position of Managing Authority in the joint program of the four 
Dutch-German Euregions.133 There is one Managing Authority for every program and it 
has several tasks which are specified by in regulations from the European Commission 
(cf. Council 2006 No 1083/2006, Art. 60: 54f; Council 2006 No 1828/2006 Art. 13). In 
accordance with the general regulation on implementing Structural Funds 1999, the 
definition of a Managing Authority “[...] means any public or private authority or body at 
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 However, since the beginning of INTERREG, the Bundesland of North Rhine-Westphalia had 
been responsible for the payments within the Dutch-German INTERREG programs through the 
framework documents of the ‘Vereinbarung’ and the ‘Übereinkunft’ dating from 1991 (mentioned 
above) (cf. Miosga 1999: 70; Vereinbarung 1991). 
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national, regional or local level designated by the Member State, or the Member State 
when it is itself carrying out this function [...]” (Council 1999 No 1260/1999 Art. 9 (n)). 
The responsibilities of the Managing Authority include reporting annually to the 
European Commission on the progress of the program, as well as giving information to 
the beneficiaries about the requirements for financing and carrying out the ‘on-the-spot 
checks’ (cf. JTIS 2010: 1; cf. Council 2006 No 1828/2006 Art. 13).134 
 
However, the decentralized structure of the Euregions was retained as much as possible 
by creating subprograms which were conducted in the separate Euregions themselves. 
Each Euregion conducted its own decision-making procedure on projects on their 
separate Steering Committees as long as these involved projects that did not belong to 
the category of ‘major projects’ (for an explanation of the term ‘major project’ see section 
6.5.3).135 This subprogram structure is recognized by the European Commission and is 
allowed as long as the results are clustered and communication for the overall program 
is conducted via one channel, which is usually the JITS (cf. interview 6 2010).  
 
 
6.5 INTERREG and increasing administration  
 
Before starting this section on the elaboration of the several program periods and the 
changes of the INTERREG program, a few remarks have to be made. The general 
reforms of the Structural Funds, especially in respect to regional or cohesion policy, 
have been explained in chapter 5 and the changes in the INTERREG program are direct 
consequences of those more general reforms. The guidelines from the European level of 
governance for the implementation of INTERREG, at least until 2006, were altered in 
compliance with the general regulations. Those guidelines were transferred into the OPs 
and CIPs of the border regions themselves because these documents were drawn up in 
accordance with the regulations for INTERREG. This section will not look at all changes 
in the overall Structural Funds, but will concentrate on the causes of the increasing 
administration and complexity, especially for end-users and end-beneficiaries in the 
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 The role of the Managing Authority in the program will be elaborated in chapter 7. 
135
 Representatives of the JITS are participating with a non-decisive voice on the Steering 
Committee meetings of the several programs (interview 18 2009). 
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border region.136 This section seeks to investigate the specific changes in the 
administrative burden for project partners in the application process, the approval 
procedure and the administrative burden of conducting INTERREG projects.  
 
Within the pilot phase of INTERREG in the years 1989-90, (see section 6.4), there were 
basically two criteria that the projects had to fulfill. Firstly, there had to be a cross-border 
interest and secondly, projects had to include efforts to improve the socio-economic 
structure of the border area. During this pilot phase, in the case of the ERW, the 
Euregion itself was project lead partner for two of the five projects. The projects had a 
duration of between one and three years.137 The decision procedure for the approval of 
the projects was quite simple at that time: project proposals were discussed on the 
board of the ERW and in the end the Euregion Council made a definitive decision on 
which projects would proceed (cf. ERW 1993: 1). The budget needed to realize those 
first projects was then requested directly for the five projects in a letter from the Euregion 
towards the European Commission, as explained before. A copy of that letter was also 
sent, for information purposes, to the Bundeswirtschaftsministerium (Bonn), the 
Ministerie van Economische Zaken Directoraat-general voor Industrie en Regionaal 
Beleid (The Hague), the Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Technologie des 
Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (Düsseldorf), the Regierungspräsident Düsseldorf and the 
Provinciaal Bestuur van Gelderland (Arnhem) (cf. Regio Rhein-Waal 1989). Because 
this pilot phase was not a program, there was no separate Operational Program 
document. 
 
Regarding the final controls on these first projects, the only procedure stipulated was 
that “the final expenditure for the projects was checked and approved by the relevant 
German and/or Dutch institutions for accounting controls” (ERW 1993: 1).138 
Comparing the five final invoices for this pilot phase, it is obvious that there was no 
standardized form to use when categorizing the various types of costs, as it there was 
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 The changes will be explained on the example of the Euregion Rhine-Waal (ERW). Until the 
INTERREG II period started (1994), the Euregion Rhine-Waal was called regio rhein/rijn-waal. 
This dissertation refer to the ERW, also in times, when it was called regio rhein/rijn-waal.  
137
 For some projects an extension had to be requested towards the European Commission 
(ERW 1993: 1). 
138
 Original citation: “die Endabrechnung der Projekte wurde von den jeweiligen zuständigen 
deutschen und/oder niederländischen Rechnungsprüfungsinstanzen geprüft und genehmigt” 
(ERW 1993: 1). 
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later on in INTERREG. At that time, every project simply summed up all their costs (cf. 
ERW 1993: Annexes I-V).  
 
In sum, the administrative burden for project applicants and partners was not high during 
the pilot scheme, but working in a cross-border cooperation structure also meant at that 
time that laws and regulations from both states had to be coordinated and therefore 
some agreements between the partners had to be made. Additionally, until 2002 cross-
border cooperation had to deal with two different currencies, which was also a kind of 
implementation burden.  
 
Since the introduction of INTERREG, successive EU enlargements have taken place 
which have meant that the number of internal borders has grown and institutional and 
socio-economic differences have also proliferated (cf. Dühr, Colomb and Nadin 2010: 
234). Very generally, the enlargements have made territorial cooperation more and more 
an instrument with which to overcome those differences. As Dühr, Colomb and Nadin 
(2010: 234) stated: 
 
“The objectives and scope of trans-boundary cooperation programs have 
broadened over time, and much of the understanding about the role of territorial 
cooperation and how best to do it has developed in a progress of “learning by 
doing”.  
 
This ‘learning-by-doing’ approach could explain the increasing number of chapters and 
increasingly detailed prescriptions in the INTERREG guidelines, as Community Initiative 
for the first three periods of funding (1990-2006) that consequently reflected the number 
of regularities in the OPs/CIPs. Particularly after the reform of the Structural Funds in 
1999 for the period of 2000-2006, the guidelines for INTERREG IIIA became significantly 
longer than for INTERREG I and INTEREG II (the reforms made to the Structural Funds 
of 1994 and 1999 are elaborated in chapter 5). 
 
Establishing Operational Programs and submitting them to the European Commission 
was, from the beginning of INTERREG in a program structure, the basic mechanism of 
funding. The Operational Programs (OPs) had to be submitted by the member states 
and these documents had to define the common structures and mechanisms by which 
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the cross-border cooperation program was to be implemented. This basic principle of 
establishing OPs for border regions was explained briefly in the guidelines of 1990 and 
in slightly more detail in the guidelines of 1994, where for example a time limit was 
specified for submitting OPs. However, the second set of guidelines was quite similar to 
the first one, with additional information given for proposals on cross-border cooperation 
relating to external borders and information on the strand concerning the completion of 
energy networks (CEC 1990 No 90/C 215/04, section V; CEC 1994 No 94/C 180/13, 
section IV). The two additions in the second set of guidelines from 1994 can be 
explained by the change in the INTERREG structure from an initiative that solely 
promoted cross-border cooperation towards an instrument with a second strand 
(INTERREG IIB) for energy networks (see illustration 7) (cf. Dühr, Colomb and Nadin 
2010: 233-235).139 In comparison with the first and second shorter sets of guidelines, the 
third guidelines from the year 2000 were more detailed and provided more detailed 
regulations on the “Preparation, presentation and approval of interventions” (section V). 
This was on the one hand a consequence of the fact that INTERREG now covered the 
strands A, B and C (as can be seen in illustration 7) and on the other hand, because 
procedures on the content of OPs and the approval of “Community Initiative Programs” 
(CIPs) were described in greater detail, including evaluations, program planning and 
common strategy (cf. CEC 2000 (b) No 2000/C 143/08 title V, point 25). Comparing the 
Dutch-German OP documents – which had been written in accordance with the 
guidelines – for the funding periods of INTERREG I and II with the CIP of INTERREG 
IIIA, the latter went into much more detail and were longer (cf. Regio Rijn-Waal 1990; 
euregio rijn-maas-noord 1994; ERW 1994; JTIS 2000). This was also a consequence of 
the general reforms of the European Structural Funds, in which we can see that the 
changes between the periods 1990-1993 and 1994-1999 were minor in comparison with 
the shift that took place in 2000-2006 (see also section 5.4 and 6.5.1).  
 
Regarding the first three sets of INTERREG guidelines dating from 1990, 1994 and 
2000, it is significant that all guidelines started with a review of past funding. The first 
guidelines of 1990 as well as the regulations of 1994 both stated that “the previous 
experience of efforts to promote cooperation between border areas in the Community” 
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 From 1997 until 1999 the INTERREG IIC-initiative focused on transnational cooperation and 
spatial planning, next to the management of water resources (Dühr, Colomb and Nadin 2010: 
235).  
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indicated that “the setting up of shared institutional and administrative structures to 
sustain and promote cooperation” had occurred (cf. CEC 1990 No 90/C 215/04; point 4 
(c); CEC 1994 No 94/C 180/13, point 4 (c)). The guidelines of 2000 also started with a 
review which included more specific details of the funding period 1994-1999. In respect 
to establishing common institutional structures, it says specifically that: 
 
“[...] experience shows that significant steps have been made towards joint cross-
border programming and programme management in many cases. However, the 
kind of strong cooperation that takes place, for example in the ‘Euroregions’ is 
still the exception rather than the rule” (CEC 2000 (b) No 2000/C 143/08, point 
5). 
 
The steps to establish common institutional structures that had been taken as part of 
cross-border cooperation until 2000 may be regarded as the consequence of the 
sections of the first two guidelines that emphasized the importance of building common 
structures in border areas, stating that the Commission would prioritize proposals “which 
are made in cooperation with regional and local authorities in border areas and, in 
internal border areas, to those which include the establishment or development of 
shared institutional or administrative structures [...]” (CEC 1990 No 90/C 215/04, point 6; 
CEC 1994 No 94/C 180/13, point 6). 
 
 
6.5.1 From INTERREG I to INTERREG IV (ETC) 
 
Transferring the INTERREG guidelines towards the border regions and starting in the 
first period of funding (1990-1993) when INTERREG was implemented via a program 
structure for the first time, common rules were established that were applicable to all 
INTERREG programs (CEC 1990 No 90/C 215/04). The common regulations of the 
Guidelines were specified for the specific border region in the first OP (e.g. Regio Rijn-
Waal 1990: 23). The processes of setting up projects, approval and final monitoring were 
more streamlined than in the pilot phase, through the application of a number of criteria 
that projects had to fulfill and that were also indirectly prescribed in the first regulations 
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on INTERREG programs (CEC 1990 No 90/C 215/04, see Annex 1).140 Additionally, the 
seven project priorities of the INTERREG I program – following the example of the ERW 
– set out the basis for the project priorities of subsequent programs (interview 19 2012). 
These priorities were called: 1. Building up networks, information flows and 
communication; 2. Traffic, transport and infrastructure; 3. Leisure and tourism; 4. 
Education and work; 5. Environment; 6. Innovation and technology transfer; 7. Research 
and project management (Regio Rijn-Waal 1990: 22). 
 
Overall, implementing INTERREG through a program structure and allocating a budget 
for several years meant a change in the activity of cross-border organizations. According 
to the interviewees, the projects were controlled in terms of their content and finances, 
but this was not mentioned or explained in the first OP in the example of the ERW (cf. 
interview 19 2012; cf. Regio Rijn-Waal 1990). It is remarkable, especially compared with 
the later OPs, that the projects, that were to be carried out in a relatively short period of 
funding (1991-1993) were already named, described and explained by the time the first 
Operational Program was approved, because they are listed in that document (Regio 
Rijn-Waal 1990).  
 
The INTERREG II program period (1994-1999) was longer than INTERREG I (1990-
1993), had a larger budget and thus longer projects could be realized (interview 19 
2012). The reform that took place before the INTERREG II programs was not as 
significant as the reform of 1999 for the INTERREG IIIA program, when the OPs became 
Community Initiative Programs (CIPs) and the program areas along the border were 
required to work together. Since the start of INTERREG IIIA, one CIP should generally 
be submitted for each border and ‘subprograms’ were drawn up for each border region 
(CEC 2000 (b) No 2000/C 143/08: point 22).141 In the INTERREG IIIA guidelines for the 
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 Within the first INTERREG-guideline six general criteria for INTERREG programs were listed 
(see Annex 1). The first Operational Program of the ERW translated the 6 criteria partly into the 
situation of that particular border-region and adjusted the own goals, which were elaborated in the 
earlier document of the ‘Grensoverschrijdende Ontwikkelings- en Handlingsconcept’. 
141
 As explained above, at the Dutch-German border there existed in INTERREG IIIA two 
programs next to the Dutch-German-Belgian Euregion Maas-Rhine. Since 2007 the four Dutch-
German Euregions joined together to one common program. The Euregion Maas-Rhine (EMR) 
remained separate, which could have been the result of consequent negotiations between the 
participating INTERREG-partners before the third and fourth period of funding started (interview 
25 2009). The main argumentation for the separate status of the EMR is written down in the 
guidelines by making exceptions for border areas “where several border converge“ (CEC 2000 
(b) No 2000/C 143/08: point 22). 
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content of the programs were given in detail, in accordance with the general Council 
regulation 1999 No 1260/1999 Art 19 (3), which explained the overall structure, content 
and aims of the programs. In fact, the guidelines for INTERREG III partly repeated the 
general regulation (point 25) and adjusted it from general regulations for Structural 
Funds towards the CI INTERREG concerning CIP issues, such as how to organize and 
structure the CIP with its several institutions and how to establish one Joint Technical 
INTERREG Secretariat (JITS) for the operational management of the CIP (cf. CEC 2000 
(b) No 2000/C 143/08: point 25; cf. Council 1999 No 1260/1999 Art. 19). Furthermore, 
the guidelines for INTERREG III included a section on coordination between INTERREG 
and other CIPs (title VII), a detailed section on “Financing” (title VIII) and “Timing” (IX), 
as well as a detailed Annex I that listed the eligible areas of INTERREG A and an Annex 
II which gave an indicative list of priority topics and eligible measures (cf. CEC 2000 (b) 
No 2000/C 143/08: title VII; VIII; IX; Annex I; Annex 2).  
 
The merging of program areas under INTERREG III increased the administrative burden 
significantly in the border regions, because ‘communication lines’ became longer and the 
joint program was still divided into subprograms, which meant that every Euregion had to 
manage its own program and communicate it to a common Monitoring Committee and 
the newly established JITS. The JITS was, among others, in turn, in contact with all 
INTERREG program partners and with the Managing Authority of the Bundesland of 
North Rhine-Westphalia and the European Commission. The joint Monitoring Committee 
and the JITS – which prepares the meetings of the Monitoring Committee – was 
responsible for constantly adjusting the three subprograms. The decisions of the joint 
Monitoring Committee concerning the three subprograms were made in respect to the 
joint mid-term evaluation, budgetary issues, such as budget transfers from one priority to 
another (sometimes with an official application made to the Commission) or from one 
subprogram to another (cf. interview 19 2012).  
 
Unlike during previous periods of funding, for the 2007-2013 period there are no extra 
guidelines that relate solely to the implementation of the new objective 3 of ETC, but just 
one set of rules for all the objectives and which relates to all the funds involved (cf. 
Council 2006 No 1083/2006). This is because, as part of the trend towards simplification, 
the EU tried to decrease the amount of regulations and create similar structures for all 
subsidies in order to make European funding more effective, transparent, easier to 
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manage and less costly. Hence the changes made at the start of the program period 
2007-2013 were considered “important steps [...] to streamline legislation and simplify 
rules for managing cohesion policy” (CEC 2007 (a): 10). The Commission introduced 
one single set of regulations for the 2007-2013 programming period for the ERDF, the 
ESF and the Cohesion Fund (CF), and this replaced the previous ten sets of regulations 
in place for the 2000-2006 programming period (European Commission DG Regional 
Policy, presentation June 2012 (b), Brussels: sheet 2). To sum up, under the current 
period 2007-2013, the following regulations are the legal basis for the European cross-
border cooperation within INTERREG:  
 
- General Structural Funds regulation which fixes the main objectives (Council 
2006 No 1083/2006) 
- ERDF regulation including a chapter on ETC with detailed requirements 
(Council 2006 No 1080/2006) 
- Implementing Regulation (CEC 2006 No 1828/2006)142  
- Regulation for a European Grouping of Territorial Co-operation, i.e. EGTC 
(Council 2006 No 1082/2006) (European Commission, Regional Policy, 
presentation 2012 (b): 7).143 
 
We will now make a brief comparison between the Implementing Regulation 2007-2013 
and the previous guidelines for INTERREG III (cf. CEC 2006 No 1828/2006; CEC 2000 
(b) No 2000/C 143/08). 
First of all, and as a logical consequence of the changes made to the general structure 
of the European financial instruments, the implementing regulations for the period 2007-
2013 deregulated the former Regulation (1999) No 1260/1999, while the guidelines for 
INTERREG III were based on those regulations. The basis for the regulations for the 
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 Within this dissertation the version of 15.02.2007 of the CEC 2006 No 1828/2006 regulation is 
used which is a ‘corrigendum’ of the regulation from 08.12.2006, but the dissertation refers to 
CEC 2006 No 1828/2006. 
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 Hence in the proposal for the next program period, starting from 2014 onwards, it is foreseen, 
that only one general set of regulations with common provisions for cohesion policy, the rural 
development policy and the maritime and fisheries policies and common provisions for cohesion 
policy only (ERDF, ESF, CF), as well as fund-specific regulations for the ERDF, ESF, CF, ETC 
and next to the EGTC regulation will exist (European Commission, DG Regional Policy 2012 (b), 
presentation: 2). 
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funding period 2007-2013 were the general Structural Funds regulations which specify 
the main objectives (cf. Council 2006 No 1083/2006; cf. CEC 2006 No 1828/2006). 
While the guidelines for INTERREG III began directly with the “general objectives and 
principles” for the INTERREG III initiative, the implementation guidelines for the 2007-
2013 period have a lengthy preamble that looks back on the success and failures of past 
funding periods and summarizes the areas that need improvement in the funding period 
2007-2013. This preamble focuses mainly on very general issues for all Structural Funds 
such as improving the communication and PR management of the programs, enhancing 
transparency, identifying and explaining steps for better monitoring and controlling and 
for the (digital) reporting of programs to the European Commission (Council 2006 No 
1083/2006, points (1)-(30)). The points made in the preamble are then developed 
extensively in the regulations. The variety of the programs, the aims, goals and content 
of the several funding instruments and the beneficiaries are not specified or explained, 
as the INTERREG III guidelines did by for example explaining the system of INTERREG 
IIIA, B and C (cf. CEC 2000 (b) No 2000/C 143/08, II-IV). This means that the new 
implementation regulations must be used for all funds and simplify work at the 
supranational and national levels, because at those two levels, several (national) or all 
(supranational) funding programs require supervision and assistance. By unifying and 
enhancing the rules and regulations for all Structural Funds, it may become easier to 
compare procedures, results and achieved targets on those two levels of governance.  
 
The question remains, however, of whether this standardization of the rules for 
implementation relieves the burden on stakeholders and participants at the subregional 
and regional levels, because all possible eventualities and exceptions are included in the 
rules, and there are more regulations relating to the programs. As such, we can hardly 
speak of any ‘grey area’, because the increased regulations have made the programs 
more rigid and there was less leeway for participants to deal with, for example, specific 
(legal) problems which could occur and are frequently not foreseen when participants 
from two countries work together. To return to cooperation at the Dutch-German border, 
where at least two natural partners from two countries were already acting together in 
joint projects and programs – in accordance with European, Dutch and German rules 
and laws – the scope for intervention was increasingly constricted, due to the threefold 
stipulations and there was hardly any leeway for addressing unexpected problems or 
obstacles in the implementation process. 
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6.5.2 Day-to-day complexity under INTERREG IV / ETC 
 
With the introduction of INTERREG IV / ETC (2007-2013) a structural change in 
comparison with the previous INTERREG III program took place when it comes to the 
day-to-day work of the INTERREG program and project managers, and thus also for the 
end- beneficiaries or end-users. The change does not stem from the fact that 
INTERREG became a European objective in its own right – in the framework of the ETC 
– rather than a Community Initiative. Instead, and particularly for this Dutch-German 
case study, the change stems especially from the fact that since the start of the current 
funding period there have been no official subprograms based on the Euregions 
(although this does not mean that several Euregions do not have separate (regional) 
projects that are approved through separate regional Steering Committees). The 
European Commission increasingly stimulated regions to let several program-areas join 
together and to create larger program-areas (cf. CEC 2000 (b) No 2000/C 143/08). The 
main reason for this would be that due to the enlarged European territory the number of 
new program-areas increased also. Since the organizational capacities of European 
Commission remained limited, desk officers would deal with more larger program-areas 
instead of many smaller ones. Due to this development the four Dutch-German 
Euregions were obliged to work together during the 2007-2013 period (rather than three 
in 2000-2006). Besides that, there has been the introduction of ‘major projects’. Another 
change has been in the workflow of the programs, which have been streamlined by 
introducing digital communication between the levels of.144 This section will mainly focus 
on the specific consequences of these changes for end-users. 
 
In general, for the (sub)regional projects in the border region, the fact that INTERREG 
became a separate European objective has not had any direct implications. The various 
strands (A, B and C) of INTERREG still exist and all three strands are helping to work on 
European integration. Strand A for cross-border cooperation still has the main share of 
budget. However, under the INTERREG strand A, there has been a shift of the budget 
towards innovative, technological and economic projects – in accordance with the Lisbon 
Agenda – compared with the INTERREG IIIA period. In INTERREG IVA 58% of the total 
budget had to be spend on priority 1 including ‘commerce, technology and innovation’ 
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 ‘Major projects’ and the digital workflow in INTERREG IV will be discussed and explained 
intensively in Sections 6.5.3; 6.7.1 and 6.7.2). 
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while priorities 2 and 3 (relating to ‘sustainable regional development’ and ‘society and 
integration’ respectively) each received just 18% of the share, which was much lower 
than during the INTERREG IIIA period (cf. JITS 2000: 84-94; JITS 2007: 80). The direct 
consequence of this was that many projects are no longer oriented directly to the 
inhabitants of the border regions, but indirectly for the inhabitants by stimulating 
technological innovations or the subregional economy. The projects which are 
conducted under priority 1 are often much higher in its total budget than most of the 
projects in priority 2 and 3 (cf. JITS 2012, web page, access 13.01.2013).  
 
In its ‘on-going evaluation’, the first question of the JITS in 2011 was whether conducting 
projects in the Dutch-German INTERREG program would lead to a disproportionate 
administrative burden.145 Out of 140 respondents, 100 answered ‘yes’ to this question. 
The difficulties that the respondents described included the complex cost plan (24 
respondents), the description of the functions of the staff employed the projects (17 
respondents), the cofinancing declaration (15 respondents) and others (JITS 2011 (b): 1; 
4). In the following section, some aspects of the increasing administrative burden 
associated with INTERREG IV projects in comparison with INTERREG III will be 
explained. 
 
Comparing the contact of the Euregion ERW with the (potential) INTERREG/ETC project 
participants and project partners – in this research also called the ‘end-users’ or ‘end-
beneficaries’ – one of the project coordinators explained the day-to-day changes and 
continuities from INTERREG III to INTERREG IV, saying that the advisory meetings 
between (potential) project participants had basically remained the same under 
INTERREG IV, but that the focus had shifted more to the cross-border element and the 
regional relevance of the project, not only in its content but also from the technical 
(organizational and financial) point of view. It is important (more so than under 
INTERREG III) that the project is balanced between both sides of the border in all 
respects (e.g. technical, financial, organizational aspects). The interviewee also stated 
that generally under INTERREG III the rules were slightly more flexible than under 
INTERREG IV – for example in the procedure for the project applications (interview 16 
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 The on-going evaluation asked 355 persons who are/were responsible for the administration 
of INTERREG IVA projects to participate in an online survey of 23 questions in respect to the 
administration of INTERREG projects. 140 people participated, of whom 84 answered as a lead 
partner and the others were ‘normal’ project partners. Around 80% of the participants were part of 
regional projects and around 20% participated in ‘major projects’ (JITS 2011 (b): 1). 
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2012). From the results of the ‘on-going evaluation’ of 2011, 55% of respondents 
answered that the time required to submit a complete project application was (very) high, 
while just 7% of the respondents said that it was (very) low. The administrative burden 
under this procedure lay mainly in the details required for the application, especially the 
account for personal costs (JITS 2011(b): 2-3).  
 
Since INTERREG IV, all project applications (and also the later ‘application for 
reimbursements’) take place via a digital monitoring system.146 147 The digital system 
was meant to simplify procedures. However, according to the results of the ‘on-going 
evaluation’, some respondents consider the digital system as “confusing” and as “very 
difficult” and state that it takes a long period of adjustment to work with the program. 
According to some respondents, submitting a project application through this system has 
its difficulties as well as making ‘applications for reimbursement’ which is often 
considered (extremely) complex. For project applicants and project partners mainly in 
the socio-cultural section, this additional requirement in the form of a standardized digital 
system can sometimes be considered as an extra burden, as one project coordinator 
explained in an interview. However, the digital monitoring system does tend to simplify 
communication in the program as a whole in respect to the communication flow between 
the subregional, regional (Germany), national and European levels of governance. When 
it comes to the projects, it also streamlines communication between the project 
applicants and partners and the (regional) program management. For example, it 
clarifies which forms need to be filled in and what is missing so far to meet the 
requirements of a complete project application. For the project as well as for the program 
management, this digital system works perfectly and has huge advantages, because it 
provides an overview of the progress in the projects (including projects in the application 
phase) as well as the progress of the program as a whole (JITS 2011 (b): 3; 5; cf. 
interview 12 2012; cf. interview 1 2012).  
 
The procedure for making a project application generally takes several months. The 
same was true under INTERREG III, but under INTERREG IV the burden has increased 
(cf. interview 33 2011). First an outline for the project has to be filled in (German 
                                                 
146
 The monitoring system for the Dutch-German program is called InterDB-SQL-System. 
147
 The term ‘application for reimbursements’ stands for the German term Mittelabruf and the 
Dutch term uitbetalingsaanvraag. 
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‘Projektskizze’); this is a simple form that only has to be submitted in one language (the 
final project application must be in Dutch as well as in German). The ‘project outline 
form’ aims to lower the barriers to submitting an INTERREG project application.148 The 
final project application can only be completed in the digital monitoring system after the 
form for the project outline has been completed and discussed with the project 
coordinator. Then the potential project partner may proceed by completing the actual 
project application form together with the plan of costs (interview 16 2012; cf. JITS 2011 
(c) point 4.2: 4).149 
 
In general, the form of the application has not changed much, but under INTERREG IV, 
a ‘cooperation agreement’ must be drawn up and signed, and this is a complex process 
for (potential) project partners, especially on larger projects (cf. JITS 2011(c) point 3.7: 
4).150 In fact, the ‘cooperation agreement’ is not a complicated form and is not generally 
much work to fill in, but larger projects with many project partners and participants 
consider this form to be a an extra burden, because it is accompanied by the 
Zusätzlichkeitserklärung, a document that explains the additionality of the work that will 
be carried out as part of the INTERREG project (cf. Council 2006 No 1083/2006 Art. 15). 
The Zusätzlichkeitserklärung needs to be set up for all working hours and it ensures that 
the working hours of the participating organizations are solely reserved for the 
INTERREG projects and that the particular organizations have put solutions in place for 
these extra hours of work (interview 16 2012). The ‘on-going evaluation’ of 2011 
confirms that indeed most of the respondents have difficulty with this form (cf. JITS 2011 
(b): 3). This Zusätzlichkeitserklärung was also a difficulty under INTERREG III, but as 
stated previously, under INTERREG III there was rather more leeway (interview 16 
2012; cf. interview 33 2011). This administrative burden was also detected in the ‘on-
going evaluation’. The results of this evaluation were discussed at one of the meetings of 
the Monitoring Committee in 2011, but the conclusion was that it would not be possible 
to scrap this form for staff members of public institutions in North Rhine-Westphalia and 
Lower Saxony. The complete abolition of the Zusätzlichkeitserklärung is not possible 
because of the Landeshaushaltsrecht and as such the Monitoring Committee decided 
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 The form of the Projektskizze is available as a download on the web page of the JITS and has 
not to be filled in via the digital monitoring system (cf. JITS 2012, web page, access 13.01.2013). 
149
 With the term ‘plan of costs’ the German word Kostenplan is meant. 
150
 With the term ‘cooperation agreement’ the German word Kooperationsvereinbarung is meant. 
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that the Zusätzlichkeitserklärung should only be filled in only by staff financed by public 
money (cf. JITS 2011 (a), point 5: 3).  
 
Furthermore, the financial accounts of staff expenses for the projects – which had to be 
made in advance – has also increased in complexity under INTERREG IV, because 
during the current funding period, all staff costs have to be calculated with a 
Personalkostenkalkulator at the end of the year for the previous year, which means, that 
staff costs for 2012 will be re-calculated in 2013 on the basis of the actual salaries paid 
out and not just on the basis of the expansion which has been made in advance (cf. JITS 
2009: 5; cf. JITS 2011(c) point 4.2.1: 5-6). In fact, the planning is re-calculated and 
differences between expansion and actual salaries paid will be integrated in the first 
‘application for reimbursement’ of the new year and that means much more 
administration work for the project partner, for the Euregions and also for the Certifying 
Authority (cf. interview 16 2012).151 The on-going evaluation of the JITS also showed 
that more than 50% of the total eligible costs in the INTERREG IV program are staff 
costs and that many project lead partners consider the calculation of staff costs to be 
extremely complicated and complex (cf. JITS 2011 (a), point 4: 2).  
 
The effort and time required during the projects, including several ‘applications for 
reimbursement’ which have to be made during the course of a project and which are 
accompanied by proof of the various costs incurred and payments made (staff, external 
services, material and overhead) and the submission of original or legally attested 
copies, are considered by most respondents of the ‘on-going evaluation’ and by the 
interviewees for this project as high or extremely high (cf. interview 14 and 15 2009; 
interview 33 2011). The respondents participating in the ‘on-going evaluation’ had to 
estimate in percentage terms the share of the total costs of the project which would go 
towards administration (only project lead partners were asked this question). The results 
show that the percentage for covering the administration is high: 75% of those 
respondents who made an estimate said that the percentage was more than 10%, and 
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 Every program area had to set up one single financial plan and had to share one single bank 
account into which the payments were made. These changes were aimed at simplifying the 
Commission’s management and oversight of the program areas (ECA 2004: 7).  
In INTERREG IV, these arrangements are coordinated by a ‘Paying Authority’ which is called 
‘Certifying Authority’ that forwards payments of all co-financing funds to the lead partners of the 
projects. It additionally monitors the proper assignment of the funds (JTIS 2008: 3-21; JITS 2013, 
web page, access 13.01.2013). 
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some of them even estimated the percentage at 25-30% of the total project costs. 
Significantly, at the program level from the side of the EU, 6% of the total costs are 
reserved for administration (JITS 2011 (b): 3-10). In this context, there does seem to be 
one changes that has improved the position of the Euregions: under INTERREG III, all 
receipts and documents had to be submitted with the ‘application for reimbursement’ and 
be verified by the particular project coordinator along with the financial administration of 
the Euregion; however, under INTERREG IV this is no longer necessary. The verification 
of the documents on which the ‘application for reimbursement’ is based is now done by 
the project lead partner itself. The lead partner has to carry out controls through an 
accountant and this person confirms that the costs spent were legal. This accountant 
has to be approved beforehand by the Euregions. Under the new procedure, the 
Euregion itself sees no longer original checks. Rather than this, the Euregion or the 
program management conducts an ‘on-the-spot check’ of the projects. These checks 
were conducted under INTERREG III as well, but the checks in the IIIA period were less 
strict than the current checks because they mainly focused on the content and PR 
activities of the projects. The current ‘on-the-spot checks’ include all books, checks, 
invoices and bills and this is a difficult task because in fact the Euregions control the 
appointed accountant. Because the Euregions are not the only controlling organizations, 
sometimes projects can undergo several controls in a short time from the particular 
Euregion, the Finanzministerium NRW and the European Commission, which both carry 
out random checks on projects. Unlike the ‘on-the-spot controls’ of the Euregion, where 
randomly selected ‘applications for reimbursement’ are controlled, the Finanzministerium 
conducts a 100% control of one, two or three ‘applications for reimbursement’. However, 
such controls do not occur unexpectedly; the ERW informs the project partner one 
month in advance. In sum, my interviewee said: “Hence, the amount of controls has 
increased enormously and that creates a bit of resentment. During the project 
application process, we try to give a real picture of the complexity beforehand” (interview 
16 2012).152 However, the interviewed project coordinator also said that: “If in the future 
it is the case that it will stay as it is now, that the accountant is controlling and we [as 
project management of the particular Euregion] no longer see any receipts and bills, 
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 Original quotation: “Die Kontrollen haben also unheimlich zugenommen und das drückt auf die 
Stimmung. Man versucht bei der Antragsstellung schon ein bisschen davor zu warnen“ (interview 
16 2012). 
  
155 
then it would be reasonable that we or the financial ministry carry out on-the-spot check. 
Controls are reasonable after all” (interview 16 2012).153 
 
 
6.5.3 Another administrative burden  
 
After the first series of mergers among program areas during the INTERREG III period, 
the value of conducting projects that covered more than one program area increased. 
The reason for this was the enhanced quality of cross-border cooperation and the 
synergy effects for the whole program area, not just for a single subprogram area. The 
development of these kinds of ‘flagship projects’ very much suited all thematic 
priorities.154 Flagship projects between the joint program and the program of the EDR 
had actually been conducted under INTERREG IIIA, however these kind of projects that 
were conducted with project partners of the several program areas or which had effects 
in more than one program area had to be approved beforehand by the European 
Commission (JITS 2007: 48).  
 
During the INTERREG IV period, the new term of ‘major projects’ was introduced, that in 
fact replaced the former ‘flagship projects’, formalizing them and increasing their 
prominence in the program. ‘Major projects’ were during the INTERREG IV period 
mainly initiated from the Dutch national side and they were allocated their own budget 
(cf. interview 6 2010, cf. interview 20 2010, cf. interview 28 2010). ‘Major projects’ fit with 
the aims of the Gothenburg and the Lisbon Agenda – namely to strengthen 
competitiveness through technology, innovation and sustainability. Additionally, ‘major 
projects’ fit with the national policies of the Netherlands (e.g. ‘Pieken in de Delta’ or ‘Nota 
Ruimte’ (Ruimtelijke Ordening) and German policies of North Rhine-Westphalia and 
Lower Saxony) (cf. JITS 2007 (a): 51-56; 78). However, the will for ‘major projects’ 
comes mainly from the national (German regional) level, and the Council Regulation for 
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 Original quotation: “Wenn es weiterhin so läuft, dass Rechnungsprüfer prüfen und wir [das 
Projekt-management der betreffenden Euregio] keine Belege mehr sehen, dann macht es schon 
Sinn, dass wir oder das Finanzministerium durch eine Vorortkontrolle mal nachsehen. Eine 
Kontrolle macht schon Sinn“ (interview 16 2012). 
154
 With the term ‘flagship projects’ the German word Leuchtturmprojekte and Dutch word 
vuurtorenprojecten is meant. 
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the general provisions of the ERDF, the ESF and the CF states clearly – under the title 
‘Major projects’ – that:  
 
“As part of an operational programme the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund may 
finance expenditure in respect of an operation comprising a series of works, 
activities or services intended in itself to accomplish an indivisible task of a 
precise economic or technical nature, which has clearly identified goals [...]” 
(Council 2006 No 1083/2006, Art. 39). 
 
Thus the intention for ‘major projects’ originates at the supranational/European level and 
the extra provisions on ‘major projects’ are taken forward by the Dutch-German 
INTERREG program partners as part of the procedure for establishing the program 
documents for the 2007-2013 period. The official definition of ‘major projects’ in the 
Dutch-German program is: 
 
“Major projects are in first place common project from knowledge institutions en 
representatives from the private sector from both countries, which will expect 
market related results on the basis of applied research” (JITS 2007 (a): 78).155 
‘Major projects’ have to fulfill several criteria, in addition to the general criteria which all 
cross-border cooperation projects have to meet.156 They should cover a large part of the 
whole Dutch-German program area. They should be long-term, sustainable and involve 
considerable engagement from both sides of the border, which means that ‘major 
projects’ have to cover a long period of time and that several budget years should be 
subdivided into significant phases. Financial participation by business is also welcomed, 
especially among the project applicants and as such, ‘major projects’ should be 
developed in close cooperation with knowledge institutions and the private sector. 
Furthermore, “the spatial extensiveness and the high quality of the ‘major projects’ is 
generally also reflected in the volume of the total cost, where a clearly bigger financial 
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 Original citation: “Majeure projecten zijn in eerste instantie gezamenlijke projecten van 
kennisinstellingen en vertegenwoordigers van het bedrijfsleven uit beide landen, die op basis van 
toegepast onderzoek marktgeoriënteerde resultaten doen verwachten” (JITS 2007 (a): 78). 
156
 Which are the cross-border character and the sustainability of the project. Next to this, projects 
should not violate the European Community law and or the national legislation (cf. JITS 2012, 
web page, access 13.01.2013). 
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contribution of the private sector is expected” (JITS 2012, web page, access 13.01.2013; 
JITS 2007 (a): 78). 
However, ‘major projects’ require significant administrative effort, because of the number 
of project partners, the large total budget and thus much effort is required to secure 
cofinancing. Preparing ‘major projects’ for approval by the Monitoring Committee and the 
administration involved in implementing the project costs a great deal of time due to the 
diversity of the project partners (cf. interview 1 2012). One program manager said that it 
is not certain that such a construction will be used in the next period of funding because 
it is very difficult to develop reasonable projects with so many participants: 
 
“The agreements that have to be made means a correspondingly high 
bureaucratic burden for these major projects. The procedure of approval before 
the projects starts is also very long and complex. In addition to this, it is very 
difficult to make changes – which occur more often at larger projects than at 
smaller – during the course of a project and that can be noticed in the 
administration. Controlling is also easier for smaller projects with fewer partners. 
Small projects are clearer and can be handled by one accountant. When you 
have 30 partners, for example, it is much more difficult. In practice major projects 
do have some problems in the areas of development and support and 
consequently also with the implementation of the project through the complexity 
of such projects” (interview 19 2012).157  
 
Before INTERREG IV, the Euregions had already warned of the problems which could 
occur. Because of past experiences with larger projects, the management of the 
Euregions knew what could happen. Issues arise not only due to communication 
between the many partners, but also from setting up the financial structures for such 
large projects. In this procedure, cofinancing is often the problem. As one interviewee 
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 Original quotation “De afspraken en de hiermee verbonden bureaucratische last, liggen bij 
deze majeure projecten heel hoog. De procedure van goedkeuring voor de start is ook erg lang 
en complex. Daarnaast is het heel lastig om wijzigingen – die komen bij grote projecten veel 
vaker voor dan bij kleine – door te voeren in de loop van het project, dat werkt administratief dan 
ook weer door. Ook controles bij projecten met minder partners zijn natuurlijk makkelijker, zijn 
overzichtelijker en kunnen door een accountant worden uitgevoerd. Bij bijv. 30 partners is dit veel 
moeilijker. In de praktijk hebben majeure projecten dus een aantal problemen op het gebied van 
ontwikkeling en draagvlak en vervolgens ook bij de uitvoering van het project zelf door de 
complexiteit van de projecten” (interview 19 2012). 
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explained, both the German Bundesländer as well as the Dutch Provincies will only 
provide cofinancing when the particular projects matches their own particular objectives. 
In the Netherlands, the national level also has a cofinancing budget and the Dutch 
national level usually cofinances where the ‘provincies’ also finance and this means, 
especially for the case of the ‘major projects’ that those projects have to deal with 
several smaller cofinancing budgets on the Dutch side. This is an extra administrative 
burden for ‘major projects’, not least because every cofinancing party has its own aims 
and requirements for the projects that that they cofinance (cf. interview 19 2012). 
As such, the decision-making process also becomes complex. The launch of ‘major 
projects’ is time-consuming and this means that the pace of implementation and 
spending the budget is much slower than that for the regional projects of the whole 
program. In fact, the smaller, regional projects balance the pace of implementation within 
the program. Under INTERREG IV it is obvious that, due to the regional projects, it has 
only been possible so far to achieve the target of the ‘n+2 rule’ for the overall program 
(cf. interview 19 2012).158 
 
 
6.5.4 Cofinancing issues in practice during INTERREG IV  
 
Generally speaking, under the current INTERREG IV program the Dutch Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (EZ) and to a lesser extent also the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment only provide cofinancing for innovative, technological and 
sustainable projects. The cofinancing budget for the projects in the ERW region, for 
example, comes mainly from the provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel (which had also 
been the case under INTERREG III) as well as to a lesser extent from the provinces of 
Limburg and Noord-Brabant. Cofinancing by the Dutch Provincies tends to be for all 
kinds of projects while only the projects involving economic, technical or innovative 
aspects are eligible for national cofinancing from the Dutch national level of government. 
The Dutch national share of cofinancing currently represents the full 25% of the total 
project budget in a very few cases. Because of the economic crisis, it is often difficult for 
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 The n+2 system or rule can be considered as an “[…] automatic decommitment rule which 
requires committed funding to be spent within two years […]” for the most European member 
states. There are some countries were a n+3 rule is applied, which means that committed funds 
must be spent within three years (Barca 2009: 74). 
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subregional or regional Dutch partners, particularly Dutch municipalities, to make up the 
cofinancing gap of 20% up to 25% (interview 19 2012). Hence, cofinancing has been a 
difficult issue under INTERREG IV although this has not generally had anything to do 
with changes made between INTERREG III and IV but with the broader economic 
situation. The trend shows that obtaining cofinancing is easier for larger projects than for 
smaller, often social or cultural projects. Usually, smaller projects such as those within 
the People II People framework project (PIIP) have direct effects for the inhabitants of 
the border regions.159 Together with the fact that a substantial share of the total budget is 
reserved for priority 1 (‘Commerce, technology and innovation’), the effect is that ever 
fewer projects that directly affect inhabitants of the border regions are being conducted. 
Under INTERREG III, the framework PIIP project was a full success: 
 
“Framework projects were well-accepted and very successful. These projects 
helped to decrease the burden, especially for project applicants who were 
applying for funding for the first time” (JITS 2007: 49).160 
 
In addition to this, many projects under the priority of ‘society and integration’ with 
relatively low total cost would not have been established if not for the possibility of 
running smaller projects within the PIIP framework, because the approval procedure of 
such projects is much shorter than for regular INTERREG projects. In brief, the PIIP 
framework projects of the INTERREG III period were able to bring the INTERREG 
programs closer to the inhabitants of the border regions and thus their ‘understanding’ of 
the work and objectives of the European Union was enhanced (cf. JITS 2007: 49).  
For these reasons and also because of the success of the PIIP projects within 
INTERREG III and the high demand for project financing within this particular framework 
                                                 
159
 Within INTERREG IIIA, projects which were and are conducted within the PIIP framework 
construction had a maximum INTERREG budget of €25,000, while ‘normal’ INTERREG projects 
needed a minimal total budget of €50,000 within the joint program and €100,000 for the EDR 
program (cf. JITS 2007: 48). During the INTERREG IV period ‘normal’ regional projects should 
ensure that they have a minimum total budget of €100,000 and the INTERREG maximum budget 
for projects within PIIP remained at €25,000 (cf. JITS 2009, point 3.3: 3). Within the ERW there 
are also three more framework projects, which are called: ‘Focus Innovation’, ‘Focus 
Sustainability’ and ‘Healthcare’. The maximum funding for projects within ‘Focus projects’ is also 
€25,000 (cf. ERW 2012, web page, access 05.07.2011) . 
160
 Original quotation: “Er is gebleken dat de kaderprojecten goed zijn ontvangen en zeer 
succesvol waren. Deze projecten hebben in het bijzonder bij aanvragers die voor het eerst een 
subsidie probeerden te verkrijgen, bijgedragen tot het verminderen van hun drempelvrees” (JITS 
2007 (a): 49). 
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project construction in the program period of 2000-2006, the budget for PIIP was 
increased under INTERREG IV and three more framework projects were established 
under the regional management of the ERW. These were called ‘Focus Innovation’ and 
‘Focus Sustainability’, and there was also a framework project on healthcare. 
Unfortunately and counter to expectations, the framework projects are struggling under 
INTERREG IV due to a lack of cofinancing. This is not due to a lack of interest in these 
framework projects – there are many good ideas but they just cannot be realized 
because of the cofinancing problems. However, a first attempt has been made to solve 
this problem. The province of Gelderland, for example, has established a cofinancing 
budget solely for PIIP projects, which have an affinity to the province (cf. interview 16 
2012, cf. interview 23 2010).  
 
In fact, the role of the project coordinators, at least for the smaller social and cultural 
projects, has changed over the last years. While under the previous funding period a 
selection of project applications had to be made, under the current period, the project 
coordinators have to visit the municipalities and organizations that could become project 
partners and investigate which project ideas may be deserving of funding and how to 
secure cofinancing for these ideas (interview 16 2012). In short, under the current 
funding period, the situation is the direct opposite of that under the previous period of 
funding, in that project coordinators are now lobbying for the possibility of project funding 
while during the last period project applicants were lobbying to have their project ideas 
funded.  
 
 
6.6 Simplifying the administrative burden of the Dutch-German INTERREG program  
 
As mentioned in section 6.5.1, where we compared the implementation rules for the 
Dutch-German INTERREG/ETC programs over successive funding periods, the 
question remained of whether the attempts of the European Commission to simplify the 
Structural Funds and make them more efficient had been effective so far for the 
INTERREG programs. Section 5.4, on the development of the ERDF, explained that 
efforts in this area started with the reform of the Structural Funds in 1999, mainly by 
decentralizing the funds in respect of their implementation, while more rigorous 
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simplification had to take place during the current period of funding and for the next 
period of funding (see also section 5.5). It is significant in this respect that while the 1999 
reform of the Structural Funds decentralized tasks and authorities relating to 
implementation towards the national, regional and subregional levels, the Commission 
also bundled the totality of the regulations for all the Structural Funds, so that the rules 
for the different funds would be more standardized. As explained in section 6.5.1, the 
Commission has been able to use a single set of regulations for the current period of 
funding (2007-2013) for the implementation of the ERDF, the ESF and the CF. This 
regulation replaced the previous ten regulations from the 2000-2006 programming 
period. (European Commission DG Regional Policy, presentation 2012 (b), Brussels: 
sheet 2). 
 
 
6.6.1 Additional requirements from (sub)national participants 
 
Before going into detail about how the drive towards simplification in the overall 
Structural Funds and the ERDF affected the Dutch-German INTERREG program in 
particular, we should note the following: for the INTERREG program along the Dutch-
German border, the regulations and rules imposed from Brussels are not the only factor 
that is causing increasing administrative complexity. The other main cause is that, as 
explained earlier, the European Commission has withdrawn from the direct decision-
making procedures of the programs and thus the program partners at the subregional, 
regional and national levels of governance are responsible for implementing and 
conducting the programs correctly. What is more, because Dutch-German cross-border 
cooperation is highly evolved and has – compared to most other European border 
regions – a long history (see sections 6.1 and 6.2), the extra regulations which need to 
be taken account of by the subregional, regional and national program partners make 
the Dutch-German program more administratively complex and stricter than the 
requirements passed down from the European Commission. The European Commission 
acknowledged this development in its document on ‘Simplifying Cohesion Policy for 
2014-2020’ under the title ‘Simplification is a joint responsibility’: 
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“Assessments carried out have shown that in certain areas there is a risk of 
putting in place additional national requirements on top of EU requirements. This 
limits the effect of simplifications on the burden placed on beneficiaries proposed 
at EU level. It therefore will be up to both Member States and authorities in 
charge of the programmes to take measures to avoid the introduction of 
unnecessary additional requirements and checks” (CEC 2012 (b): 15). 
 
One interviewee remarked that the extra requirements that are discussed before a 
program starts with all the program partners are generally very significant in the Dutch-
German program (cf. interview 21 2012). Another interviewee was also concerned about 
the huge administrative burden of cross-border cooperation along the Dutch-German 
border. He acknowledged that greater transparency would not be possible in the Dutch-
German program because the program is already excellently communicated through 
extensive annual reports and other documentation. Every detail of the program can be 
looked up somewhere. The question remains, therefore, of whether there is any way of 
making the program more effective. Furthermore he questioned that it is not completely 
clear for someone like him, who knows Dutch-German cross-border cooperation quite 
well but does not know the inside decision making in detail: “[...] and I ask myself, who is 
creating this bureaucracy? Is it really Brussels or is it created during the implementation 
in the field?” (interview 17 2012).161 
 
Some interviewees from the European Commission – such as one head of unit at the 
DG Regional Policy – but also from other institutions in Brussels, referred to the extra 
regulations as ‘gold plating’ (interview 22 2010; interview 35 2012). However, this term 
was not used in the border region itself, nor during negotiations between the program 
partners before a program starts. In fact, most of the program partners were unfamiliar 
with the term ‘gold plating’ until they heard that civil servants at the European 
Commission and some ministries in The Hague used it.162 The Dutch-German program 
partners did not think that the additional opportunity of ‘major projects’ in the Dutch-
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 Original quotation: “[...] und frage mich, wer verursacht eigentlich die Bürokratie. Ist es wirklich 
Brüssel oder die Umsetzung vor Ort?” (interview 17 2012). 
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 The term ‘gold plating’ is used also by Jens Geier (MEP of the Group of the Progressive 
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament), when he says that in the 
context of the complexity of EU funding, the member states complicate European regulations by 
adding their own requirements (citation: “[...] die nationalen Regulierungen die europäischen noch 
mehr verkomplizieren”) (VDI Nachrichten 2013, web page, access 25.03.2013). 
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German program of INTERREG IV counted as ‘gold plating’. However, extra regulations 
which have already been agreed upon and which are stricter than the European 
regulations are indeed known as ‘gold plating’. In short, the interviewee from the 
program management of the Euregions was very firm in his assertion that ‘major 
projects’ are not part of ‘gold plating’ for two reasons: firstly, because ‘gold plating’ has a 
negative connotation and ‘major projects’ used to be a positive incentive for the border 
regions, because ‘major projects’ go beyond small initiatives and also because  
 
“The idea of major projects is based on the political desire to implement projects 
with a larger impact and effect within our INTERREG program. I don’t count this 
as ‘gold plating’ but more as a wish to give the program a certain direction. The 
term ‘gold plating’ refers to issues that are specified in the subsidy requirements, 
such as the additionality requirements or limits on staff costs, which are set by 
ourselves. I think these issues could be described as ‘gold plating’. But I would 
separate the major projects from this” (interview 1 2012).163 
 
The main reason however, why ‘major projects’ do not belong in the category of ‘gold 
plating’ is because implementing ‘major projects’ is a part of the general regulations for 
the funding period of 2007-2013. However, within the Dutch-German program the 
definition of ‘major projects’ has been tightened up at the subregional, regional and 
national levels than the regulations passed down from the supranational level (cf. JITS 
2007 (a): 78-79; Council 2006 No 1083/2006 Art. 39: 47).  
 
Besides the question of categorizing ‘major projects’, one interviewee stated on a more 
general note that: “the idea with the major projects sidesteps the general principle of 
decentralization” (interview 21 2012).164 In respect to the simplification and 
regionalization of the future program period, he continued by saying that: “[From today’s 
                                                 
163
 Originial quotation: “Majeure projecten is een politieke wens om projecten van een grotere 
impact en een grotere uitstraling binnen ons INTERREG-programma uit te voeren. Ik zie dat niet 
als ‘gold plating’ maar meer als een wens om met het programma een bepaalde richting op te 
gaan en onder het begrip ‘gold plating’ vallen dingen, die zijn opgenomen in onze 
subsidievoorwaarden, bijvoorbeeld de additionaliteisverklaring, dingen als grenzen voor de 
personeelskosten, die wij hebben vastgesteld en andere. Dit soort dingen kunnen volgens mij wel 
onder ‘gold plating’ vallen. Maar daar wil ik de majeure projecten van scheiden” (interview 1 
2012). 
164
 Original quotation: “[...] die Idee mit den majeuren Projekten (hebt) eigentlich den dezentralen 
Ansatz wieder auf” (interview 21 2012). 
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perspective], something is wrong in the basics because from the European point of view 
everything is decentralized. It would be better to insert something into the regulations 
that really would lead to simplification and contribute to the regionalization of decision-
making” (interview 21 2012).165  
 
The general discussion about ‘additional requirements in a program’ is not confined to 
the Dutch-German border, but also involves other regions and other programs. That is 
why the same respondent added “that [the national requirements on programs] also exist 
in other programs. Cross-border cooperation – and that is the intention from Brussels – 
is meant to be decentralized and it depends a lot on how a state is organized, which 
indicates how much leeway the regions get” (interview 21 2012).166  
 
Contrary to what might have been expected from the general tenor, one other 
interviewee from the European Commission said that “the regions all want to play a 
strong role. However, in comparison with France or Poland, we can see that the national 
level in Germany really doesn’t have a strong role” (interview 10 2012).167 But an 
explanation for this last statement can be found in Germany’s federal system. As 
explained in section 3.1, regional policy in Germany is the responsibility of the federal 
states or Bundesländer and is not a task of the central government in Berlin. This 
respondent was referring to the national level rather than to the regional level which the 
German Bundesländer belong to in this dissertation (for the division of levels of 
governance, also see section 3.1). During the interview the interviewee also commented 
on the mechanisms for cross-border cooperation programs in France, Portugal and 
Poland, where the national authorities decide almost all important issues through the 
Monitoring Committees. The regions themselves simply follow the decisions made at 
national level and only the selection of the projects itself takes place at the regional level. 
The interview partner added that this has a negative impact not because the national 
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 Origininal quotation: “[Aus heutiger Sicht], liegt einfach etwas an der Basis falsch, denn aus 
europäischer Sicht ist alles dezentralisiert. Man sollte eigentlich in den Vorordnungen ein paar 
Dinge hinein schreiben, die wirklich zu Vereinfachungen führen und die zur Regionalisierung auf 
Entscheidungsebene beitragen” (interview 21 2012). 
166
 Original quotation: “Das [die nationalen Auflagen an die Programme] gibt es aber auch 
anderswo. Die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit – und das ist von Brüssel so gewollt – ist 
ein dezentraler Ansatz und es hängt sehr stark davon ab, wie ein Staat organisiert ist, um fest zu 
stellen „wie viel Leine” er den Regionen vor Ort lässt” (interview 21 2012). 
167
 Original quotation: “Die Regionen möchten alle eine starke Rolle spielen. Im Vergleich zu 
Frankreich oder Polen muss man aber sagen, dass die nationale Ebene in Deutschland wirklich 
keine starke Rolle spielt” (interview 10 2012). 
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level tends to want to conduct its own strategy, but mainly because, unlike the regions, 
national authorities are usually not keen on adding extra requirements. However, she 
said that when the national level is involved in a direct decision in a cross-border 
cooperation program, it has to look carefully at the border regions and tailor its strategies 
to suit the regional concept of cross-border cooperation (cf. interview 10 2012).  
 
A further point concerning decisions made at the national level is that member states 
would be able to use national eligibility rules for co-financed projects, rather than two 
sets of rules as was done in the past.168 For the Dutch-German border under INTERREG 
IV, the program partners agreed on one set of rules for all documents of the INTERREG 
IVA program period (cf. interview 1 2012).  
 
In respect to the simplification of control systems and with that to simplifying the working 
in the programe itself and make the administration less time consuming, it was foreseen 
that for smaller programs, some of the requirements on control arrangements can be 
carried out by national bodies established according to the national rules and thus 
reduce the need to comply with certain Community audit requirements (CEC 2007 (c): 
10) The Dutch-German INTERREG IVA program drew up a document called 
‘Beschreibung der Verwaltungs- und Kontrollsysteme für das INTERREG IV A-
Programm Deutschland-Nederland gemäß Artikel 71, Verordnung (EG) 1083/2006’. This 
is a description of the management and control system, in accordance with the Council 
egulation 2006 No 1083/2006 (cf. JITS 2008; see also Council 2006 No 1828/2006 Art. 
24). This document describes and defines the entire control strategy and method of 
controlling projects and the overall program. For the implementation of the CIP, a single 
‘Managing Authority’, a single ‘Certifying Authority’ and a single ‘Audit authority’ for the 
program work together in accordance with Council regulation 2006 No 1083/2006 Art. 59 
and Council regulation 2006 No 1080/2006 Art. 149) (see also section 7.1 and 7.3). 
These authorities are located at separate institutions and thus function independently 
and the principle of the “separation of functions between and within such bodies” is 
fulfilled (CEC 2006 No 1083/2006 Art. 58b: 54).  
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 In the past, one set of rules was in place for the Community co-financed projects and one for 
nationally funded projects (cf. CEC 2007 (c): 10).  
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6.7 The complexity of simplification: a further step towards simplifying the Dutch-German 
INTERREG/ETC program? 
 
The proposals for the next funding period on specific provisions for the support from 
ERDF for the goal of ETC (2014-2020) were published on 14 March 2012 and it features 
a prominent place for the discussions surrounding preparations for the next funding 
period, the subjects of ‘(in)efficiency’, ‘(in)effectiveness’ and ‘simplification’ have an 
important role (see also section 5.5). 
 
Later on in the proposals, in relation to ‘simplification’, the document says for example 
that a maximum of four thematic priorities in cross-border cooperation programs may be 
introduced or that in order to achieve a better comparison of the targets, a list of 
prescribed indicators for cross-border cooperation programs must be completed (Council 
2012 No COM (2011) 611final/2, chapter 3, Art. 5: 20; Art. 15: 29; Annex: 35f). 
In the proposals for the forthcoming new funding period, the importance of cross-border 
cooperation in the context of the ETC is made clear by giving the ETC a particular value 
and affirming that “trans-boundary problems can most effectively be solved with the 
cooperation of all regions concerned to avoid disproportionate costs for some, and free 
riding by others” (e.g. cross-border environmental pollution) (Council 2012 No COM 
(2011) 611final/2: 2). More generally, it also states that “governance can improve as a 
result of coordination of the sector policies, actions and investments on a cross border 
and transnational scale” (Council 2012 No COM (2011) 611final/2: 3). The importance of 
cross-border cooperation within ETC can also be seen in the proposals setting out the 
division of funding between the different cooperation components as follows: cross-
border cooperation 73.24% (a total of €8,569,000,003), transnational cooperation 
20.78% (a total of €2,431,000,001) and interregional cooperation 5.98% (a total of 
€700,000,000) (Council 2012 No COM(2011)611final/2: 7).169 This proposal describes 
the aim of cross-border cooperation (in addition to the aim of transnational and 
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 For the period 2014-2020 an amount of €376 billion is proposed for economic, social and 
territorial cohesion and this budget has to be divided as follows: convergence regions €162.6 
billion; Transition regions €39 billion; Competitiveness regions €53.1 billion; Territorial 
cooperation €11.7 billion; Cohesion Fund €68.7 billion; Extra allocation for outermost and 
sparsely populated regions €0.926 billion and Connecting Europe Facility for transport, energy 
and information and communication technologies (ICT) €40 billion (with an additional €10 billion 
Euro ringfenced within the Cohesion Fund) (Council 2012 No COM (2011) 614final: 6). 
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interregional cooperation, cf. Council 2012 No COM (2011) 611final/2: 10) and it is said 
that cross-border cooperation 
 
“[...] should aim to tackle common challenges identified jointly in the border 
regions (such as poor accessibility, inappropriate business environment, lack of 
networks among local and regional administrations, research and innovation and 
take-up of information and communication technologies, environmental pollution, 
risk prevention, negative attitudes towards neighbouring country citizens) and 
exploit the untapped potentials in the border area (development of cross-border 
research and innovation facilities and clusters, cross-border labour market 
integration, cooperation among universities or health centres), while enhancing 
the cooperation process for the purpose of the overall harmonious development 
of the Union” (Council 2012 No COM (2011) 611final/2: 9). 
 
However, simplifying existing programs is a complex issue since the programs have 
developed over time and multiple program partners all have their own distinct roles and 
responsibilities. In the two sections that follow, two concrete examples of simplifying 
programs will be described in respect to the Dutch-German case study. Both examples 
refer to the ‘second shift of authority’, whereby authority has passed from the 
supranational level to the national, regional and subregional levels through the principles 
of funding, especially through the ‘programming principle’. The question of measuring 
the results and effectiveness of the program and the overall reduction of the 
administrative burden for the beneficiaries will be discussed. The attempts at 
simplification stemmed in both examples from sides of the European level. The program 
partners at the national, regional and subregional levels have had to accept these efforts 
and possible changes in the ETC programs for the Dutch-German border are already 
being discussed by a ‘Preparing Committee’ which has met several times.170 The 
‘Preparing Committee’ includes representatives from the Bundesländer of North Rhine-
Westphalia and Lower Saxony as well as from national level of the Netherlands, as well 
as the Dutch provinces and the Euregions themselves. One of the main points of 
discussion is inspecting the simplification of the regulations and how this can be applied 
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 The ‘Preparing Committee’ was called in German Vorbereitungsgruppe and in Dutch 
voorbereidingsgroep. 
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towards the Dutch-German region (JITS 2013; cf. interview 1 2012; cf. interview 31 
2012). 
 
 
6.7.1 First example of “Measuring the results and effectiveness of the programs” 
 
In the context of growing complexity and administration in European programs, the 
administrative burden of proving that a program is effective is certainly one of the most 
important goals. Setting indicators and categories to measure the output of the programs 
is closely related to the process of evaluation which has already been discussed 
extensively in the literature on cohesion policy (cf. Bachtler and Wren 2006; Bachtler and 
Michi 1995; Jakoby 2006; Polvari and Bachtler 2004). To summarize, structural and 
cohesion programs are implemented under a common regulatory framework throughout 
the European Union but the regional and national circumstances and institutional 
arrangements for managing and delivering regional policy vary widely (cf. Bachtler and 
Wren 2006: 143).  
 
How to measure the output of a program has been under discussion for longer than just 
the last few years and the discussion over indicators is closely related to the question of 
efficiency, which is demanded from Brussels (cf. Euractiv 2011, web page, access 
05.07.2011). 
In the regulations that accompanied the 1988 reform of the Structural Fund, it was 
stipulated that: 
 
“Monitoring shall be carried out by reference to physical and financial indicators 
specified in the Commission decision approving the operation concerned. The 
indicators shall relate to the specific character of the operation, its objectives and 
the form of assistance provided, and to the structural and socio-economic 
situation in the countries in which the assistance is to be provided. They shall be 
arranged in such a way as to show, for the operations in question:  
- the stage reached in the operation,  
- the progress achieved on the management side and any related problems” 
(Council 1988 No 4253/88 Art. 25 (2): 10). 
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However, at that early stage of the Structural Funds, which were still being allocated on 
the basis of the program structure, the indicators were not generally set for all programs. 
 
Efficiency was also addressed in the double interview with civil servants of the DG 
Regional Policy, who were responsible for quality management (German 
Qualitätssicherung) in cross-border cooperation programs. One of them said that 
efficiency is very difficult to measure and: “We cannot prove that European interventions 
do have an effect [on cross-border cooperation] and that really is an issue. Everyone 
wants to have numbers and indicators to measure results. With Europe 2020, the 
direction has been set towards making everything measurable. One of the first attempts 
was agreeing on a list of indicators for the period 2007-2013, which prescribed the use 
of certain predefined indicators, but that was not compulsory. Just 7 out of 27 states 
used the indicators for cross-border cooperation and measured the results. So a 
comparison is not possible yet” (interview 10 2012).171  
 
The question remains of why the European Commission does not oblige the member 
states to use a common list of indicators to measure the output of the programs, since in 
respect to evaluating the EU programs “[...] there are differences in the data collected, 
the sophistication of application and the kinds of question addressed” (Bachtler and 
Wren 2006: 144). This is due to the diverse range of policy instruments and objectives, 
as well as the different institutional arrangements for managing and implementing the 
various programs. Another factor is the fact that the circumstances under which the 
programs are implemented throughout Europe also differ considerably in geographical 
and economic terms, for example (cf. Bachtler and Wren 2006: 144). The same can be 
said of the individual cross-border cooperation programs throughout Europe – these use 
different reporting indicators, according to the interviewee, because of the fact that the 
member states and their circumstances differ enormously from each other. It is very 
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 Original quotation: “Wir können nicht beweisen, dass die europäische Intervention Auswirkung 
[auf die grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit] hat und das ist echt ein Problem. Alle wollen 
Zahlen und Indikatoren, um die Auswirkungen zu messen. Mit Europa 2020 geht man in die 
Richtung alles messbar machen zu wollen. Einer der ersten Versuche war eine Festlegung einer 
Indikatorenliste in der Periode 2007-2013, indem man vorschrieb, dass man bestimmte 
Indikatoren nutzen sollte, dies war jedoch nicht verpflichtend. Nur 7 von 27 Ländern haben die 
Indikatoren für grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit genutzt und die Resultate gemessen. 
Dann lässt sich nun damit noch nichts vergleichen” (interview 10 2012).  
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difficult to find indicators which are a compromise between the 27 member states and 
their various border regions (cf. interview 10 2012). Besides this, indicators which have 
to be submitted as an achieved output or target at the end of the programs is often 
difficult and difficult to provide accurately because of differing definitions and/or double-
counting. Above all, developing a list of indicators for the end of a program is also often 
difficult, because the effects of interventions, such as in tourism or education, may take 
years to be felt – long after end of a program. Setting up a strict list of indicators would 
cause these long-term effects to be overlooked, at least not in the indicator list which has 
to be submitted to the European Commission at the end of the program. The interviewee 
added that the ETC is an example of this par excellence, because it has a relatively 
small budget and aims to stimulate a long-term development in the border regions 
(interview 10 2012). As Bachtler and Wren (2006: 144) found from the periodic reports of 
the European Commission, most results reported for EU cohesion policy claim that 
substantial levels of job creation, investment and other results are attributable to the 
policy. The question remains of whether measuring a set of indicators really does 
enhance the efficiency of a program or whether it is a tool for creating greater 
transparency and thus enabling comparisons between the various programs. The 
interviewee was quite clear on that question: indeed the indicators are a tool for 
comparing programs and also to monitor results and value for money (interview 10 
2012). That may be why in the proposal for the next funding period “Common indicators 
have been defined to better capture the outputs of and increase the overall orientation 
on results” (Council 2012 No COM (2011) 611 final/2: 7). These common indicators are 
set out in the Annex of the proposal and concerning the measuring of ETC goals (cf. 
Council 2012 No COM (2011) 611 final/2: 25). 
 
The interviewee form the European Commission also explained that if output were to be 
measured simply to enhance the transparency of a program, there are other, better tools 
to do this. One method would be to categorize the costs, which would have to be 
specified before the programs started and then checked again at the end of a program 
period (interview 10 2012). 
  
In order to explain the system of indicators for cross-border cooperation programs more 
in detail, the interviewee explained that under the current program there are four 
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priorities and 86 categories that have to be determined (interview 10 2012).172 If the 
Commission sees that there are irregularities, a communication will be sent to the 
regions. The interviewee stated that all the programs are controlled every year and these 
quality controls would be enhanced in future. However, the interviewee also admitted 
that “often the use of the categories is done incorrectly, people put in the wrong dates or 
use categories twice for the same output, because they don’t know how to do this 
properly or because of the changes to the method within a short time period or some 
other reason”.173 A further explanation made clear that in general it is much better to use 
categories than the indicators, because after all the aim is to measure and control 
whether the money is spent “in the member states on the aim for that was foreseen” 
(interview 10 2012).174 
 
In addition to completing lists of indicators and categories and conducting ex-ante, mid-
term and ex-post evaluations, every program is required to submit a yearly report. Joint 
programs like the Dutch-German program for cross-border cooperation submit one joint 
yearly report, and in the 2000-2006 funding period this report included a list of indicators 
for every project conducted. The annex listed all the indicators achieved by the projects 
every year (cf. JITS 2000: 115; cf. JITS 2007 (a): 88; 103; JITS 2004 (b): Annex D: 
111f.).175 In the current funding period (2007-2013), the requirements for the yearly 
report were a little different because the text of the yearly reports is more compact and 
thus more readable for all the interested parties and not exclusively for the European 
Commission.176 The annexes on project indicators are still included and PR activities and 
publications are also included in the yearly reports, but in a more summarized version 
rather than the extensive list used in the previous funding period. A further change is that 
indicators on projects and on PR and communication are no longer divided between the 
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 Within the proposal for the next period of funding there exist 10 indicators with 51 units for 
ETC-programs (cf. Council 2012 No COM(2011)611 final/2, annex: 33-36). 
173
 Original quotation: “Oftmals stimmt die Nutzung der Kategorien an sich nicht, die Leute geben 
oftmals falsche Daten ein oder nutzen mehrere Kategorien für den gleichen Output, weil sie sich 
nicht auskennen, oder weil sich die Methodik innerhalb von kurzer Zeit geändert hat oder 
Ähnliches” (interview 10 2012). 
174
 Original quotation: “wofür es in den Mitgliedstaaten vorgesehen war” (interview 10 2012). 
175
 Within the yearly CIP reports of the joint Dutch-German program of the funding period of 2000-
2006 also an extra annex was inserted wherein all publications, newspaper articles etc. 
concerning the INTERREG program was insert with title and date (JITS 2004 (b), Annex C: 89f). 
176
 The yearly reports may be shorter in the funding period 2007-2013, because of the 
transparency due to the common digital monitoring system, which include all projects with their 
planned and achieved targets. 
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separate subprograms and given for each project, but are summed up as total numbers 
per priority (cf. JITS 2011 (d): 30; Annex 1: 36f). 
 
The Dutch-German cross-border cooperation program now publishes yearly reports and 
the Joint Technical INTERREG Secretariat has set up a very informative website, (cf. 
JITS 2013 web page, access 13.01.2013). Both of these channels provide interested 
parties with all the required forms for INTERREG project applications, yearly reports and 
other detailed information and downloads concerning the joint program of the four Dutch-
German Euregions. The question of whether it is still necessary to enhance the 
transparency of the ETC/INTERREG program will be answered by one of my 
interviewees.177 An interviewee from the European Parliament said that it would not be 
possible to make the Dutch-German program more transparent, because everything is 
already described in the informational documents, websites, databank as well as in the 
annual reports (cf. interview 17 2012). 
 
The detailed annual reports are checked by staff members of the DG Regional Policy, 
but are also communicated to other DGs in the Commission because sometimes the 
content of one program, such as in the area of agriculture, may overlap with other 
programs and this overlap has to be monitored to avoid double financing or to stimulate 
synergy effects. Additionally, the “expert knowledge of the colleagues from the other 
DGs” can be used to make a better appraisal of the activities in the programs and this 
leads to a better evaluation of the report (cf. interview 10 2012).178 
 
The general statement of the European Commission on the future program period in 
respect to the work done on reporting, evaluating, managing and monitoring the 
programs is that they “should be proportionate in financial and administrative terms to 
the level of support allocated” (CEC 2012 (b): 7). Furthermore, the Commission is 
convinced that in some cases simplification could lead to a direct cut in administration 
costs. In this respect, it says that “focusing on core common indicators will facilitate 
aggregation of data and reporting on achievements at EU level” (CEC 2012 (b): 9). 
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 The four Dutch-German Euregions also each have their own websites, where the topic 
INTERREG is just a part of the whole presentation of the particular organizations. For the EDR 
see: www.edr.eu, for the EUREGIO see www.euregio.eu, for the ERW see www.euregio.org and 
for the ermn www.euregio-rmn.de. 
178
 Original quotation: “fachspezifische Kenntnis der Kollegen aus anderen GDs” (interview 10 
2012). 
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Regarding the yearly reports, the Commission wants to introduce simpler and 
automatically generated reports in order to decrease the burden writing these 
documents. In sum, “The intention of the Commission is to ensure proportionate 
reporting by the managing authorities, limiting it to essential elements” (CEC 2012 (b): 
9). The yearly reports could consist largely of automatically available data from the 
information system without the need for detailed texts, as during previous funding 
periods. However, the Commission will not do away with the old form of report entirely, 
because twice within the future program period – in addition to the final implementation 
report – the managing authorities will “be requested to submit more comprehensive 
reports” (CEC 2012 (b): 9).  
 
 
6.7.2 Second example of reducing the administrative burden for beneficiaries 
 
The next example of ‘the complexity of simplifying programs’ is reducing the 
administrative burden for beneficiaries. We chose this example because the increasing 
administrative burden of previous and current program periods can be felt in the border 
region itself, especially by the Euregions and their project partners and by participants 
who have to follow increasingly intensive and complicated rules with complex and time-
consuming procedures for making applications and managing projects. The 
requirements for the projects were much stricter under INTERREG IIIA than during the 
INTERREG I period. The increasing administrative burden is partly a consequence of 
the development of the ‘programming principle’ and the withdrawal of the European 
Commission from direct decision-making in the programs themselves. That tendency, 
over several program periods, has caused increasing authority to be delegated from the 
European Commission to the other involved levels of governance. The national (German 
regional) levels of governance have taken on an increasingly important role for example 
(see also chapter 7). Nowadays, the regulations for implementing a program like the 
Dutch-German INTERREG program are very extensive and that of course is reflected in 
the requirements for the specific projects themselves.  
 
Attempts have been made to reduce the administrative burden for beneficiaries from two 
sides. On the one hand, the European Commission will introduce some changes to 
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reduce administration in the 2014-2020 funding period. On the other hand, the 
INTERREG partners in the border regions (especially the management of the Euregions) 
have already made some attempts to ease the application procedure for projects, which 
we will describe below. The ‘beneficiaries’ of the program can thus be interpreted in two 
ways. From the point of view of the European Commission, the beneficiaries of the 
programs are the member states, because the money for the programs is given to the 
national level. For the other levels of governance involved at the subregional, regional 
and national levels – also called the INTERREG program partners here – the 
beneficiaries are the end-users or project partners. However, the Commission’s attempts 
to simplify procedures for their beneficiaries (the member states) have also had an effect 
for the end-users of the program, the project partners. 
 
First of all, for the next period of funding (2014-2020) the European Commission 
proposes that the administrative burden will be reduced due to the “wider possibilities for 
the use of simplified costs” while the simplified costs options which were already 
introduced in the period 2007-2013 will be retained (CEC 2012 (b): 10). Specifically, this 
proposal means that some newly introduced (annual) account systems will be conducted 
in respect to the financial management. In respect to the management and control 
systems, some simplifications will also be introduced, for example Managing Authorities 
at the national (German regional) level of governance may also act as Certifying 
Authorities. Additionally, ‘greater proportionality’ should exist, involving exemptions for 
‘low-volume programs’ and also for programs which have delivered consistently good 
results. Above all, the monitoring and checks carried out by the European Commission 
on individual operations should be limited on their frequency (European Commission, 
DG Regional Policy 2012 (a) presentation: 21).  
 
The simplification of costs already carried out in the 2007-2013 period (but not applying 
to all programs in that period) included ‘flat rates’. According to one interviewee from the 
DG Regional Policy such simplifications as ‘flat rates’ should be introduced in areas 
where mistakes often happen, such as the area of ‘indirect costs’. Here, a flat rate of 
15% of the total costs could be reserved, without needing to approve every cent that is 
spent. Of course the reason for using a ‘flat rate’ construction must be explained 
thoroughly beforehand. If the ‘flat rate’ is accepted, subsequent auditing does not need 
to check all the costs incurred but just the method used (cf. interview 6 2010). ‘Flat rates’ 
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will be extended to several categories of costs for the funding period 2014-2020. The 
official formulation for simplifying cost reimbursement options is described as follows: 
 
“Introduced in 2007-2013, simplified cost reimbursement options provide 
possibilities to reduce the burden associated with financial management, control 
and audit, both for the beneficiaries and the national and regional authorities” 
(CEC 2012 (b): 10). 
 
In addition to this, the proposal for the period of 2014-2020 foresees a “performance 
orientation of cohesion policy” with which “the payment of lump sums and unit costs in 
particular may be conditional on the delivery of agreed outputs or results” (CEC 2012 
(b): 10). Furthermore, the period for which documents must be retained will be reduced 
from the current maximum of over 10 years to around five years in the next program 
period (CEC 2012 (b): 10). 
 
As well as the attempts from the European level to simplify the programs, the Dutch-
German INTERREG partners are also seeking to address the increasing complexity of 
project applications and aim to make the procedure of approving projects as easy as 
possible for project partners (despite the fact that the national level has added additional 
requirements to the program, see also section 6.5.3). First of all, the subprograms of the 
separate Euregions in the INTERREG IIIA and IV programs have standardized all the 
documents for project applications which are available on the central website of the Joint 
Technical INTERREG-Secretariat. The application forms include all the advisory 
manuals and guidelines. The regional program management uses a shared digital 
monitoring system for all the projects in all the regional programs, as explained 
previously. However, the four ‘regional program managements’ in the form of the four 
Dutch-German Euregions remain the first contact points for regional project ideas and 
initiatives, and carry out the work of the Managing Authority under the responsibility of 
the Managing Authority in accordance with the general regulations for the ERDF, ESF 
and CF: 
 
“The Member State may designate one or more intermediate bodies to carry out 
some or all of the tasks of the managing authority under the responsibility of that 
authority” (Council 2006 No 1083/2006 Art. 59 (2); cf. JITS 2008: 4). 
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On the side of the member states, it is important that in a large program area such as 
the one in my case study, there are ‘connecting authorities’. The regional program 
management organizations already conducted tasks on behalf of the Managing Authority 
during the previous program periods and this construction contributed to the successful 
implementation of the funds under the past program periods. During the period 2007-
2013, the structures established by the regional program management were used 
alongside the excellent knowledge of the regional managements about the region and 
actors involved as well as the implementation of the INTERREG program itself: 
 
“The spatial proximity of the regional program management structures located in 
the border regions and the project partners has many advantages in respect of 
advising and supporting these partners; it means we are able to answer 
questions and solve problems quickly through meetings and personal contact” 
(JITS 2008: 2f)179  
 
and 
“Normally the regional program management is supposed to support the project 
applicants during the process of initiating the projects. They advise the applicants 
in the development and elaboration procedure of the projects” (JITS 2008: 6).180 
 
To summarize, on the one hand, the application procedure, rules and forms have been 
standardized to benefit end-users. The approval procedures have been streamlined 
under INTERREG IV and are now quite similar from Euregion to Euregion since the 
Dutch-German Euregions have agreed on uniform application procedures in compliance 
with the digital monitoring system. On the other hand, the regional program management 
structures remain in order to be closer to the regional projects and applicants, and to act 
as contact points in the regions themselves, because their regional knowledge and 
networks can be used during regional projects.  
                                                 
179
 Original citation: “De ruimtelijke nabijheid van de in het grensgebied gevestigde regionale 
programma-managements bij de projectpartners biedt vele voordelen bij de advisering en 
ondersteuning van deze partners; op deze wijze kunnen vragen en problemen in kortstondige 
bijeenkomsten en persoonlijke gesprekken worden besproken” (JITS 2008: 2f). 
180
 Original citation: “In de regel zijn de regionale programmamanagements voor de 
ondersteuning van de aanvragers bij het initiëren van de projecten verantwoordelijk. Zij adviseren 
de aanvragers bij de ontwikkeling en uitwerking van projecten” (JITS 2008: 6). 
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The Euregions also appreciate that the project approval can be very time-consuming – in 
the case of an INTERREG project which is not part of a framework construction181 – and 
during the approval process several barriers have to be removed before a project 
application will be approved at the official meeting of the regional Steering Committee. In 
order to get projects approved at such a meeting, the civil servants from the Euregions 
provide as much assistance as possible to project partners. Some Euregions, such as 
the Euregio Rhine-Waal or the EDR, have also established a Technisch Overleg (TO) or 
Koordinierungsgruppe which meets approximately once a month (cf. interview 31 2012). 
The TO was introduced under INTERREG III and still exists under INTERREG IV and 
serves to communicate the progress of project applications. Representatives of the 
INTERREG partners (not the project partners themselves) participate. The goal of these 
meetings is to discuss in an informal setting the progress towards project approval, 
cofinancing issues and the content of the projects, but also to generate new ideas for the 
project and other project-related issues. Furthermore, potential cofinancing parties like 
the Dutch provinces also participate in the TO, enabling them to see at a relatively early 
stage of the project application which project ideas may need future cofinancing and can 
communicate those ideas at this very early stage to their separate departments. The 
TO’s main goal is to speed up the procedure of project approval and test at an early 
stage whether a project application is viewed favorably by the other parties or not. In 
short, the establishment of the TO is purely an advantage for the end-users and, 
established by the border regions themselves, is an attempt to decrease the burden for 
the end beneficiaries.182 
                                                 
181
 Framework-projects are e.g. “PIIP”-projects or the earlier mentioned “Focus-projects” (cf. ERW 
2011, web page, access 05.07.2011).  
182
 The basic idea behind these TO or Koordinierungsgruppen meetings is to help project 
applicants, but as one interviewee emphasized, such an extra committee can also have a 
negative effect – for example, potential project applicants may be asked to make adjustments 
following the meeting and they may then work on this feedback but not in a way that the project 
application could be approved. The proposed project may then be rejected in the end. Such a 
situation could give the program a negative image, because applicants’ efforts would be in vain. 
Furthermore, on the basis of a short project description (see form in downloads on the web page 
of the JITS), the relevant departments of the ministries are often not able to formulate a positive 
or negative position vis-à-vis the project plan. Additionally, due to the several rounds of 
adjustments before a project application is submitted, some project applicants can no longer 
recognize their initial idea after the process of this first TO/Koordinierungsgruppe (interview 31 
2012).  
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6.8 Summary  
 
This chapter has given a detailed overview of the development of cross-border 
cooperation along the Dutch-German border. There has not been one development but 
at least two. Firtstly, the ‘renationalization shift’ – in this dissertation also called the 
‘second shift of authority’ – that started with the introduction of the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975 when European institutions passed increasingly 
responsibility for implementing cross-border cooperation to the subregional level at the 
border region itself and to the national and especially for Germany the regional level. 
Secondly, there was another development that began much earlier. These were grass-
roots or bottom up developments in the border regions themselves, establishing 
networks, institutions and organizations with the aim of conducting cross-border 
cooperation in the border region itself for the benefit of the region and its inhabitants. 
These early projects and network structures occurred independently of European 
financial support and because they have been active since the 1950s, they were not 
originally part of a European wide strategy. More than that, because as can be seen 
from the overall development of the European regional policy since the end of the 
Second World war towards the mid 1970s, no concrete strategy existed in this field (see 
also chapter 4). In the 1980s the two developments just described – the European and 
the (sub)regional – converged when European funding was allocated to the regions – in 
this case study the border regions – to stimulate cross-border cooperation in a 
systematic way. As part of that development, the pre-existing Dutch-German Euregions 
were given an important new role in allocating European regional funding from 1989 
onwards.  
 
When analyzing this development by using the theoretical model of this dissertation, it 
can be seen that the supranational European institutions, especially the European 
Commission, became a ‘new Principal’ which transferred since the mid 1970s 
increasingly more authority and responsibility for the content of cross-border cooperation 
(especially after the programmatic funding starting in 1990) towards the other involved 
levels of governance: the subregional, regional and national levels (see also illustration 5 
in chapter 5). As a consequence, the European Commission, as a ‘new Principal’, 
created multiple ‘new Agents’ on the other levels of governance. In the case of the 
Dutch-German border, the ‘new Agents’ where not so much newly ‘created’ or founded 
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but were organizations that were already existing, due the bottom-up movement 
mentioned above and explained intentensively in section 6.2 (see also chapter 7).  
 
Since the introduction of the INTERREG program, the Dutch-German Euregions have 
become responsible for the implementation of a program which began as a Community 
Initiative and later became an European objective of its own under the last funding 
period (2007-2013): European Territorial Cooperation (ETC). As well as the renaming 
and restructuring of European regional policy, some concrete changes in the Dutch-
German border regions can also be seen. On the one hand, the merging of program 
areas and the bringing together of several Euregions to work together under one 
program since 2000 can be witnessed (see section 6.4). On the other hand, also the 
step-by-step withdrawal of the European Commission from specific decision-making and 
the delegation of these powers to the other levels involved can be seen. It is, this 
retreatment of the Commission or renationalization of cross-border cooperation that has 
been the source of further complexity, however, because it has been replaced with 
increasing oversight and monitoring by the Commission, which has been applied to the 
program over time. As a consequence of the increasing retreat of the European 
Commission from direct involvement in the cross-border programs over time, the 
controlling from the side of the new Principal – the European Commission – increased 
and the overhead and administration was growing for the ‘new Agents’ (see also section 
6.5.1).  
However, the discussion on the day-to-day running of the program shows that not all 
regulations are coming from Brussels, but that other program partners at other levels of 
governance have also introduced additional regulations and requirements into the 
program. This seems to be a consequence of their (re)gained leeway regarding the 
focus and implementation of the program. Those extra requirements made by the 
national and (sub)regional program-partners – the ‘new Agents’ – introduce extra 
administrative burdens on the end-users on the programs and also for the Euregions 
themselves (see sections 6.5.3 and 6.6). 
  
Overall, the discussion on simplification has made it very clear that simplification has not 
only been an issue for the last few years, but dates back to the 1990s in the case of the 
Dutch-German program (see also section 6.6). All the authorities involved at the multiple 
levels of governance have sought a further simplification and the practical consequences 
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are already being felt in the current program, such as the use of a digital monitoring 
system or the introduction of an extra meeting to support project applicants during the 
approval procedure (see sections 6.7, 6.7.1 and 6.7.2). However, a further simplification 
may be needed in future to get a better balance between the costs and efforts to 
administrate and participate in such a cross-border programe and the specific output of 
the single projects. On the one hand a program was set up in the early 1990s with the 
aim to reduce cross-border cooperation and to ease the strains on cross-border 
cooperation while on the other hand, it can be seen that within the program the 
administrative burden increased over the several program-periods as a consequence of 
the several reforms of the European Structural Funds in general and of the INTERREG-
program in particular. Because of the fact that the actors on the several levels of 
governance involved acknowledge the problem of the still increasing bureaucracy the 
discussions on simplification of European Structural Funds and European subsidy 
programs remained. 
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7. Agents and Principals all at the same time: MLG and PA combined 
 
As we have already seen, there has been a ‘shift in authority’ in European regional 
policy, from national governments to the supranational European Commission. This was 
followed by a ‘second shift in authority’ in which – in the case of European cross-border 
cooperation – the Commission delegated authority back to the national and regional 
levels of government as well as to subregional authorities (the Euregions) by developing 
the EU’s cross-border INTERREG program. The ‘first shift’ of authority, the 
‘supranationalization shift’, took place within overall development of the European 
regional policy as explained in chapter 4. The second shift, the ‘renationalization shift’, 
involved a delegation of authority from the European Commission – as a new Principal – 
back to the national, regional and subregional levels – as new Agents. This chapter will 
largely focus on theoretically explaining the ‘second shift of authority’, as this has most 
drastically increased the administrative complexity of the INTERREG program. 
 
What makes this study of Euregional cross-border cooperation interesting from a 
theoretical point of view is that it includes not only multiple Principals  who, as member 
states of an international organization are a common phenomenon  but also multiple 
Agents, with Euregions and national and regional governments acting as Agents who 
have been given decision-making authority by another Agent, namely the European 
Commission (see illustration 8). It is that process that cannot be fully analyzed either by 
the MLG approach or the PA approach individually (see also sections 3.3. and 3.3.1). 
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Illustration 8: From multiple Principals to ‘new Agents’ 
 
 
 
 
(Own illustration) 
 
 
The Dutch-German Euregions were working on cross-border cooperation long before the 
European INTERREG program was introduced, and as such these organizations were 
not ‘founded’ by the European Commission as Agents. But even so they may still be 
viewed as Agents constructed by another Agent in view of the tasks that they carry out 
on behalf of the Commission. The same can also be said of the national and regional 
governments who act as Agents as well. These were not newly created as Agents either, 
but in terms of their new tasks in the field of cross-border cooperation, they can also be 
considered ‘new Agents’. The situation of the European INTERREG program for cross-
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border cooperation can perhaps best be summed up by an observation made by 
Hooghe and Marks (2001: 94): “while many policy areas can be described as institutions 
looking for funding, cohesion policy is funding looking for institutions.” More specifically 
in the case of INTERREG the ‘second shift’ took place as described by Perkmann 
(Perkmann 2005: 175), who speak of “the need of the European Commission for 
regional policy implementation partners that would be able to devise and initiate cross-
border projects on a local level.” As a result, the European Commission needed and still 
needs (sub)regional intermediairies who were and still are able to implement the 
European funding programs in the regions, because the Commission itself is and was 
not able to conduct them by themselves. The Euregions at the subregional level were 
given the new function of institutions for implementing the INTERREG program, together 
with their regional and national program partners.  
 
As the European Commission delegated authority to the subregional, regional and 
national levels and withdrew progressively from the direct decision procedure for cross-
border projects, a process that began mainly after the introduction of INTERREG in a 
program structure and thus at the beginning of the INTERREG I program in 1990, it also 
sought to enhance its means of controlling the work of its ‘new Agents’. (cf. Regio Rijn-
Waal 1990: 23; cf. Euregio Rhein-Waal 1994; cf. JTIS 2000; 2004; 2008; 2010). The 
‘second shift’ or ‘renationalization shift’ was thus further reinforced by giving INTERREG 
a program structure in 1990. This shows how the European Commission increasingly 
acted as a ‘new Principal’ and that the national, regional and subregional levels of the 
member states became the ‘new Agents’. Empirically, this means that since the start of 
the INTERREG I program in 1990, the main decisions in border-region projects have 
been made by program partners at the subregional, regional and national levels together 
with the European Commission. With the start of the INTERREG II period in 1994, the 
European Commission withdrew as a member in the regional Steering Committees and 
thus no longer had a decisive say in the specifics of cross-border cooperation projects 
and the ‘second shift’ took another step further (cf. Euregio Rhein-Waal 1994: 52). 
However, the European Commission remained part of the overall Monitoring Committee 
until the end of the INTERREG II program in 1999 (cf. Euregio Rhein-Waal 1994: 52; 
JITS 2000: 98). After the 1999 reforms, the European Commission no longer had a 
decisive seat in the Monitoring Committee either, which meant that the specific 
implementation of programs was from that point on the responsibility of the subregional, 
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regional and national program partners and the ‘second shift’ had taken another a step 
in its shifting of authority. Members of the European Commission were – and still are – 
invited to Monitoring Committee meetings in an advisory capacity (cf. JTIS 2000: 100). 
Since then, overall monitoring of the program has been carried out by the European 
Commission, while the monitoring of specific projects – the so called ‘first level control’ – 
takes place at the national (Netherlands) and regional (German Bundesländer) and 
subregional levels (conducted by a so called berechtigte Prüfstelle together with a 
regional program management which in this case study is located in the Euregions). The 
implementation of the program in the border region and the decisions made over project 
allocation are also solely the responsibility of the program partners at the subregional, 
regional and national levels (cf. JTIS 2008: 26).  
 
In order to delegate responsibility for implementing the programs, the European 
Commission has established various control mechanisms and oversight procedures, 
including contracts, monitoring systems and the possibility of imposing sanctions, as 
described in the literature on the PA approach (the Principal in general seeks to control 
its Agent, see section 3.2). The Commission has been able to do this because it has the 
explicit responsibility, as the original Agent of the member states, for managing the 
finances of the EU and supervising the implementation of policy by all member states 
(cf. Pollack 1997: 105).  
 
As part of this ‘second shift’, whereby the Commission supervises controls on member 
states, administrative complexity has increased significantly from one program period to 
the next. The Commission’s role in implementing EU policies is primarily that of a 
supervisor and overseer and the actual implementation is generally delegated to 
appropriate agencies in the member states. The Commission seeks to supervise the 
national agencies and the way they carry out their EU duties. The Commission is in a 
position to do this because the policies are applied in a reasonably uniform manner in all 
member states (Nugent 2006: 175). However, regarding the different geographical, 
cultural, social, demographical and economical circumstances of the member states and 
the regions in which the programs are implemented, total uniformity in measuring the 
results of programs and setting the goals and requirements of specific funding 
instruments is not possible, as described in section 6.7.1 for the INTERREG program.  
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What should be emphasized here is that giving authority over control, implementation 
and decision making to the member states completely, also means that the national level 
is able to impose additional requirements and regulations, in order to tailor the program 
to their own policy strategies. The European Commission itself has noted the 
increasingly detailed rules on eligibility for the programs and says that these rules are 
decided mainly at the national level (cf. European Commission DG Regional Policy 
2009: 7). However, the Commission allows the member states “to apply national control 
rules more rigorously than those prescribed in this Regulation” (CEC 1997 No 2064/97: 
2). As such, the European Commission has actually stimulated the ‘bureaucratic drift’ of 
the Agent (see also section 3.2). However, the European Commission in its role as the 
‘primary Agent’ has also enhanced its regulations on implementation over time, for 
example through rules such as the n+2 system or fully delegating responsibility for 
conducting the first two evaluations (ex ante and ‘on-going’/midterm) to the member 
states and the program partners (cf. Barca 2009: 74f). 
 
It is not only controls by the subregional, regional and national Agents that have 
increased, but also financial administration in the European Commission itself, through 
its restructuring of the internal organization and the creation of new controlling 
departments and auditing services in the Commission (cf. Mendéz and Bachtler 2011: 
750). The DG Regional Policy in particular has been the subject of stricter controls 
because the margins of errors were and still are higher than at other DGs (cf. European 
Commission DG Regional Policy 2012 (a), presentation; cf. Mendéz and Bachtler 2011: 
752f, cf. interview 26 2012). 
 
When these two shifts in the Principal-Agent relationship (see illustration 8) are 
analyzed, two of the four control mechanisms mentioned are specifically relevant for the 
topic of study and will be explained in more detail in the following sections: 1) Designing 
the Agent’s contract so that it includes the correct incentives and 2) Monitoring the 
Agent’s actions (cf. Blom-Hansen 2005: 629). 
 
The other two control mechanisms mentioned by Blom-Hansen (2005) that are 
supposed to ensure that member states resist the temptation to use the Structural Funds 
allocated to them for their own purposes rather than for those stated by the EU goals, 
are ‘applying sanctions to Agents who “drift” from the original contract’ and ‘choosing an 
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Agent carefully’, as explained in section 3.2. In this case study, the point of sanctioning 
is less relevant because the sanctions procedure has only been applied very rarely in 
the area of Structural Funds and because it is very difficult for the European Commission 
to recover money which has already been spent. Such procedures are time-consuming 
and involve excessive legal work. In fact, in the case of Dutch-German cross-border 
cooperation, this method has never been used at all (cf. interview 2 2009). Neither is the 
‘careful choice of an Agent’ particularly relevant in this case study because the European 
Commission and the supranational level in general has no choice in the Agents that it 
appoints because the member states act as its natural partners and each member state 
arranges and delegates the implementation of the Structural Funds – or in this case the 
cross-border program of INTERREG (cf. Molle 2007: 102; Blom-Hansen 2005: 630). 
 
 
7.1 From ‘new Principal’ to ‘ new Agents’: Designing an Agent’s contract. 
 
The ‘second shift’, away from the supranational European Commission – now acting as 
a Principal – towards its ‘new Agents’, the member states at the national level and the 
regions and the Euregions at the subregional level, will be explained in this subsection 
through the control mechanism of ‘designing the Agent’s contract so that it includes the 
correct incentives’ (cf. Blom-Hansen 2005) and will be applied to this case study in 
section 7.3.  
 
With regard to the ‘design of the Agent’s contract’, the PA literature indicates how the 
Principal can build in the ‘correct incentives’. In the case of cohesion policy and more 
specifically in the case of the Structural Funds, the topic of this study here, it can be 
ascertained that the correct incentives are that the projects carried out as part of the 
programs must be compatible with the goals set by the ‘new Principal’. A contract 
between a Principal and an Agent needs to be designed in such a way as to give the 
Agent incentives to comply. In the public sector the most potent incentives are financial 
and administrative ones. As Molle (2007) states, in the field of cohesion policy financial 
incentives are provided through the selection of beneficiaries, which is part of the 
programming process and will be explained in more detail below. Administrative 
incentives, meanwhile, specify rules that relate to choosing the projects and partners 
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that may become involved. Molle states that the more that the interests of partners are 
likely to coincide with those of the Principal, the higher the chance of compliance. He 
acknowledges that the “EU is not the final decision-maker” and that the member states 
and regions are in the position to determine which projects are funded (cf. Molle 2007: 
192f).  
 
The official goal of European cohesion policy has remained unchanged since the 1960s. 
It still aims to reduce economic and social disparities in the Union, at both national and 
regional levels. In addition to this general goal, the projects in the programs need to be 
innovative and must build on the national policies of member states (cf. Blom-Hansen 
2005: 624, 627). In order to achieve the goals of cohesion policy, the Structural Funds 
have some basic principles which were laid down in the reforms of 1988 and which are 
called ‘additionality’, ‘programming’, ‘concentration’ and ‘partnership’ (see section 5.3.1). 
These four basic principles of the Structural Funds remain the basis of the Structural 
Funds to this day. These principles will be outlined here in order to show how the ‘new 
Principal’ (the European Commission) has designed the contract for the ‘new Agents’ (at 
the national, regional and subregional levels). 
  
First of all, the principle of ‘concentration’ means that funds must be spent in the areas of 
greatest need (cf. Bache and George 2006: 465f.). EU financial assistance is 
concentrated through a series of priority objectives, which have existed since the 
Structural Funds were first conceived, but have changed slightly over the various 
program periods. Programs such as INTERREG have enabled the EU to focus on 
particular problems and opportunities relating to regional development in Europe, as well 
as to experiment with new approaches and campaigns to promote the development of 
network cooperation between regions that straddle national borders (Panteia et al. 2009: 
9). Today, the most common aim of regional policy is to enhance regional economic 
competitiveness, stimulate economic growth and create new jobs (cf. European 
Commission 2011 web page, access 05.07.2011).  
 
The second principle, ‘additionality’, means that Structural Funds must be 
complemented by national expenditure, which is meant to exclude the possibility that 
money from the Structural Funds is being used to finance existing national policies or to 
replace existing national funding (Blom-Hansen 2005: 631). The EU funds should 
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complement rather than replace national resources (Nugent 2006: 371). Contributions 
from the Structural Funds therefore “must not replace or equivalent structural 
expenditure by a member state in the regions […]. […], the financial allocations from the 
Structural Funds may not result in a reduction of national structural expenditure […]” 
(Porras-Goméz and Barzeley 2012: 4f). Furthermore, this principle means that member 
states cannot use EU resources to reduce national spending on regional development 
and to make sure of this, EU resources go directly to the regions or managing authorities 
rather than to national treasuries (Hix 2005: 290). The goal of this principle was greater 
involvement by subnational authorities (cf. Council 1999 No 1260/1999, Art. 11: 14; 
Blom-Hansen 2005: 631; Bache 1998: 70). This principle already existed in the basic 
ERDF regulation from 1975, but was reinforced in 1988 because it was regularly ignored 
(EEC 1975 in Bache and George 2006: 463; cf. Bache 2008: 4). From the very 
beginning, evaluating the principle of ‘additionality’ was not easy, because it is 
impossible to make a comparison with what member states would have spent in the 
absence of these funds (cf. CEC 1975: 7f).  
 
The next principle, ‘programming’, means that programs lasting several years became 
the norm for all funding in order to ease the Commission’s administrative burden, 
promote a more coherent approach and facilitate controlling and monitoring (cf. Bache 
1998: 70; Hix 2005: 290). The ‘programming principle’ means the Commission does not 
decide on project allocation; rather, grants from the Structural Funds are allocated to the 
member states on the basis of broad programs (Blom-Hansen 2005: 632). Funds are 
allocated for the entirety of the program period and the program partners are required to 
set up an Operational Program (OP) before the start of the program period which is 
subject to approval by the European Commission. The programs are prepared by the 
member states, discussed and elaborated beforehand with their program partners, and 
prepared in accordance with the regulations set by the European Commission (cf. 
Council 2006 No 1080/2006; Council 2006 No 1083/2006). At the beginning of each 
multi-annual program period, the program is discussed by the Commission and the 
member states, who submit a single programming document for each structural priority 
objective. These documents form the legal basis for allocating grants to individual 
projects over the entire program period (Blom-Hansen 2005: 632). In previous program 
periods those evaluations were known as ex-ante and ex-post assessments and later on 
(since 2000) the mid-term evaluation was introduced in order to evaluate the progress of 
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the programs (cf. Bachtler and Michie 1995: 746). As such, as Bachtler and Wren (2006) 
have stated, the cohesion policy became one of the most intensively evaluated policies 
in Europe. As explained in chapter 5 on the development of the Structural Funds and the 
ERDF since the reforms of 1988, when the programming principle for European Funds 
was introduced, successive phases of regulation have created an increasingly rigorous 
system of appraisal, monitoring and evaluation covering all EU-funded regional 
development interventions. In respect to evaluation, the programming cycle led to the 
development of the ex-ante evaluation to verify the targets for the program, the mid-term 
evaluation to establish the need for corrective action and the ex-post evaluation to 
assess results (Bachtler and Wren 2006: 143). In sum, the principle of ‘programming’ is 
an essential element for maintaining long-term added value. It has facilitated greater 
strategic planning, especially at the regional level and encouraged the participants “to 
adopt a ‘strategic’ approach to regional development, leading to the introduction of new 
ideas and approaches, better project selection and greater coherence in co-financed 
projects” (Bachtler and Gorzelak 2007: 317). Additionally and “from a financial 
perspective, multi-annual programming gives rise to a greater stability of funds for 
economic development than does annual budgeting” (Mairate 2006: 171). 
 
The principle of ‘partnership’ generally means that “the policy operates through close 
cooperation between the Commission, national governments and regional authorities 
(which in some states had to be created for the purpose) in the process that runs from 
the preparation of projects to the implementation and monitoring of expenditure” (Hix 
2005: 290). In the regulation (Council 1988 No 2052/88, II: 8), this is expressed as 
follows:  
 
“They [the Community operations] shall be established through close 
consultations between the Commission, the Member State concerned and the 
competent authorities designated by the latter at national, regional, local or other 
level with each party acting as a partner in pursuit of a common goal. […]. The 
partnership shall cover the preparation, financing, monitoring and assessment of 
operations.”  
 
As we can see, the ‘partnership principle’ was conceived primarily as a vertical 
relationship between the European Commission and national, regional or subregional 
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authorities. Over time a horizontal dimension of partnership has grown, which involves a 
wide range of stakeholders at the subregional, regional and national levels. The 
advantage of partnerships in combination with the ‘programming principle’ (see below) is 
that it helps to focus intervention on the needs of the region or of particular target 
groups. It also stimulates ideas for projects through the partners communicating 
opportunities in relation to Structural Funds requirements (Mairate 2006: 173). As 
Bachtler and Gorzelak (2007: 318) point out, evaluation studies generally conclude that 
the principle of ‘partnership’ has brought enhanced transparency, cooperation and 
coordination to the design and delivery of regional development policy as well as the 
result of a better quality of regional development interventions. The benefits of the 
‘partnership principle’ are usually: “[...] new forms of governance, stronger involvement 
of local actors, collaborative working and cooperation on economic development 
initiatives, improved decision-making in the management of economic development 
interventions (e.g. project selection) and opportunities for exchange of experience” 
(Bachtler and Gorzelak 2007: 318). As part of the ‘partnership principle’, the European 
Commission has made it clear that the member states themselves have primary 
responsibility for monitoring program expenditure, while the Commission will act in a 
supervisory role, overseeing the national systems. This means that the partnership 
principle could also be part of the control mechanism of ‘monitoring the Agent’s action’, 
as mentioned by Blom-Hansen 2005, and will thus also be looked at in more detail in 
section 7.2. 
 
Under the principle of ‘partnership’, a system of ‘shared management’ was created, 
which means that there are different levels of control – in the member states there are 
three levels of control with corresponding bodies of the Managing Authority, the 
Certifying Authority and the Audit Authority – act independent of one another (European 
Commission DG Regional Policy 2009: 7). The Managing Authority, or the regional 
program management under the responsibility of the Managing Authority, conducts the 
‘first-level control’ and its main responsibility is to ensure that the program is 
implemented effectively and correctly. To do this, the Managing Authority has to inform 
the Commission of whether financial and physical targets – which are set in the 
Operational Program before the program begins – have been achieved, by means of 
Annual Implementation Reports that are examined and approved by the Monitoring 
Committee. The ‘Certifying Authority’ conducts the ‘second-level control’. The ‘second-
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level control’ also takes place within the member states and assures the Commission 
that the expenditure “being declared for reimbursement is accurate, results from a 
reliable accounting system, and complies with applicable Community and national rules. 
It receives expenditure claims from the Managing Authority and carries out checks 
before it includes them in the certified claim for payment sent to the Commission” 
(European Commission DG Regional Policy 2009: 8; cf. Barca 2009: 74). The ‘Audit 
Authority/Authorities’ in the member states “has/have a key function in building up 
assurance in the system through the performance of the important responsibilities 
imposed by the regulations, at the beginning of a period, during the implementation and 
at closure” (European Commission DG Regional Policy 2009: 9) This system of ‘shared 
management’ is stipulated by the program documents, which are described under the 
point of ‘programming’, so that the European Commission is able to see how the projects 
and the whole program will be monitored in the member states. 
 
It is also important to remember that Structural Fund money takes the form of ‘matching 
grants’, meaning that European Funds do not finance entire projects or programs, but 
only part of them. The percentage of the European money allocated depends on the 
particular program. This system of ‘matching grants’ can also be seen as a kind of a 
control mechanism: because national, regional or subregional money from the member 
states is also involved, fiscal control will also be exercised over the partly EU-financed 
projects by that particular member state, rather than by the supranational level. In the 
literature on cohesion policy, these ‘matching grants’ are also often explained or 
mentioned in combination with the principle of ‘additionality’, because national, regional 
or subregional money is involved and European money supplements national funding 
(cf. Porras-Goméz and Barzelay 2012: 4f). 
 
 
7.2 Monitoring the actions of the Agent 
 
The PA literature typically speaks of two types of monitoring control: the ‘police patrol 
oversight’ and the ‘fire alarm oversight’ (cf. Héritier 2007: 24; cf. Blom-Hansen 2005: 
634; cf. Molle 2007: 193). On the basis of the results of this study, it is possible to see 
how, in the case of interregional cross-border cooperation, both types of control apply.  
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‘Police patrol oversight’ in this case study works in a number of ways. Firstly, member 
states have to set up national Monitoring Committees to monitor the Structural Funds 
programs; its activities consist mainly of reporting, evaluating and auditing (cf. Council 
1999 No 1260/1999: Art. 35 in Blom-Hansen 2005: 634; cf. Molle 2007: 193). As 
mentioned in the context of the ‘partnership principle’, the Commission, the subnational 
authorities and interest organizations are represented on those Monitoring Committees 
and they are chaired by the member states, meaning that the composition of the 
Monitoring Committee for a program is fully determined by the member states (cf. Blom-
Hansen 2005: 638; cf. Barca 2009: 74). However, as explained earlier, this constellation 
has changed over successive program periods. The chair of a Monitoring Committee 
(the member states) is responsible for making annual and final status reports to the 
Commission which specify how the Structural Fund programs have been implemented 
and conducted (Council 1999 No 1260/1999: Art. 37 in Blom-Hansen 2005: 634).183 The 
evaluation of the programs (ex-ante and the mid-term evaluation) takes place in those 
Monitoring Committees and the results are discussed. Consistent with Blom-Hansen, 
monitoring the Agent’s actions includes evaluation procedures – the ex-ante and mid-
term evaluations as well as the ex-post evaluation. The first two evaluations are primarily 
the responsibility of the member states while the ex-post evaluation must formally be 
undertaken by the European Commission (Blom-Hansen 2005: 634, Barca 2009: 74). 
 
In short, the ‘police patrol oversight’ can be characterized as “centralized, ongoing, 
thorough and systematic”, because it is based on regular control of the Agent’s activities 
(Molle 2007: 193; cf. Héritier 2007: 24).  
 
Less costly than ‘police patrol oversight’ is the second type of control, the ‘fire alarm 
mechanism’. This comes into play when one of the third-party actors involved under the 
‘partnership principle’, such as subnational authorities and interest organizations, reveals 
non-compliant behaviour by the Agent. These bodies are in a position to monitor the 
Structural Funds operations closely in the individual member states (Héritier 2007: 24; 
Blom-Hansen 2005: 634), and consequently, this mechanism requires less involvement 
by the Principal. As Blom-Hansen states (2005), the European Court of Auditors (ECA) 
                                                 
183
 The tasks of the Monitoring Committee are described in Article 65 of the Council Regulation 
2006 No 1083/2006 (Molle 2007: 214) . 
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may also conduct special investigations in selected areas of EU cohesion policy. This 
was done in 2004, for example, in a Special Report by the ECA during the program 
period of INTERREG III (ECA 2004; cf. interview 24 2010). Reports set up by the ECA 
are not based on the reports of the Commission but on the ECA’s own evaluations, so 
that they are as independent as possible. These reports consider both the program and 
the project level of the Structural Fund programs and can be seen as a form of 
evaluation of how the program is being implemented. Furthermore, the European 
Parliament, the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee are 
also in a position to sound a ‘fire alarm’, because the Commission is obliged to report to 
them on the operations of the Structural Funds and the general status of EU cohesion 
policy at least every three years (Blom-Hansen 2005: 634f). 
 
 
7.3 Practical consequences of both systems of control for the case of Dutch-German 
cross-border cooperation 
 
This section will discuss the practical consequences of both control mechanisms 
described in sections 7.1 and 7.2 in relation to the administrative burden or complexity of 
Dutch-German cross-border cooperation.  
 
Firstly, the principle of ‘concentration’ – which means that European money has to be 
spent on the areas of greatest need – can be clearly applied in this Dutch-German 
border-region. This principle has informed cross-border cooperation since the European 
Commission developed its view that border regions are often neglected under national 
policies with the result that their economies have often become peripheral within national 
boundaries (CEC 2004 (a): 2). Furthermore, border regions often suffer from the division 
of communities in economic, social and cultural terms, which is the effect of a national 
border in the region (cf. CEC 2000 (b): 6). The overall aim of INTERREG for cross-
border cooperation has remained constant during all the funding periods and is, as 
mentioned earlier, that national borders should not be barriers that hinder balanced 
development and integration throughout Europe (CEC 2004 (a): 2). As such, European 
border regions, including the Dutch-German border areas, can be considered as areas 
that need financial stimulus from the European Structural Funds. Awareness of the 
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importance of stimulating territorial cooperation in Europe has increased over successive 
program periods and European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) has become a separate 
objective under the most recent program period of funding, and under the ETC the 
objective of cross-border cooperation now actually accounts for the largest share.184 This 
has formalized Europe’s appreciation of the importance of financial stimulus in cross-
border regions, in that cross-border cooperation is no longer simply the subject of a 
Community Initiative, as it had been until the end of 2006, but has now been embodied 
in a separate European objective (see also section 5.2.3). 
 
The basic principle of ‘additionality’ had existed since the ratification of the ERDF 
regulations in 1975. Efforts were made to prove that the ‘additionality principle’ was 
being applied by the member states – for example, in the first annual report of the ERDF 
in 1975, the German government pointed out that the funds devoted to the 
‘Gemeinschaftsaufgabe’ were higher in 1975 and 1976 than they had been in 1974, 
before the Fund was created (CEC 1975: 7f). In that first year of the ERDF in the 
Netherlands, an agreement was struck between the Ministries of Finance and Economic 
Affairs which “provides for receipts and from the Fund to be credited to the latter as 
additional resources and that the precise manner of their use will be specified in the 
annual budget” (EEC 1975: 7). The ‘additionality principle’ has changed slightly since the 
1988 reforms of the European Structural Funds and it has become a stricter 
requirement. For Germany, this meant specifically that before 1988 the funds were used 
almost exclusively to refinance projects approved for domestic regional funds. The near 
absence of the principle of ‘additionality’ in Germany prior to 1988 meant that the 
Commission hardly influenced German regional policies (Anderson 1996: 190). With the 
introduction of the Communitarian Initiatives in 1988, the Commission gained the 
“capacity to upset the delicate distributional balance among problem regions” and made 
the German Federal Ministry of Economics “concerned about losing control over 
development and expenditure priorities, not to mention the procedures attending 
development” (Anderson 1996: 190). As explained earlier, the Communitarian Initiatives 
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 In the program period 2007-2013, the division of the ERDF-budget within the ETC-objective is 
as follows:  
Cross-border cooperation: €5.6 billion 
Transnational cooperation: €1.8 billion  
Interregional cooperation: €445 million (European Commission 2011, web page, access 
10.08.2011). 
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were part of the Structural Funds and “were programs devised by the Commission to 
meet outstanding regional needs” (George 2004: 119; cf. Bache 1998: 71). 
 
Looking at the application of the ‘additionality principle’ over the successive program 
periods of INTERREG, it is clear that it has become progressively stricter over time. On 
paper, the official Operational Programs for the Dutch-German border from these 
periods mention the additionality requirements as part of the “criteria for project-
approval” in the same way (cf. JTIS 2000: 107; cf. JTIS 2007: 98; see also Annex 1). But 
in practical terms, the documentation required for project applications has changed: 
since the start of the INTERREG IV period, an extra document has been required which 
explains how the project meets the criterion of additionality. In specific terms, this means 
that working hours for staff working on a project must be reserved for that particular 
project, for example, and it is explicitly not allowed for them to be spent on other 
activities in the participating organization. Although small, this document presented 
significant difficulties for some project partners under INTERREG IV (see also section 
6.5.2). 
 
The principle of ‘programming’ can also be seen clearly in the Dutch-German 
INTERREG system, the current INTERREG period being the fourth program. 
INTERREG is – like all Structural Funds – phased in programs; a program lasts for 
several years and money is allocated to the program (the member states) for the 
duration of the program. The European Commission sets general rules for the 
implementation of the INTERREG program before each new program period starts. 
These general regulations or guidelines apply to the ERDF program as a whole. There 
are also regulations that relate specifically to INTERREG (cf. for example Council 1999 
No 1783/1999; Council 2006 No 1083/2006; cf. European Commission DG Regional 
Policy presentation 2012 (a)). Generally speaking, the regulations that relate to 
INTERREG have become increasingly strict from one program period to the next (cf. 
CEC 1990 No 90/C 215/0; CEC 1997 No 2064/97: 1-7) due to withdrawal of the 
European Commission from direct project decision-making and later from direct program 
management, as explained before.185 However, in addition to this general withdrawal of 
                                                 
185
 In the pilot phase of INTERREG (1989/90) when there was no program, the European 
Commission decided on the project allocation, but with the start of introducing the program 
structure under the INTERREG I program (1990), the European Commission was no longer 
solely responsible for approving projects, but worked with other levels of governance involved in 
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the European Commission from direct participation in the programs, new requirements 
were introduced. For example, for the cross-border INTERREG programs, the obligation 
to monitor and report became more prescriptive and several evaluation moments were 
introduced (ex ante, mid-term and ex post), as described in section 7.2 in the context of 
‘police patrol oversight’. Financial absorption was also incentivized through a further rule 
known as the n+2 rule (cf. Barca 2009: 76). 
 
In accordance with the Commission’s regulations and as a general requirement for the 
Structural Funds, the Dutch-German program partners of the two member states were 
required to set up an Operational Program and a ‘Description of the Management and 
Control Systems’ which was subject to the approval of the European Commission before 
the program could start (cf. JTIS 2008). In the case of the Dutch-German joint 
INTERREG program, the approval of the European Commission does not usually take 
much time because this program applies a 100% control unlike other European border-
region programs. A 100% control means that all spending in the program is controlled 
and there is no need to establish a control strategy in which certain controls are 
conducted systematically. 
 
At the end of a program period, a final report must be submitted to the European 
Commission from the national level. This report should include a description of the 
controls and audits that been carried out, which projects have been controlled and how 
the approved methods of control have been applied. The European Commission 
analyses these reports and is entitled to carry out ‘spot checks’ for up to two years after 
the end of the program.186 In the Dutch-German INTERREG program, in which four 
Euregions operate jointly and are coordinated by one Joint Technical INTERREG 
Secretariat (JTIS) and one joint Monitoring Committee, forthcoming program periods are 
usually prepared very carefully. There are several group meetings at which 
representatives of the program partners at the subregional, regional and national level 
                                                                                                                                                 
the program (cf. Regio Rijn-Waal 1991: 23). Until the end of INTERREG I (1991-1993), the 
European Commission participated in the Steering Committees for project decisions. Until the 
end of the INTERREG II period (1994-1999), the European Commission had a decisive seat on 
the Monitoring Committee for decisions concerning programs as a whole, while it no longer 
participated in the Steering Committee meetings (cf. ERW 1994: 52). With the start of INTERREG 
III (2000-2006), the Commission retreated a step further from the program in that it only attended 
Monitoring Committee meetings as an advisory observer (cf. JTIS 2000: 98f). 
186
 Spot checks’ take place mainly for ‘high-risk programs’ as defined by the DG Regional Policy. 
The Dutch-German border-region does not belong into that category. 
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come together to work on the future Operational Program for the upcoming funding 
period, as explained earlier. The results of these meetings is a finished Operational 
Program that already meets the requirements of the European Commission as well as 
the additional requirements set by subregional, regional and national program partners. 
Officially, those extra requirements are agreed by consensus, but it is obvious that the 
various levels of governance working together in the Dutch-German INTERREG system 
each have their own agenda and the final version of the Operational Program includes 
compromises between the different levels involved.  
 
The ‘partnership principle’ is also evident in the Dutch-German border-region. The three 
authorities for the current INTERREG IV program are located as follows: the Managing 
Authority belongs to the Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Energie des Landes 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, the Certifying Authority belongs to the Ems Dollart Region and the 
Audit Authority is the Finanzministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. These carry 
out the tasks explained in section 7.1 (JTIS 2008: 20, 50, 55; cf. CEC 2009).  
 
Funding for the Dutch-German INTERREG program is provided as ‘matching grants’. All 
Structural Funds are basically ‘matching grants’, which means that the European Funds 
do not finance the whole program or whole projects conducted within a particular 
program (see also section 7.1). In general, EU support must be co-financed with national 
public or private funding (cf. Bachtler and Wren 2006: 144). The percentage of European 
money and the percentage that comes from co-financing from the program and/or 
project partners will differ between programs. For the Dutch-German INTERREG 
program, the program partners agreed to fund 50% of the total amount. The other 50% 
of the projects and thus also of the whole program is co-financed by the subregional, 
regional and national project partners. Because Dutch, German and European money is 
involved, the Dutch-German program is currently subject to three forms of control, and 
the German ‘Landeshaushaltskontrolle’ is the strictest form of control. As mentioned 
earlier, ‘matching grants’ can be seen as an indirect control mechanism for this particular 
program, because of the strict German controls on spending from the Dutch-German 
and European budget. 
 
With regard to other control mechanism in the PA literature – ‘monitoring the Agent’s 
actions’ (see section 7.2) – in this Dutch-German case study, it is clear that ‘police patrol 
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oversight’ takes place here, in view of the multiple evaluations before, during and after 
the end of a program. Furthermore, under the ‘police patrol control’, the program and its 
controllers are supervised by the Monitoring Committee in the Dutch-German 
INTERREG program. However, this mechanism has gradually changed over the course 
of the different program periods and can be viewed primarily as a direct consequence of 
the changing constellation of the Monitoring Committee and the withdrawal of the 
European Commission from direct decision-making relating to the projects (since the 
start of the INTERREG II period) and its withdrawal from being directly involved in 
decisions concerning the program (since the start of INTERREG III period) (cf. 
EUREGIO 2002: 18; JITS 2000: 98; cf. Regio Rijn-Waal 1991: 23). Since ‘police patrol 
oversight’ can only be regarded as part of the ‘programming principle’, the gradual 
withdrawal by the European Commission can only be explained as a withdrawal from 
that ‘programming principle’. This development shows that responsibility for the 
implementation of INTERREG is delegated to actors at the national level who, together 
with the subregional and regional INTERREG program partners on each side of the 
Dutch-German border, are responsible for enforcing control mechanisms – including two 
of the three mandatory evaluations – in the INTERREG system.  
 
The second tool used to monitor the actions of the Agents (see section 7.2) is the ‘fire 
alarm mechanism’ which has not so far been applied directly to the Dutch-German 
border-region program. In very general terms, the special report of the ECA mentioned 
general issues concerning the INTERREG program but nothing that related specifically 
to the Dutch-German border (cf. ECA 2004). Since the Dutch-German INTERREG 
program serves as a kind of role model in Europe and trust between desk officers and 
the subregional, regional and national program partners has increased through years of 
good cooperation between all levels of governance, the European Commission rings the 
alarm bell in case something could happen, for example missing the deadline for the 
strict n+2 rule, an issue which was discussed by the program partners during the 
INTERREG III period. However, in general terms, the ‘fire alarm’ mechanism has so far 
not been applied to the Dutch-German INTERREG program. 
 
In conclusion, decision-making authority over project applications has been enhanced at 
the national, regional and subregional levels, and control responsibilities have been 
made more rigorous for the program as a whole, as explained earlier. In addition to this 
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development, the European Commission has also charged the relevant national actors 
with setting up additional oversight mechanisms and added extra requirements for the 
approval of INTERREG projects to guarantee that the program is conducted 
appropriately (cf. CEC 1997 No 2064/97: 2f; CEC 2000 (b) No 2000/C 143/08: 12; CEC 
2004 (b) No 2004/C 226/02: 8). As explained above, setting up extra control rules that 
are stricter than those prescribed in the regulations is allowed (cf. CEC 1997 No 
2064/97: 2). Such additional national-level requirements on controlling and project 
selection generally promote the avoidance of mistakes and enable the program to focus 
on the priorities of the particular member states. For example, the 100% control of the 
Dutch-German program that is conducted means that a high error rate can be avoided 
(cf. interview 1 2012). However, this ‘over-fulfilment’ in terms of control mechanisms has 
important negative side-effects, such as a growing administrative burden especially on 
the end-users of the program. For example, project applications involve considerable 
time and administrative effort during and after the project, as well as generating a great 
deal of paper work, mainly due to the controlling (cf. interview 14 2009).  
 
 
7.4 Summary 
 
This chapter has focused on the extent to which the theoretical framework of this 
dissertation is a useful one for analyzing the Dutch-German case study. Very generally, 
the MLG approach is used in this case study to define the levels of governance working 
together in this Dutch-German program (see also section 3.1.1.). The MLG approach 
helps mainly to elaborate on the horizontal cooperation which exist between authorities 
on both sides of the border. In The Netherlands and in Germany in particular the 
authorities for the involvement and implementing of the program lay at different national 
governmental levels and that is why for example the German regional ‘Bundesländer-
level’ works with nearly the same authority in the program as a partner together with the 
Dutch-national level.  
 
In order to explain the shifts of authority and the development over time, the PA 
approach proved to be a useful tool to answer why the administrative burden in the 
Dutch German cross-border cooperation has increased and explain the nature of the 
developing relations between involved actors. In order to do so however, the 
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combination with the MLG approach is vital since the latter first identifies the levels 
between which authority is shifted.  
 
 
This dissertation focuses on two shifts of authority; the ‘first shift of authority’ or 
‘supranationalization shift’, took place when the European member states delegated 
policy-making authority to the European Commission. The MLG approach emphasized 
the importance of this development for European cooperation. It is however the ‘second 
shift of authority’ or ‘renationalization shift’, involving the delegation of authority from the 
European Commission – as a ‘new Principal’ – back to the national, regional and 
subregional levels – that shows the usefulness of the combined MLG-PA approach. After 
this shift, the bureaucratic burden of the programs increased steadily for the ‘new 
(multiple) Agents’ at subregional, regional and national levels of governance. 
 
The involvement of the ‘new Agents’ that increased as the ‘renationalization shift’ 
occurred, has led to increased complexity in cross-border governance, partly as the new 
controls and monitoring procedures imposed by the European Commission as a ‘new 
Principal’ have been implemented, and partly through their own ‘overfullfillment’ of the 
European rules. This mechanism can be explained as follows: in delegating 
responsibility to ‘new Agents’, the European Commission has established various control 
mechanisms and oversight procedures in order to ensure that the programs were 
implemented in the regions according to the regulations put in place by the Commission. 
Those control mechanisms are mainly implemented at the national level. However, it is 
not only the European Commission that enhances its control and oversight mechanisms; 
the national program partners have done so too. The national level has added extra 
requirements, not just because the program regulations allow this, but also in order to 
tailor cross-border projects to meet national policy priorities.  
This chapter focused on the practical consequences of the four basic principles of the 
European Structural Funds which are applied also in the Dutch-German program, the 
‘concentration-’, ‘additionality-’, ‘programming-’ and ‘partnership-principle’ and it has 
been elaborated how two of the four control mechanisms of the PA literature can be 
applied at the Dutch-German program: Firstly, designing the Agents contract and 
secondly monitoring the actions of the Agent. Very generally due to establishing an 
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Agents contract the actions for monitoring can be determined. Next to the ‘drift’ of the 
multiple ‘new Agents’ which was explicitly allowed by the Principal of the European 
Commission to insert extra requirements on the program (see also section 6.6.1) it is 
mainly the monitoring, controlling and reporting conducted on all involved governance 
levels, but especially on the level were the program is conducted practically – in the 
border regions – which increased over the several program periods and that is why the 
administration burden increased especially for the end-beneficaries of the program.  
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8. Conclusions 
 
European integration does not only imply intergovernmental cooperation between states, 
as occurred in the years shortly after the Second World War. What makes European 
cooperation such a unique process is the existence of supranational institutions, 
specifically the European Commission, to which the member states have given policy-
making authority. During the process of European integration – which began as early as 
the 1950s – the European Commission and its predecessor the High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community became to a large extent responsible for 
developing and implementing European regional policy.  
  
The importance of a European regional policy within the post-war European project was 
made clear by Hallstein in the early 1960s, when he stated that regional policy is not a 
policy which could be set alongside monetary policy, agricultural policy and 
infrastructural policy, or tax policy, economic policy and trade policy, but that it 
penetrates all sectors and he emphasized the relationship between the economic and 
regional dimensions. It is thus no surprise that the aim and the intention of the European 
regional policy of the original six member states was in the first place to reduce 
economic and social disparities between the various regions of the European Union. 
Indeed, the Treaty of Rome stated its preamble that harmonious development of the 
economies could be achieved “by reducing the differences between the various regions 
and the backwardness of the less favoured regions”.  
 
Over the years however, this historic effort has suffert increasingly from the strains of 
growing beaucratic complexity that forms a burden a the day-to-day implementation of 
cross-border initiatives. The European Commission as well as other involved actors in 
cross-border governance are well aware of this problem, which formed the starting point 
of the research project. Significantly, the European Commission, which is ultimately 
responsible for the work of EU funds, actively raised the issue in preparing for the 
program budget starting in 2014. In a special publication called “Simplifying Cohesion 
Policy for 2014-2020” the Commission started with the straightforward comment that 
“Simplification has been one of the most popular demands for the new cohesion policy”. 
At least concerns about the groing bureaucracy involved in cohesion policy in general, 
and cross-border cooperation in particular found a listening ear in Brussel. This 
  
203 
dissertation does not so much look at the solutions the European Commission may 
present, but focused on finding an explanation of the nature of the problems by looking 
at how relations between actors involved changed over time.  
 
In the case of the Dutch-German INTERREG program – a program that was conducted 
in the framework of the European Regional Development Fund, as established in 1975 
in order to conduct European regional policy – one sees not only nation states 
delegating decision-making authority to the European Commission as part of the wider 
process of European integration, and enabling the EU to shape their cross-border 
policies, but we also witness the European Commission, in turn, delegating decision-
making authority to actors at the national and subnational levels just as national 
governments had previously done.  
 
To explain these complicated relationships, this dissertation used a combined Multi 
Level Governance – Principal-Agent model (MLG-PA model) to analyze cross-border 
cooperation to explain the reasons for the growing administrative complexity in this field. 
This approach has proved fruitful, since it has revealed how inter-institutional 
relationships at different levels of cross-border governance may be understood in terms 
of changing oversight and control mechanisms, leading to a more complex cross-border 
governance structure. Whereas the MLG approach enables us to understand general 
shifts in authority between all relevant actors at the various levels of governance 
involved, the PA approach has given us more insight into what characterizes the 
relationships between these actors. While the MLG approach is mainly used to define 
the levels of governance involved and elaborated the horizontal cooperation between the 
levels of both countries, the ‘shifts of authority’, especially the second shift or 
renationalization shift when authority is shifted (back) from supranational level to 
national, regional and subregional levels of governance can most optimal be explained 
with the a combined MLG-PA approach. A combined approach has reinvigorated the 
strengths of both the MLG approach and the PA approach since it has shown that not 
only do many shifts in governance take place across the various levels of governance, 
they have also resulted in actors that play the role of a Principal and an Agent at the 
same time. The wider scope of a combined approach has made it possible to conduct a 
more in-depth analysis of my case study of multilevel governance, in which a multitude 
of actors have become ever more interrelated over time.  
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In the case of the Dutch-German cross-border cooperation, two ‘shifts of authority’ have 
taken place. In this dissertation, these ‘shifts of authority’ have been called the 
‘supranationalization shift’ (or the ‘first shift of authority’) and the ‘renationalization shift’ 
(or the ‘second shift of authority’). The ‘first shift’ started within the early development of 
European integration since the end of the World War II. However, it is the ‘second shift’ 
that is of particular interest in analysing this case study. This basically started with the 
introduction of the European Regional Development Fund in 1975. Under this 
‘renationalization shift’, the European Commission has created new Agents to perform 
tasks on its behalf as the new Principal. Just as the member states did when acting as 
the ‘original Principals’, the European Commission also seeks to monitor its newly 
created Agents by putting in place oversight procedures to maintain control over the 
program. It has assumed the role of a supervisor rather than participant. The other 
program partners involved at the participating levels of governance have enjoyed 
increasing leeway to implement the programs, provided they have done so according to 
the basic principles of European Structural Funding.  
 
This process, in which an Agent may act as a Principal and create new Agents, can only 
be explained by using an analysis that combines the Principal-Agent mechanisms of the 
PA approach with the multiple-level and multiple-actor MLG approach. A combined 
MLG-PA approach leaves room for such a development, whereas a purely MLG 
approach, (in which authority generally transfers away from national actors) or a purely 
PA approach (in which the Principal-Agent relationships always go in one direction) 
would have been too limited.  
 
As this study shows, the discussion among MLG scholars on the question of whether, in 
the end, national actors are losing authority through the process of growing European 
governance or have in fact been able to maintain a central position is less relevant than 
the conclusion that, in the process of ongoing European integration, policy-making is 
becoming ever more dispersed between a range of actors that operate as both 
Principals and Agents. In the end, it is not so much a question of who is in the driving 
seat, but showing empirically that through the development of the INTERREG program, 
responsibilities and tasks have increasingly become diffused across all the levels 
involved. 
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However, to a certain extent, the case study does show that in a sense, national actors 
have indeed ‘regained’ authority over cross-border cooperation. However, to conclude 
that national actors have ‘regained’ the authority they previously lost would be an 
oversimplification. Given that regional policy and European cross-border cooperation 
have developed against a backdrop of years of European integration and taken the form 
of a system of Multi-Level Governance, any increased role for national actors needs to 
be seen firmly in this context. National oversight institutions increasingly control whether 
European money is being spent properly in border regions and report their findings to 
the European Commission, which still has formal responsibility for these projects and 
programs. In this context, it is also interesting that the member states, as new Agents, 
have not so much ‘taken back’ some of the competences that they once ceded, but that 
they have received fresh authority from a new Principal, the European Commission. 
Almost as if to emphasize this point, the new supranational Principal, the European 
Commission, has actually enabled the new Agents, the other levels of governance 
involved, to develop the so-called ‘bureaucratic drift’ described in PA literature. 
Accordingly, the Agents have developed their own vision of what their mandate is or 
ought to be, and have begun to pursue their own interests or try to expand their tools 
and influence. Authority for decision-making, implementation and control has been 
delegated to the national level and the national level is also able to impose additional 
requirements on the program, because the regulations for implementing INTERREG 
enable this. In addition, the Commission itself has enhanced its own system of control by 
putting in place ‘automatic rules’ such as the n+2 rule.  
 
In this case study, this means that on the one hand the national level draws up some of 
the project rules and monitors the overall progress of the program but on the other hand 
it helps take concrete decisions about whether or not European INTERREG money 
should be spent on project applications. This means that the national level not only partly 
controls the process but also plays an active part in the decision-making process. 
Here, we can see that the division of responsibilities in INTERREG has changed over 
the successive program periods, as have the oversight and control mechanisms. The 
national level together with the subregional and regional program partners have clearly 
added extra requirements to the INTERREG program, particularly since the start of 
INTERREG IV/European Territorial Cooperation (2007), while the supranational level is 
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no longer directly involved in program-level decision-making since the start of 
INTERREG IIIA (2000). However, the European Commission still has final responsibility 
and may apply sanctions when cross-border activities are mismanaged. Interestingly, 
the Commission has been able to enhance oversight mechanisms on nation states even 
though the same national actors have gained a relatively greater say in INTERREG 
decision-making on cross-border cooperation, because the Commission has retreated 
from the decision-making committees. 
 
This process has led to a situation in which European rules for the INTERREG program 
at the Dutch-German border are ‘over-fulfilled’ and extra requirements have been added 
to the program. The German controls in particular go above and beyond the European 
requirements and constitute a considerable administrative burden for ‘end users’, project 
partners in the border regions. In short, due to the development of the multiple and 
multilevel Principal-Agent relationships between the European Commission and the 
other levels of governance involved and due to the extra national requirements for the 
overall program and particularly for the projects, project realization is in reality much 
more complicated than European regulations might imply.  
 
In sum, there are multiple Principal-Agent relationships in European cross-border 
cooperation and these relationships have become more complex over time as actors 
have acted both as Principals and as Agents simultaneously. Here, the national and 
supranational levels have increased their administrative requirements and the increasing 
administration and complexity can be explained mainly through increased controls. This 
growth in controls is because the actors on the ‘stage’ of European cohesion policy, and 
thus the circuit of the Structural Funds, have become very diverse and each actor (which 
are the levels of governance and the participating organizations themselves) are 
responsible for controlling compliance with their own regulations if they are involved with 
money or personal staff. In fact, the Principal-Agent relationships throughout the 
separate Structural Funds have become ever more dispersed and diffused. Each 
participating level may want to see itself as a Principal, but in reality they are often also 
Agents.  
 
The controlling of the program can be regarded also as a method of communicating 
results and progress to the Commission, which is no longer directly involved in the 
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programs. In addition to this, complexity also stems from the fact that working across 
borders not only means that several levels of governance are involved, but also that 
several different actors with different national competencies on both sides of the border. 
Each authority involved has its own priorities and strategies that cross-border 
cooperation has to fit with, otherwise those authorities will find it difficult to be involved in 
the program, especially when cofinancing is required.  
 
In the end, however, for participants in cross-border projects, this development also 
means an increased administrative burden since they have to comply with ever more 
rules imposed by ever more authorities involved. In order to address this issue, the 
entire body of European cross-border governance would need to be simplified, either by 
a process in which authority again becomes more concentrated or through more clearly 
structured control mechanisms. Given the conclusions of this research, the former 
seems unlikely. The latter may be difficult but is not necessarily impossible. It would 
require more cooperation by the actors involved and a consensus that, in the end, 
creating an environment for successful cross-border cooperation projects should have 
priority. 
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Annex 1: Project-criteria INTERREG I (1991-1993) and INTERREG II (1994-1999) in 
the case of the Euregio Rhine-Waal 
 
Within the INTERREG I period, the projects had to fulfill the following criteria in order to 
get funded:  
(1) The projects had to have a direct cross-border element  
(2) had to be balanced divided through the region and have an impact on a larger scale 
above local community level  
(3) had to make a contribution to the improvement of the economic structure and had to 
improve the employment-opportunities within the region 
(4) had to be substantially financed from the region itself whereby the EC-financing was 
considered additional funding  
(5) the project had to focus on the use of regional potentials and on the development of 
promising starting points 
(6) the project had to be ready to be implemented as much as possible, because the 
projects had to be completed within the quite short period of INTERREG I  
(Regio Rijn-Waal 1990: 23).  
 
These six quite general criteria were concretized into more detail within the next 
Operational Program for the INTERREG II period. Within the OP of INTERREG II the 
ERW it says that projects that wanted to be funded had to fulfill eight basic criteria, which 
were compared to the INTERREG I period more concrete:  
(1) the project had to contribute towards the aims of this INTERREG program and its 
priorities, with the focus on the improvement of the economic structure of the border 
region and on the basis of sustainability  
(2) the cross-border character of the project had to be significant and presented in terms 
of concrete participations from actors at both sides of the border  
(3) the project should the entire Euregion as much as possible 
(4) the project should be in conformity with the criteria of the national and regional “policy 
programs already implemented in the region and the project should – if possible – be 
placed in the context of or in synergy with the objective 2 and 5b  
(5) aid to commercial cooperation projects is only possible if the European Commission 
had approved it in the framework of competitiveness  
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(6) the eligible costs of the projects were preferably at least 100.000 ECU and never less 
than 50.000 ECU;  
(7) the cofinancing – including the contribution of the project participants – had to be 
guaranteed and  
(8) the project had to be conducted (practically and financially) within the fixed time-
period of the program (ERW 1994: 53) 
 
Within the INTERREG IIIA and IV program periods, the project-criteria increased at first 
sight. Within the INTERREG IIIA program in total 18 points of criteria are listed in the 
OP, however under these 18 points a few very general things are enclosed, as creating 
sustainability (points 7 and 9) or having advantageously effects for the environment or 
the employment-market situation (points 3, 6 and 8) (JITS 2000: 106-107). In the 
INTERREG IVA/ETC-program period, in total 12 project-criteria are listed in the OP, 
whereby a few criteria have divisions in separate subpoints. The criteria are nearly the 
same as the criteria of the previous period. There is just one new point of criteria added, 
that is that the results of the projects proved with clear and measurable indicators (JITS 
2007: 100, point 8; cf. interview 10 2012). 
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Annex 2: List of interviews  
 
Interview 1:  INTERREG/ETC program manager at the Dutch-German program 
(2012): 01.06.2012 
Interview 2: Former INTERREG I-III program manager at Dutch EZ (2009): 
30.03.2009 
Interview 3:  Former INTERREG I-III program manager at Dutch EZ (2010): 
02.02.2010 
Interview 4: Former INTERREG I-III program manager at German MWEBWV 
(2009): 16.04.2009 
Interview 5:  Former president of the AEBR (2009): 03.04.2009 
Interview 6: ETC program manager at DG Region, European Commission 
(2010): 15.07.2010 
Interview 7:  ETC program partner (Lower Saxony) (2010) (telephone): 
26.11.2010 
Interview 8: Former INTERREG IIIA program manager, DG Regional Policy, 
European Commission (2009) 04.05.2009 
Interview 9: Former INTERREG III/ETC program manager, DG Regional 
Policy, European Commission (2009) 05.05.2009 
Interview 10: Civil Servant responsible for quality in cross-border programs, DG 
Regional Policy, European Commission (2012): 19.03.2012 
Interview 11: Former INTERREG I-II program manager Dutch EZ and 
responsible for establishing the first Dutch-German programs 
(2009): 15.04.2009 
Interview 12: Civil servant responsible for Dutch mainstream-programs, DG 
Regional Policy, European Commission (2012): 29.02.2012 
Interview 13: INTERREG/ETC project participant, partner or applicant (2009): 
09.12.2009 
Interview 14: INTERREG/ETC project participant, partner or applicant (2009): 
09.12.2009 
Interview 15: INTERREG/ETC project participant, partner or applicant (2009): 
09.12.2009 
Interview 16: INTERREG IIIA-ETC project coordinator at one Dutch-German 
Euregion (2012): 11.07.2012 
Interview 17: Europarlamentarian (2012) 06.03.2012 
Interview 18: INTERREG/ETC program manager in the Dutch-German program 
(2009): 02.04.2009 
Interview 19: INTERREG/ETC program manager at one Dutch-German 
Euregion (2012): 17.07.2012 
Interview 20: Europarlamentarian (2010): 12.07.2010 
Interview 21:  President of AEBR (2012): 03.04.2009 
Interview 22: Head of Unit, DG Regional Policy, European Commission (2010): 
15.07.2010 
Interview 23: INTERREG/ETC program manager at Dutch ‘Provincie’ (2010): 
09.08.2010 
Interview 24:  Civil servant, European Court of Auditors (2010) (telephone): 
30.09.2010 
Interview 25: INTERREG program manager at one Euregion (2009): 
01.04.2009 
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Interview 26: Civil servant responsible for European Structural Funds at one 
representative of a German Bundesland in Brussels (2012): 
22.03.2012 
Interview 27: Civil servant at a Dutch Provincie, formerly involved in INTERREG 
I and II (2009): 06.03.2009 
Interview 28: Civil Servant at the Dutch Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 
(2010): 02.07.2010 
Interview 29: Member of the ‘Landtag’ of North Rhine-Westphalia, responsible 
for (among others) structural policy (2012) (telephone): 
07.03.2012 
Interview 30: Extern advisor formerly involved in INTERREG I-III (2009): 
03.02.2009 
Interview 31: INTERREG/ETC program manager at German ‘Bundesland’ 
Lower Saxony (2012) (telephone): 15.05.2012 
Interview 32: Civil servant responsible for European Structural Funds at one 
representative of a German Bundesland in Brussels (2012): 
27.03.2012 
Interview 33: INTERREG project participant, partner or applicant (2011): 
13.07.2011 
Interview 34: Head of Unit, DG Connect, European Commission (2009): 
05.05.2009 
Interview 35: Civil servant at representation of Germany in Brussels, 
responsible for (among others) European structural policy (2012): 
14.03.2012 
 
 
Interviews as background information 
 
Interview 36:  Civil servant, Huis van de Nederlandse Provincies (2012) 
08.03.2012 
Interview 37: Civil servant, Huis van de Nederlandse Provincies (2012): 
22.03.2012 
Interview 38:  Civil servant, European Court of Auditors (2010) (telephone): 
22.06.2010 
Interview 39: Double interview with civil servants, responsible for bilateral 
relations within the European Union, Benelux-cooperation and 
interregional cooperation, Staatskanzlei North Rhine-Westphalia 
(2010): 26.10.2010 
Interview 40: Double interview with civil servants responsible for mainstream-
programs of Germany and the Netherlands, European 
Commission (2012): 29.02.2012 
Interview 41: Civil servant responsible for international relations between the 
Netherlands and Germany, Provincie Overijssel (2012) 
(telephone): 15.03.2012 
Interview 42:  Double interview with civil servants from the Landesvertretung 
North Rhine-Westphalia and the Huis van de Nederlandse 
Provincies (2012): 28.03.2012 
Interview 43: Civil servant of the ‘Bundesland’ North Rhine-Westphalia at the 
Benelux-Union (2012): 20.03.2012 
Interview 44:  Europarlamentarian (2012): 30.07.2012 
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Interview 45:  Civil servant, former responsible for bilateral relations within the 
European Union, Benelux-cooperation and interregional 
cooperation, Staatskanzlei North Rhine-Westphalia (2010) 
(telephone): 30.11.2010 
Interview 46:  Double interview with civil servants, Huis van de Nederlandse 
Provincies (2012): 08.03.2012 
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230  
Nederlandstalige samenvatting  
 
Deze dissertatie bestaat uit twee hoofdelementen. Aan de ene kant staat het empirische 
deel, het onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van de Nederlands-Duitse 
grensoverschrijdende samenwerking en aan de andere kant staat de analyse van deze 
empirische ontwikkeling door middel van een theoretisch model. 
 
Het onderzoek heeft tot doel de over de jaren toenemende complexiteit in de uitvoering 
van het financieringsprogramma voor grensoverschrijdende samenwerking van de 
Europese Unie INTERREG/Europese Territoriale Samenwerking (ETS) te verklaren aan 
de hand van de samenwerking in de Duits en Nederlandse grensregio’s. Om de 
historische ontwikkeling van de Europese integratie met betrekking tot het Europees 
regionaal beleid en de grensoverschrijdende samenwerking in kaart te brengen, werd in 
het onderzoek archiefwerk vooral in Brussel, maar ook bij de Euregio’s en bij de 
regionale en nationale overheden verricht. Voor de ontwikkeling vanaf 1989/90 en voor 
het schetsen van de huidige situatie werden bijna 50 interviews gevoerd met actoren op 
de verschillende in de grensoverschrijdende programma’s samenwerkende 
beleidsniveaus. 
 
Omdat de grensoverschrijdende samenwerking aan Duits-Nederlandse grens als een 
van de eerste in Europa door lokale initiatieven, in de vorm van bijvoorbeeld 
grensoverschrijdende werkgroepen, werd opgezet, is deze in vergelijking met vele 
andere samenwerkingsvormen aan de binnengrenzen van Europa relatief ver 
ontwikkeld. De structuren en organisaties voor de doorvoering van grensoverschrijdende 
samenwerking bestonden in deze grensregio’s al lang voordat Europese middelen 
hiervoor werden ingezet. De samenwerking aan deze grens geschiet door decentrale 
resp. lokale organisaties in samenspel met regionale en nationale actoren.  
 
Wanneer we kijken naar de ontwikkeling van de Europese Integratie zien we niet alleen 
samenwerking tussen landen. De Europese Integratie is in de loop van tijd, beginnend 
na de Tweede Wereld Oorlog, tot een uniek proces geworden, waarin subnationale en 
supranationale instituties zijn ontstaan. Deze instituties kregen van de lidstaten door de 
jaren heen meer en meer autoriteit overgedragen. Toen in 1975 het Europees Fonds 
voor Regionale Ontwikkeling (EFRO) werd opgericht met het doel om het Europese 
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regionaal beleid een instrument te geven, zien we dat aan de ene kant Europese 
lidstaten autoriteit aan de Europese Commissie toekenden, maar aan de andere kant 
tevens dat de Europese Commissie op haar beurt in de daarop volgende jaren autoriteit 
gaf aan de lidstaten, omdat de projecten en de latere programma’s binnen het EFRO 
werden doorgevoerd door de lidstaten zelf.  
 
Deze dissertatie kijkt in het bijzonder naar de start van de Europese stimulering van 
grensoverschrijdende samenwerking in het jaar 1989/90 met de introductie van het 
INTERREG-initiatief (een programma dat binnen het EFRO werd opgezet). Bij de 
introductie van dit programma was de achterliggende gedachte dat overheidsinstellingen 
aan beide kanten van de grens samen zouden moeten werken, aangezien zij met 
dezelfde problemen en moeilijkheden geconfronteerd zouden kunnen worden en dat de 
regionale economieën aan beide kanten van de grens zouden kunnen profiteren van 
meer grensoverschrijdende samenwerking. Dit idee was echter niet nieuw, er bestonden 
reeds sinds het midden van de jaren 1950 ideeën, initiatieven en 
samenwerkingsverbanden aan de Nederlands-Duitse grens. De Nederlands-Duitse 
Euregio’s werden in de tijd van 1958 tot aan 1978 opgericht en tot aan de dag van 
vandaag bestaan er aan deze grens vier Nederlands-Duitse en een Nederlands-
Belgisch-Duitse Euregio.  
Het Europees financieel programma waarmee deze Euregio’s werken heet sinds 2007 
Europese Territoriale Samenwerking (ETS), maar begon kleinschaliger met het 
Communitair Inititatief INTERREG. Kort samengevat heeft het de Europese 
grensoverschrijdende samenwerking tot aan het huidige programma vier 
programmaperiodes doorlopen: INTERREG I (1990-1993), INTERREG IIA (1994-1999), 
INTERREG IIIA (2000-2006) en INTERREG IVA/ Europese Territoriale Samenwerking 
(ETS) (2007-2013). Het huidige programma INTERREG V/ ETS is in 2014 begonnen en 
eindigt 2020. 
 
Het maatschappelijk belang van dit onderzoek zit vooral in de groeiende zorg over de 
manier waarop Europees regionaal beleid van grensoverschrijdende samenwerking in 
de grensregio´s wordt omgezet en hoe dit over de verschillende programma-periodes 
heen is veranderd. Als concrete aanleiding kunnen de toenemende bezwaren van 
uitvoerende projectpartners in de grensoverschrijdende projecten worden gezien ten 
opzichte van de steeds ingewikkeldere en arbeidsintensievere administratie- en 
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controlesystemen maar ook bijvoorbeeld door een steeds langere 
goedkeuringsprocedure voor de projecten. Door de toename van benodigde tijd, 
expertise en arbeidskracht voor de administratieve kant van projectrealisatie, neemt de 
kans dat steeds weer dezelfde organisaties subsidieaanvragen opstarten, toe. Voor 
organisaties en instituten die vertrouwd zijn met de complexe regelgeving is het 
makkelijker om een inschatting te maken over de kosten en baten van een aanvraag. 
Bovendien zijn ook de wegen van de subsidieaanvraag en projectbewerking bekend. 
Ook ziet men dat in toenemende mate gespecialiseerde ondernemingen de aanvragen 
voor de projectdragers in de hand nemen en zowel tijdens de projectlooptijd als ook voor 
de afsluiting van de projecten de administratie door de projectaanvrager aan dergelijke 
ondernemingen wordt uitbesteed. Deze ontwikkeling mag dan binnen de alledaagse 
uitvoering van Europees beleid niet als iets bijzonders worden gezien, maar staat wel in 
groot contrast met de begintijd van de Nederlands-Duitse samenwerking toen lokale 
‘bottom-up’ initiatieven werden opgericht met het doel de praktische problemen, die het 
leven in de grensregio’s met zich mee bracht op te lossen en om de 
levensomstandigheden in de grensregio’s te verbeteren door middel van vaak 
kleinschalige acties en contacten. 
  
De huidige discussies over een mogelijke simplificatie van Europese 
subsidieprogramma’s wordt overigens niet alleen in de Duits-Nederlandse grensregio’s 
gevoerd, maar geldt ook voor andere Europese subisidie-programma’s en heeft 
inmiddels ook gehoor gekregen bij de Europese beleidsmakers in Brussel. Uit sommige 
interviews, die in het kader van dit onderzoek in Brussel werden gevoerd, werd duidelijk 
dat politici en beleidsmakers zich deels ook afvragen of de verzwarende regelgeving 
binnen het programma van de ETS niet door de Europese Unie maar juist door de 
lidstaten zelf is opgelegd. Men is zich ervan bewust, dat Europese lidstaten een 
bepaalde mate aan vrijheid hebben om de Europese programma’s te implementeren. 
Desalniettemin erkent men in Brussel ook het probleem van de administratie en 
toenemende controle. Daarom is men binnen de Europese Commissie onder andere op 
zoek om effectieve controle mechanismen op te stellen en het gehele stelsel van 
subsidieprogramma’s te vereenvoudigen. 
 
Om de complexe verhoudingen in de ontwikkeling van de grensoverschrijdende 
samenwerking aan de Duits-Nederlandse grens nader te verklaren is gekozen voor een 
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theoretisch kader bestaande uit een combinatie van het Multi-Level Governance en het 
Principal-Agent model (MLG-PA model). Door middel van dit gecombineerde model kan 
worden verklaard hoe de inter-institutionele verhoudingen tussen de verschillende 
beleidsniveaus op het gebied van grensoverschrijdende samenwerking begrepen 
kunnen worden. Met name de verandering in administratie en controle mechanismen die 
een complexe beleidsstructuur met zich meebrengt kan hierdoor verduidelijkt worden.  
 
De basis van de het MLG model is de aanname, dat besluitvormingsautoriteit in Europa 
sinds eind van de jaren 1950s zich steeds meer over de verschillende beleidsniveaus 
verspreidde en dat traditionele theoretische benaderingen, waarin de 
intergouvernementele samenwerkingen tussen staten centraal staat, niet langer 
toereikend zijn. De belangrijkste assumptie van het MLG model is dus dat 
besluitvormings-competenties gedeeld worden door actoren op verschillende 
beleidsniveaus zowel binnen als tussen deelnemende lidstaten. In de literatuur 
concentreert een deel van de discussie zich daarbij op de vraag in hoeverre deze 
diversificatie van besluitvormingsautoriteit heeft geleid tot een afname van de invloed 
van nationale overheden op het proces van Europese integratie.  
 
In de casus van de grensoverschrijdende samenwerking met Europese middelen kan 
het MLG model worden toegepast, omdat hier zowel een decentralisatie van 
besluitvorming naar het subnationale (regionale en lokale) beleidsniveau kan worden 
geconstateerd als ook een centralisatie naar het supranationale (Europese) 
beleidsniveau. Kortom, door middel van het MLG model kunnen de afzonderlijke 
beleidsniveaus worden geïdentificeerd en de overdracht van autoriteit en besluitvorming 
in het kader van de ontwikkeling van de Europese Integratie zichtbaar worden gemaakt. 
Wat in het MLG model echter ontbreekt, is een verklaring waarom bepaalde interacties 
tussen de verschillende betrokken beleidsniveaus plaatsvinden en hoe deze interactie 
concreet is vormgegeven. Een nadere analyse van de interactie tussen de actoren op de 
verschillende samenwerkende beleidsniveaus kan ertoe bijdragen de vraag naar de 
toegenomen complexiteit te beantwoorden. Om die reden werd een tweede theoretisch 
model aan het theoretisch kader van dit onderzoek toegevoegd: Het Principal-Agent 
model. 
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De Principal-Agent (PA) benadering baseert op het principe dat als twee partijen in een 
PA relatie samenwerken, de ene partij als agent fungeert, die in de naam van de andere 
partij, de principal, opdrachten uitvoert of taken waarneemt. De principal besteed feitelijk 
taken of werkzaamheden uit aan de agent. Door middel van het PA model is het 
mogelijk om nauwkeuriger te kijken naar hoe de relaties in de overdracht van autoriteit 
tussen de betrokken beleidsniveaus er precies uitzien. De redenen voor een overdracht 
van autoriteit kunnen divers zijn, zoals een te kleine personele capaciteit van de 
principal of niet genoeg kennis over een bepaald werkterrein. De agent wederom 
probeert juist door zijn expertise en zijn werkzaamheden zoveel mogelijk naar zijn eigen 
voorstellingen door te voeren. Hier kan op den duur een asymmetrische verhouding ten 
gunste van de agent ontstaan. In de PA literatuur wordt over een “shirking” en “slippage” 
gesproken. In geval van “shirking” ziet men dat de agent steeds minder moeite doet bij 
de doorvoering van de taken die hem zijn opgelegd en in het geval van “slippage” ziet 
men een agent die in toenemende mate zijn eigen agenda maakt. Om een dergelijke 
asymmetrie te voorkomen, heeft de principal mechanismen ontwikkeld, die de agent 
controleren. Kortom, de ene beleidsactor, de principal, staat autoriteit af aan een andere 
actor, de agent, en probeert deze vervolgens te sturen zodat de agent niet afwijkt van 
zijn oorspronkelijke taken of opdrachten. Deze sturing geschiet vaak door allerlei 
controlemechanismen die daarmee als indicator gelden van een toenemende 
diversificatie van beleidsautoriteit ten aanzien van de grensoverschrijdende 
samenwerking.  
 
In de casus van de Nederlands-Duitse grensoverschrijdende samenwerking zien we dat 
in algemene zin twee belangrijke processen hebben plaatsgevonden, waarin er sprake 
was van een overdracht van autoriteit tussen verschillende beleidsniveaus. De eerste 
overdracht van autoriteit vanuit de lidstaten (als multiple principals) naar Europese 
instituties (als agents) vond plaats in de algemene ontwikkeling van de Europese 
Integratie en wordt in deze dissertatie “supranationalization shift” genoemd. De in deze 
dissertatie beschreven “renationalization shift”, doelt op de overdracht van autoriteit 
vanuit de Europese instellingen (als nieuwe principals) aan de lidstaten en regio’s (als 
nieuwe agents) die later in de ontwikkeling van de Europese Integratie heeft 
plaatsgevonden. Door deze ontwikkeling functioneren actoren op die verschillende 
beleidsniveaus zowel als principals als ook als agents. Hiermee stuit dit onderzoek op 
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een belangrijk gegeven, waarin in de gangbare PA literatuur vooralsnog geen ruimte 
bestaat.  
 
Wat betreft de MLG literatuur wordt, zoals hierboven reeds aangemerkt, vaak 
gediscussieerd over de vraag of het nationale beleidsniveau aan autoriteit verloren heeft 
door de ontwikkeling van de Europese Integratie. Interessant voor deze casus is de 
vaststelling, dat in het proces van een zich steeds verder ontwikkelende Europese 
Integratie, beleidsbepaling steeds meer verdeeld wordt over de verschillende 
beleidsniveaus en dat deze niveaus zowel als agents als ook als principals kunnen 
functioneren. Het is dus niet zozeer de vraag wie “de touwtjes in de handen heeft” als 
wel van belang om te laten zien dat in de loop van de ontwikkeling van het 
INTERREG/ETS-programma de taken en de verantwoording meer en meer over alle 
betrokken beleidsniveaus verdeeld zijn geraakt.  
 
De eerste overdracht, de “supranationalization shift” begon al in de eerste jaren van de 
Europese Integratie vlak na het einde van de Tweede Wereld Oorlog. De nieuwe 
Europese samenwerkingsverbanden werden gecoördineerd door nieuwe, deels 
supranationale overheden. Dit betekende voor de lidstaten een overdracht van nationale 
autoriteit naar een supranationaal Europees niveau. In de casus van de Nederlands-
Duitse grensoverschrijdende samenwerking is de tweede overdracht van autoriteit, de 
“renationalization shift” van groot belang. Op het gebied van Europees regionaal beleid 
begon deze tweede overdracht met de ontwikkeling en de uiteindelijke introductie van 
het EFRO in 1975. Om het EFRO in de lidstaten te kunnen implementeren was met 
name de Europese Commissie op hulp vanuit de lidstaten aangewezen. De Europese 
Commissie, die door de eerdere overdracht van autoriteit zelf als agent werd 
opgebouwd door de multiple principals, de lidstaten, werd door de tweede overdracht 
van autoriteit zelf een nieuwe principal die nieuwe agents creëerde. De lidstaten (en 
regio’s) als nieuwe agents kregen de bevoegdheden om, in opdracht van de Commissie, 
nieuwe taken te vervullen. Om er zeker van te zijn dat deze nieuwe agents de taken en 
bevoegdheden geheel in de zin van de nieuwe principal, de Europese Commissie, 
zouden doorvoeren, werden er verschillende procedures en controlemechanismen 
opgelegd. In de casus van de Nederlands-Duitse grensoverschrijdende samenwerking 
ziet men deze controle onder andere begin jaren 1990 in de vorm participatie van de 
Europese Commissie in de stuurgroepen voor project-besluiten en de deelname aan 
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besluiten op programma niveau in het Comité van Toezicht. Hiernaast werden jaarlijkse 
rapportages en verantwoordingen conform de Europese reguleringen aan de Europese 
Commissie ingediend. Nadat de Nederlands-Duitse INTERREG-programma’s hun 
eerste programma-periode succesvol hadden afgerond in 1993, werd met ingang van 
het tweede INTERREG-programma die besluitvormingsprocedure en dus ook de directe 
controle en participatie van de Commissie gewijzigd: vertegenwoordigers van de 
Europese Commissie namen niet langer deel aan de project-besluitvormingsprocedures 
en kregen geen stem meer in de Stuurgroepen. Met de start van INTERREG IIIA in 2000 
trok de Europese Commissie zich nog verder uit de programma’s terug toen de 
Commissie geen beslissende zetel meer in het Comité van Toezicht meer innam en zich 
daardoor volledig tot een toezichthoudende in plaats van een participerende instantie 
ontwikkelde. Samenvattend is te zien, dat in deze tweede “shift” de Europese 
Commissie door de jaren heen zichzelf steeds meer uit de concrete uitvoering van de 
programma’s terug trekt en met iedere stap terug het systeem in zijn geheel complexer 
wordt. De complexiteit zit in het feit dat de andere programma-partners op de nationale, 
regionale en lokale beleidsniveaus door deze terugtrekkende beweging van de 
Europese Commissie steeds meer vrijheid kregen bij de implementatie van de 
programma’s, onder de voorwaarde dat zij deze conform de basisprincipes en regels 
van de Europese Structuurfondsen voor grensoverschrijdende activiteiten 
implementeerden. Deze regels werden met ingang van iedere subsidieperiode 
uitgebreider en ingewikkelder.  
 
De conclusie dat het nationale niveau door de ontwikkeling en de uiteindelijke 
implementatie van het Europees regionaal beleid autoriteit zou hebben terug gekregen 
zou te kort door de bocht zijn, omdat het Europese regionaal beleid en hiermee ook het 
terrein van de Europese grensoverschrijdende samenwerking in de loop van het proces 
van Europese integratie zijn ontwikkeld en hiermee niet van een “teruggave” kan worden 
gesproken. Toch kan tegelijkertijd worden vastgesteld, dat de nationale 
overheidsinstellingen, als deel van de nieuwe agents, meer en meer controleren of de 
middelen, die aan grensoverschrijdende samenwerking worden besteed wel volgens de 
Europese en nationale regels zijn uitgegeven. Hiermee is niet alleen de verantwoording 
van de implementatie van de fondsen voor grensoverschrijdende samenwerking maar 
ook een deel van de verantwoording van de controle van de activiteiten en de voortgang 
van de programma’s op het nationale niveau overgedragen. Zo zien we bijvoorbeeld dat, 
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voordat een nieuwe subsidieperiode van start gaat, de controlemechanismen van de 
programmapartners (het lokale, regionale en nationale niveau) door de nationale 
overheden van de lidstaten ter goedkeuring aan de Commissie moeten worden 
gestuurd. Gedurende de programmalooptijd worden de resultaten van dergelijke 
controles naar de Europese Commissie gestuurd, die de formele verantwoordelijkheid 
voor de programma’s en hiermee indirect ook voor de projecten draagt. In feite 
controleert de Commissie door deze werkwijze de controle van de 
controlemechanismen. In deze context is het interessant om te zien dat de lidstaten in 
hun rol als nieuwe agents geen competenties “terug hebben genomen” die zij ooit 
zouden hebben gehad maar, dat zij juist nieuwe autoriteiten overgedragen hebben 
gekregen van een, door hen zelf in het leven geroepen principal, de Europese 
Commissie. 
 
Het is juist deze ontwikkeling die verantwoordelijk is voor het ‘bureaucratic drift’ in de 
Europese, grensoverschrijdende samenwerking. Conform de PA literatuur zouden de 
agents vroeger of later zelf hun eigen visie over hun mandaat formuleren en hun eigen 
interesses vervolgen en daarmee hun mogelijkheden en invloed willen uitweiden. Deze 
‘bureaucratic drift’, niet van het Europese, maar van het nationale beleidsniveau wordt 
gestimuleerd doordat de Europese regulering voor de implementatie van het 
INTERREG-programma erin voorziet dat de verantwoording voor de besluitvorming, 
voor de implementatie en voor de controlling van het programma, deels of volledig bij 
het nationale niveau ligt. Daarnaast biedt het systeem mogelijkheden voor nationale 
actoren om aanvullende voorwaarden te stellen.  
 
Opmerkelijk is dat het nationale niveau in de loop van tijd een bijzondere rol heeft 
ingenomen, doordat het de bevoegdheid heeft om zelf additionele project-voorwaarden 
te introduceren en daarnaast tegelijkertijd ook de algehele voortgang van het 
programma controleert en tevens ook mag meebeslissen over hoe de Europese 
INTERREG-middelen worden besteedt. Concreet betekent dit dat het nationale niveau 
niet alleen de controles meebepaald, de controlling uitvoert, maar ook een bepalende 
stem in besluitvormingsprocedure heeft. Desalniettemin heeft de Commissie met haar 
terugtrekkende beweging uit bestaande procedures er voor gezorgd dat de 
controlesystemen opgeschroefd werden terwijl nationale autoriteiten tegelijkertijd relatief 
gezien belangrijkere spelers in het geheel zijn geworden.  
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Omdat dit onderzoek een Europees subsidieprogramma onder de loep neemt, waarin 
projecten met actoren uit verschillende landen worden gerealiseerd komen er, naast de 
toegenomen complexiteit in de verticale relatie tussen verschillende beleidsniveaus, per 
definitie horizontale relaties tussen niet altijd even goed vergelijkbare actoren in de 
betrokken landen bij. Iedere nationale, regionale en lokale betrokken Nederlandse en 
Duitse autoriteit heeft eigen prioriteiten en strategieën, waar grensoverschrijdende 
samenwerking in moet passen, omdat het anders voor deze autoriteiten moeilijk is om in 
een dergelijk programma te participeren.  
 
De boven geschetste ontwikkeling leidde tot een situatie waarin de bepalingen in 
Europese regelgeving voor het programma aan de Duits-Nederlandse grens werden 
aangevuld met nóg meer regelingen van betrokken nationale actoren, zowel op 
nationaal als op subnationaal niveau. Vooral de controles van de Duitse overheid gingen 
verder dan conform de Europese regelgeving vereist en waren om die reden een extra 
administratieve last voor de ‘eindverbruikers’, de projectdragers en -partners in de 
grensregio. Kortom: Door deze ontwikkeling van multiple en multilevel principal-agent 
relaties tussen de Europese Commissie en de andere betrokken beleidsniveaus en door 
de extra nationale eisen aan het programma is de uitvoering van grensoverschrijdende 
projecten gecompliceerder dan eigenlijk op basis van alleen de Europese regelgeving 
nodig zou zijn.  
 
Samenvattend zien we meerdere principal-agent verhoudingen in de Europese 
grensoverschrijdende samenwerking die in de loop van de tijd complexer zijn geworden 
doordat actoren een dubbele rol van zowel principals en als ook van agents zijn gaan 
spelen. In deze ontwikkeling hebben de nationale en suprantionale niveaus hun 
administrative voorwaarden en procedures opgeschroefd. Deze toegenomen 
administratie en complexiteit wordt vooral zichtbaar in de steeds uitgebreidere 
controlemechanismen. Deze toename aan controle kan worden verklaard door de 
toenemende diversificatie van het besluitvormingsproces in het kader van de Europese 
Structuurfondsen. 
 
Uiteindelijk betekent deze ontwikkeling in de grensoverschrijdende samenwerking voor 
de deelnemers aan het programma, de projectdragers en projectpartners, een 
toegenomen administratieve last, omdat ook zij de steeds complexere regels die door de 
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beherende autoriteiten en de programma-partners worden opstelt, moeten aanhouden. 
In feite zouden niet alleen concrete regels en voorwaarden, maar de hele constructie 
van het beleid voor Europese grensoverschrijdende samenwerking in zijn geheel 
simpeler gemaakt moeten worden. Dit zou kunnen gebeuren doordat of autoriteit en 
bevoegdheden weer meer gebundeld zouden moeten worden, of door het beter 
structureren van controle mechanismen binnen de programma’s. Gezien de resultaten 
van dit onderzoek lijkt de eerst genoemde oplossing onwaarschijnlijk. De tweede 
mogelijkheid zal moeilijk door te voeren zijn, maar is zeker niet onmogelijk. De 
voorwaarde hiervoor zou een nog beter samenspel van de actoren zijn en het besef dat 
het maar om een ding gaat: Het mogelijk maken van succesvolle projecten voor 
grensoverschrijdende samenwerking.  
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